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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the social psychological significance of intractability 
across groups in conflict using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. The 
permeability of group boundaries that are assumed to separate and divide is examined 
through the exploration of the groups’ dialogical relationships with each other in three 
different studies. Using an ideographic approach, a total of fifty two depth interviews 
were carried out in London and Israel, to capture meaningful perspectives of the conflict 
by those enmeshed within it. The first study set in London, explored the perceptions of 
Jewish participants with a lived experience of Israel and of Palestinian participants living 
in the UK, as to the intractability of the conflict. Results showed a diverse set of social 
representations where imagined boundaries between the groups remained closed due to 
their different historical interpretations leading to present day perceptions, yet at the same 
time the boundaries were softened by a vision of an imagined future where both groups 
talked of the sharing of their commonalities rather than differences. The second study 
was set in northern Israel, exploring how a sample of Jewish and Palestinian citizens of 
Israel, the latter group making up 20% of the population, worked together as medics. A 
contrast was found between their flourishing relationships inside the work space, 
protected by Israeli medical ethics and that outside, where inequality, with a sense of 
non-recognition by the Palestinian citizens, and a sense of threat by the Jewish citizens 
reflected the latter groups’ dialogical relationship with the Palestinian population in the 
West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The final investigation, explored how the concepts 
of semantic barriers and bridges were useful in exploring boundary permeability further 
to discuss how intractability is not necessarily a given, but a symptom of asymmetrical 
relationships in tension. As a whole, this thesis makes contributions to the study of 
conflict in Israel, to the intractability of conflict in general and to possibilities for 
dialogue.  
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1. Introduction 
‘Sometimes it’s hard if you saw a group of them together you’d be hard pressed 
to find out who was Israeli and who was Palestinian because they are so similar. 
They are both very outgoing and vibrant personalities. And you know, there is no 
reason that they shouldn’t be part of a more equal society.’  (Jewish Israeli 
participant)  
1.2. Introduction to the thesis 
This chapter sets out the geopolitical context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
order to provide a brief overview of the two groups’ positionings to acknowledge 
how they each stem from the foundations of their geopolitical and historical milieu. 
Although this discussion is not directly focussed on the social psychological 
processes that are examined in the rest of the thesis, this is necessary to familiarise 
readers with the roots of the conflict. Indeed, one key insight from social psychology 
is to acknowledge the centrality of context as key to analysing human behaviour 
(Howarth, Campbell, et al, 2013). And it is from this base that I shall begin the 
research journey. 
 I will introduce the aspirations held by both Jewish and Palestinian Israeli 
groups as they navigated their projects that were set within a web of a wider global 
infrastructure which remains integral to the continuation of the conflict. From the 
inception of the state of Israel in 1948 to the present day, the losses and gains for 
both groups are briefly summarised to set out the context from which their social 
representations have been developed. This includes the attempts by both groups to 
find a peaceful resolution leading to structural changes as well as the periodic 
violent incursions by the Israeli military and Palestinian resistance groups. My 
position as a researcher, as an outsider not having any attachment to either group, is 
discussed. Finally, I briefly describe a pilot study undertaken in Israel at the 
beginning of my empirical journey. The study was useful in both asserting the 
complexities of my positioning as well as exploring how the initial theoretical 
trajectory needed to be carefully thought through before embarking on empirical 
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work. What was learnt from that exercise has formed the base of my theoretical and 
empirical positioning regarding this thesis. 
1.2.1. Aspirations of statehood and its consequences 
Conflict has become entrenched in Israel’s development as a nation state. The 
history of Israel and Palestine is a parallel history, each with its own narratives and 
yet at the same time their histories are also intertwined. Each can be defined, both by 
the Other and by themselves, through their ideological narratives of past and future 
aspirations, which for the most part, have followed divergent paths. The 
consequences of one group’s actions of those aspirations onto the Other activates a 
response, which activates yet another, as both groups continue to be locked in a 
painful duet of mutual suffering and perceived sense of victimhood. 
1.3. Context of the conflict 
The context of the conflict is partly set 3,000 years ago when the land, now the State 
of Israel, was said to be promised to descendants of Jacob after Moses led the 
Exodus out of Egypt. Evidence for this is given in the Torah, as rabbinical 
authoritative Jewish religious teachings. Mainstream Jewish tradition looks on this 
promise as being given to all Jews and their descendants. This land was described as 
being from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates River, an area much larger than 
present day Israel which would now include the Palestinian Territories (West Bank, 
East Jerusalem and Gaza) and parts of present day Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon 
and Iraq. Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories lies to the east of the 
Mediterranean Sea, bordered to the south by Egypt, the north by Lebanon and Syria 
and the west by Jordan, between 29 and 33 degrees north of the equator. It is a small 
geographical area, 20,777 square kilometres almost identical to the size of Wales in 
the UK, and is populated by approximately eleven million people, similar to the 
population of London. Two geographical maps are shown in Figure 1, one to display 
the area as it lies in modern-day times in relation to other nations and another larger 
scale map showing the modern State of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, although 
the borders between the West Bank and Israel are geo-politically not so clearly 
defined as shown overleaf. Maps of Israel/ Palestine have often been used for 
political purposes (Wallach, 2011) to show territorial entities that will differ from 
one to another; the maps chosen reflect the geographical context rather than a 
geopolitical one.  
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Figure 1: Israel and the Palestinian Territories  
 
 
The key driver of the conflict was, and remains, the sovereign competition 
for the same area of land by two groups; one that declared the State of Israel in 1948 
and the other, the indigenous people who had lived there prior to 1948. Neither 
group to date has been successful in reaching a compromise to share this land that 
does not conflict with their own ideological aspirations and goals.  
1.3.1. The birth of a nation state: Israel: 14th May 1948 
Israel was declared a nation state following the failure of a UN partition agreement 
to find an equitable solution to the growing conflict between Jews and Arabs over 
land and immigration rights since the beginning of the century. British Mandate 
Palestine had governed the area after the division of the defeated Ottoman Empire 
between Britain, France and Arab tribes against Germany and its allies during WW1 
(1914-1918). Britain, influenced by Zionist idealism with its appeal to assist the 
Jews in returning to their biblical homeland following anti-Semitism and pogroms in 
Europe, gave permission to establish “a national home in Palestine” under the 
Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Smith, 2013) as long as the rights of the indigenous 
Arab population were upheld. At that time it was not clear that the area would 
become a Jewish hegemonic national state. It was placed under the protectorate of 
the British as defined by the League of Nations in 1922. This contradictory narrative 
sowed the seeds for later disharmony. Jewish immigration continued to rise, during 
and after WW2 (1939-1945), following the genocide of the Holocaust, when six 
million Jews, nearly half of the world’s Jewry, were killed by the German Nazi 
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regime. With this rise in the number of immigrants to Palestine, outnumbering the 
quota set by the British to appease the indigenous population, there followed a 
deterioration in the already tense relationship between the Jews, the indigenous Arab 
population (Muslim, Christian, Druze and Bedouin) and the British, leading to 
sporadic and deadly conflict and competition over the territory that both the Jews 
and the Arabs claimed as their own (Barr, 2011).   
Britain appealed to the United Nations for assistance. The United Nations 
recommended the partitioning of the land between the Jewish and the Arab 
populations with Jerusalem placed under an international protectorate. Although the 
subsequent international vote accepted the resolution (33 votes to 13, with 10 
abstentions) the Arab contingencies were among those who voted against. A request 
to the International Court of Justice to revoke the vote failed, leaving the plan to 
proceed formally towards partition the following year when the terms of the British 
Mandate of Palestine was due to expire. Although Britain accepted the result of the 
vote, it refused to enforce it, stating it was unacceptable to both sides (Barr, 2011). 
As Britain formally left Palestine on 14
th
 May 1948, Israel declared itself a State. 
The Palestinians mark this day as the ‘Nakba’ translated as the ‘catastrophe’.    
1.3.2. Losses and gains: Aliyah and refugees  
The immediate gain for Israel was the freedom for Jewish immigrants from Western 
Europe after the devastating effects of the Holocaust to live in a safe and secure self-
determined State. Jews from the Arab Middle East who faced persecution and 
discrimination during and after the conflict, also immigrated to Israel, ending 
hundreds of years of co-existence under Muslim rule (Harkabi, 1977). The 
population of Jewish Israelis almost doubled from 1948 to 1951, from 650,000 to 
over a million. Immigration has been constant from many parts of the world since 
1948. All Jews, as defined by law can immigrate under the Law of Return (Aliyah), 
with their children and grandchildren; this was extended in 1970 to include non-
Jewish spouses, as well as non-Jewish spouses of Jewish children and grandchildren 
(www.jewishagency.org). Benefits to immigrants include free travel to Israel, 
Hebrew tuition, health insurance and financial benefits to help in the well-organised 
absorption process. The largest influx came from the former USSR after the end of 
the Cold War with a total of 1.2 million immigrants. Of the 14.2 million global 
Jewry, 43% now reside in Israel, (2015, Jewish Virtual Library) with the remainder 
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mostly living in the USA, but with sizeable communities in S America and the EU, 
including the UK and Australia. There are few remaining elsewhere.   
     At the time of the birth of the State of Israel in 1948 there were losses for 
the Palestinian population. Over 80% of the Palestinian Arab population, 727,000 
from a previous population of 860,000 were forced to leave, either through fear of 
death from the Jewish military or left temporarily, planning to return once peace had 
returned to the region (Smith, 2013, p.203). Refugees travelled to surrounding Arab 
countries of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Most still remain sixty years later in 
refugee camps run by UNWRA (United Nations Works and Reliefs Agency for 
Palestine refugees) as numbers have since swollen to five million (www.unwra.org). 
Refugees were not fully accepted by their host country (although the situation in 
Jordan differs as before 1967 it controlled the West Bank), nor were they allowed to 
return home to the villages of their birth due to Israeli enacted laws of residency. 
The UN resolution 194 in December 1948 (www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194) 
to allow Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and villages or to be 
compensated, has had little effect on any change of strategy.   
Of the 133,000 Arab Palestinians who survived the hostilities in 1948 by 
remaining in the new nation state, or for some returning under local agreements, 
their status led to the entitlement of Israeli citizenship. The Israeli Arabs, as they 
became known, were mostly made of Muslim (Sunni) Arabs but also included 
minorities from Christian, Bedouin and Druze communities. Their numbers have 
since increased to 1.7 million, 20.7% of the Israeli population (Israel Central Bureau 
of Statistics 2011). Their stigmatisation of being the minority and unwanted out 
group has been well documented (Rouhana, 2007, Kalhidi 2010) which has 
illustrated the early segregation amidst different administrative and civil conditions 
to the Jewish Israeli citizens (Smooha, 1993, Pappé, 2011,Yaftel, 2000).    
1.3.3. Occupation and settlements   
Gains of further expansion of territory by Israel were made less than twenty years 
following 1948. In a pre-emptive strike in 1967 Israel captured the Sinai, including 
the Suez Canal, resulting in Syrian and Jordan forces joining an Arab front against 
Israel. Within six days Israel defeated the Arab front and captured the Golan Heights 
from Syria and the West Bank / East Jerusalem from Jordan and Gaza from Egypt. 
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Inhabitants from the Golan Heights were of Syrian descent, mostly from the Druze 
community and do not form part of my research. 
 The West Bank, with a land area of 2,180 square miles shares its north, 
south and west borders, as defined by the ‘green line’ border of 1948, with Israel 
and its eastern border with Jordan divided by the River Jordan. Although the West 
Bank was not annexed by Israel, it remained under Israeli military control as an 
occupying force; its legal standing as occupied territory is disputed by Israel but not 
by the international community, including the US, nor the United Nations 
(http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136).  
Israelis commonly name the area of the West Bank as ‘Judea and Samaria’, 
from biblical interpretations. From the beginning, land was acquired for the building 
of Israeli settlements that further exacerbated tensions between the two conflicting 
groups. Although such developments were and are considered to be illegal by the 
international community and the United Nations (UN Resolution 465), its basis 
developed from the Allon Plan (Smith, 2013, p.303) that implied annexation over 
many parts of the occupied territories was planned for many years. The number of 
settlements built from 1967 has increased steadily and is now home to 400,000 
Jewish Israelis. 
East Jerusalem, geographically part of the West Bank was annexed by Israel 
in 1967.   It is here in the ancient walled ‘old city’ that is depicted as the holy centre 
of the three monolithic religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Suburbs continue 
from this site eastwards towards the West Bank, and westwards towards Israel. UN 
Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) remains one of seven, which condemns the 
annexation, and Israel’s Jerusalem Law which declares the city to be Israel’s 
‘complete and united’ capital. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have a status 
of ‘permanent residency’ and are allowed the right to live and work in Israel with 
access to benefits such as health and social security but with strict limitations as to 
the right to keep this status. Israeli settlement building has continued apace in East 
Jerusalem, now almost equal to those of those in the West Bank with between 
300,000 to 375,000 Israeli Jewish settlers now outnumbering the 250,000 East 
Jerusalemites.    
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The building of the security fence (Israeli naming) or the separation wall 
(Palestinian naming) begun in 2002, threads its way around the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, built to deter Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel (Barak-Erez 
2006). Its route has been criticised for its presence over the 1967 ‘green line’, the 
mark of which is discussed as forming the official national border between Israel 
and an intended independent Palestinian state.  
1.3.4. A time for peace: the Oslo Accords.  
During the early 1990s international efforts to bring a peaceful resolution between 
the two groups culminated in the Oslo Accords in 1995, with both sides declaring 
their intention to end the conflict. Israel accepted the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) as representing the Palestinian people and would negotiate with 
them. In return, the PLO overturned their previous charter of 1968 ‘that had denied 
Israel’s existence and called for her overthrow by armed struggle, were now 
inoperative and no longer valid’ (Smith, 2013, p.439). A new political body the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) replaced the PLO as part of these negotiations. Various 
stages were set that would work towards final status negotiations, that included 
discussions on state borders, Palestinian self-determination and Jewish Israeli 
settlement blocs. The final negotiations remain in 2015, a distant vision. All 
subsequent peace negotiations have either ended in failure or impasse.  
 One of the outcomes of the Oslo accords was the division of the West Bank 
into three areas - Area A, B and C, set up as initial stages in the on-going negotiation 
process. Area A, is under civil and security control by the PA and includes eight 
Palestinian cities and surrounding areas. In 2013 this area comprised about 18% of 
the West Bank (B‘Tselem, 2013). The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) can enter the area 
to follow military  raids in search for suspected militants, yet Israeli citizens are 
officially forbidden to enter. Area B remains under Palestinian civil control and joint 
Israeli – Palestinian security control and includes over 400 Palestinian villages and 
their lands with no Jewish Israeli settlements. This area comprises about 22% of the 
West Bank (B’Tselem, 2013). Area C remains under full Israeli civil and security 
control, comprising approximately 63% of the West Bank including settlements, 
outposts and declared state land (B’Tselem, 2013). This area includes annexed East 
Jerusalem and the Palestinian area of the Dead Sea.  
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From the outset, the regional and international agencies have been central to 
peace negotiations, which in the post Oslo years included the planning of a separate 
Palestinian state alongside a secure Israeli state (the two state solution). Subsequent 
to the ongoing failure of the Oslo Accords, all negotiations have been ultimately 
unsuccessful: Camp David 2000, Roadmap 2002, Annapolis 2007, and more 
recently Kerry 2012/14 (USA) when no peace deal came close to being accepted by 
either side leading to a break down in further talks.  Their ultimate failure in finding 
a workable solution to end the conflict reflects the lack of common ground not only 
by the protagonists, but by the political and ideological interests of other nation 
states and agencies that have become part of the on-going conflict. This includes the 
Jewish communities outside Israel, most notable as strong lobby groups to the US 
government bodies, the Quartet (US, EU Russia, UN) recruited in 2000 to act as 
mediators in peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, the wider Arab 
community, the United Nations and other international legal bodies.  
 1.3.5. Disengagement from Gaza  
Gaza, a small piece of land in south west Israel adjoining Egypt on is southern 
borders, was occupied during the 1967 offensive against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. 
Disengagement by Israel in 2005 led to the Palestinian Authority (PA) taking control 
of Gaza but with restrictions of movement and goods between Gaza and Israel 
placing a humanitarian challenge on the territory, resulting in further growing 
political resistance. Parliamentary Palestinian elections held in 2006 for the first 
time, as part of a strategy for building statehood institutions, was fought between the 
two main rival political parties in the Palestinian Territories, Hamas and Fatah. 
Hamas won popular support in Gaza helping the party to an overall election win and 
unexpected victory. Hamas, listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel, backed a 
more military role in its resistance to Israel with a strong Islamic ethos, at odds with 
the more moderate Fatah party. Fatah had formally renounced violence against Israel 
within a context of on-going peace negotiations. The Quartet made any future 
financial assistance to the PA dependent on nonviolent strategy, recognition of the 
state of Israel, plus accepting all previous peace agreements. Hamas rejected these 
terms at that time leading to the suspension of some international assistance with 
economic sanctions imposed by Israel. By 2007 tensions between Hamas and Fatah 
erupted into hostilities leaving over two hundred Palestinians dead in this intragroup 
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violent struggle. Hamas finally took control of Gaza. Various agreements between 
the two Palestinian political parties led to a unity government agreement in April 
2014 which remains in place at the time of writing.   
As the humanitarian situation worsened, with an economic blockade and 
Israeli control of goods and peoples entering and exiting Gaza, a loss of essential 
public services ensued, for example, reduced access to electricity and petrol 
supplies. Gaza militancy was strengthened in response, heightening already 
ideological tensions. Between 2004 and 2014 Qassam rockets, from Palestinian 
militant groups, were fired into southern Israel killing 44 Israelis, injuring many 
more and spreading fear amongst the inhabitants living in areas close to the Gaza / 
Israeli border where the majority of the rockets fell. Israel has attacked Gaza three 
times in response. The first attack, Operation Cast Lead in 2008 / 2009, followed by 
a further incursion, Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012, left nearly four thousand 
Gazans dead, the majority of whom were civilians including women and children. 
Many more were injured and the area’s infrastructure destroyed. The number of 
Israeli defence forces killed amounted to less than a hundred. A further offensive 
during six weeks in the summer of 2014 (Operation Protective Edge) resulted in a 
further 2,000 Gazan deaths, comprising 1,500 civilians including 539 children. An 
estimated 10,000 were injured, including 3,374 children of whom 1,000 were left 
permanently disabled (www.amnesty.org). 66 Israeli IDF soldiers were killed and 
six Israeli civilians, including one child. 30% of the Gazan population were 
displaced during the conflict. The differences between the numbers killed and 
injured across the groups demonstrate the disparity of power and military capability 
between the two conflicting groups.  
1.3.6. Palestinian Resistance  
The first Intifada (1987-1993) represented the Palestinian uprising as a protest and 
resistance to Israel’s continued hegemony and occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza. Actions included boycotts of institutions of the Israeli civil administration, 
economic boycotts, general strikes, the use of graffiti and the widespread use of 
throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and Israeli 
infrastructure within the Palestinian Territories. In response, the Israeli military were 
involved in a strategy to control the rising violence.  During these six years, the IDF 
killed between 1,162 and 1,204 Palestinians who in turn killed 100 Israeli citizens 
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and 60 soldiers. In the first two years of the uprising, between 23,600 and 29,900 
Palestinian children, injured by IDF beatings, needed medical treatment;  it was 
estimated that 7% of all Palestinians under the age of 18 required medical attention 
because of injuries from shootings, beatings and teargas. According to Amnesty 
International approximately 80% of the Palestinians killed during the first month 
were in demonstrations where Israeli security services lives were not in danger 
("Israel and the Occupied Territories: Broken Lives – A Year of Intifada". Amnesty 
International (Retrieved November 4, 2012).  Not only was there intergroup 
violence, but intra-Palestinian violence became prominent following the recruitment 
of Israeli collaborators which carried a death sentence for those found guilty, 822 of 
whom were killed during this time. 
The Second Intifada uprising, or more commonly known as the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada from 2000-2005 that followed the failure of the Camp David peace 
negotiations, was an even more violent period for both groups. Three thousand 
Palestinians were killed by the IDF, many thousands more injured and the 
destruction of areas of infrastructure, with the use of strict curfews and control of 
movement through checkpoints are well documented (www.peacenow.org). 
Palestinian tactics included mass protests, general strikes, intensified suicide 
bombings and mortar attacks in Israel by Palestinian militant groups waging 
guerrilla warfare accounting for 566 Israeli deaths. Most of the deaths were civilians 
as attacks often took place in Israeli cities in restaurants and markets or on public 
transport systems. 
1.3.7.  Economic development in a global world   
In terms of development and economic success, Israel has established itself, in just 
over sixty five years, as a technically advanced market economy, ranked 19
th
 out of 
187 nations in 2013 on the UN’s Human Development Index (www.hdr.undp.org). 
Not abundant in natural resources, Israel has been particularly successful in the High 
Tech and Telecommunications field, backed by a strong venture capital industry. 
Israel was invited to join the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) in 2010 and has signed Free Trade Agreements with the USA and the 
EU.    
22 
 
The Palestinians have not had the same opportunities to thrive economically due to the 
restrictions as imposed by the conflict. As can be illustrated in the table below, the 
differences between the two groups are wide in terms of economic development which 
has affected employment, education and life expectancy. The Israeli people enjoy a 
much higher standard of living with better access to these life realities. As Palestine is 
not a state, it is not included in the global market economy nor has access to full UN 
status. However since the Oslo Accords of 1993 agreed by both groups with 
international support, the first stage of a peace process to fulfil the ‘right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination’ (Knesset 1993) where each side recognised 
the legitimate right of the other, opportunities arose for the Palestinian people under 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) to gain more economic independence. Although the 
agreements for self-determination never materialised there was a window of economic 
opportunity. But aid is still a factor in the economy, relying heavily on aid ($1.1 billion 
in 2010, www.unicef.org) as well as receiving support by UNRWA (United Relief and 
Works Agency) on behalf of the Palestinian refugees with an annual budget of $600 
million (www.unwra.org). The economic status of both Israel and the Palestinian 
territories are shown below: 
     Table 1: Economic status of Israel and the Palestinian Territories    
 Israel  Palestinian 
Territories 
 OECD 2013  
(www.oecd.org) 
2013 
(www.unicef .org) 
Life expectancy   81.7 yrs 73 yrs (2012) 
Gross Domestic Product GDP $258.1. (billion) $8.1.  (billion)  
(2011) 
Per capita (GDP)   $32,000 $1,609 
% yr average growth  3.8%     2.2% 
Long term unemployed 0.8%     23.4% 
Tertiary education   46.4%  25.8% (EU data) 
eacea.ac.europea.eu  
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The total population for both groups now stands at approximately 11.25 million and 
divided as shown below 
Table 2. Population in Israel and the Palestinian Territories    
 Israel West Bank   East 
Jerusalem  
Gaza Total 
Israeli Jews 6 million 310,000     
Jewish 
settlers 
195,000 
Jewish settlers 
0 6.5 
million 
Palestinian  1.1 Million 
Israeli Arabs 
1.75 million            
(30% refugee 
status) 
260,000 1.6 million         
(75% 
refugee 
status) 
4.8 
million 
Total  7.2 million 2 million 455,000 1.6 million 11.25 
million 
CIA Statistics 2011: population statistics to nearest 50,000 
 
1.4. Researcher positioning   
To give such an introduction to the context of the geopolitical area is a challenging 
task, not only because the amount of literature is vast, but also because of the 
difficulty of bringing together this literature in a way that is representative of both 
groups’ past and future aspirations. There is only so much an account as described 
here could attempt to do. First, I would like to establish what the thesis is not about 
and second I should like to address my positioning as a social psychologist. I have 
no blood tie with either a Jewish or Arab ancestry. I am a white British woman, 
well-travelled and with a life-long interest in conflict resolution. I am perceived as 
an outsider in Israel and so connected to international perspectives on the conflict. 
My thesis is not intended to support any political perspective as my focus is social 
psychological and not political (although, as we shall see, we cannot divorce the 
two).  Neither will it represent, nor make any claims to represent, any religious or 
cultural positioning that might be perceived as being related to the conflict. I am 
committed to understanding why groups remain locked in forms of protracted 
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conflict and the social psychological processes through which these conflicts can 
become so enduring.    
1.5. Pilot study in Israel  
Before embarking on the first empirical study, I carried out a small pilot study in the 
summer of 2012 in Israel. This was intended to explore collective identity amongst 
Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. The research objective was to examine social 
representations surrounding processes of identity by meeting and interviewing a 
small sample to discuss the meaning of their identity, whether on a national, cultural 
or social level. The pilot research was carried out in four different cities in order to 
gain a feel for the different levels of segregation and coexistence in Israel: 
Jerusalem, Haifa, Nazareth and Tel Aviv as follows: 
Table 3: Informal pilot study interviews in Israel, June 2012 
 Jewish 
Israeli 
Palestinian  
Israeli 
Jerusalem x  3  
Haifa  x 3 
Nazareth  x 1 
Tel Aviv x  1   
     
Recruiting Palestinian Israelis to talk on an individual and informal basis 
proved difficult. I needed introductions through third parties before people were 
willing to be interviewed, with many refusals along the way. The Jewish Israelis on 
the other hand, were much easier to recruit and clearly not so hesitant. Interviews 
were held informally, and some were recorded when permission was given, as 
follows: Jewish Israeli x 3 and Palestinian Israeli x 2. Of those who were unwilling 
to have the interviews recorded, notes were taken. The interview sample was 
recruited through contacts I had from UK universities and institutions, so it is not a 
random or representative sample. They were representatives of their communities 
who spoke fluent English and were educated to degree standard and above. Their 
input was invaluable in providing a background and baseline from which to explore 
further an array of self-described identities as perceived by the two groups of people.  
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The interviews lasted approximately one hour, with questions surrounding 
themes of personal identity in relation to their nation, culture, and ethnic group. My 
questioning was explorative in nature to allow the participants to feel free to offer 
their narratives in their own words. It was during these first interviews that I began 
to understand about the complex relationship between identity as a construct of 
one’s cultural and national heritage and how that impinged on their personal 
identity. The significance of the term ‘identity’ became a source of 
misinterpretation, mistrust and anxiety. Identity seemed to hold a different 
connotation than is assumed in the UK. By introducing the term in a direct manner 
there appeared to be an assumption that I was discussing either something very 
private or that I had a prior view on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and so there was 
a hesitancy to broach this subject. For the Palestinian Israelis there appeared to be a 
genuine fear that I may discuss details of their identity with third-party institutions 
that might lead to a compromising situation with their Israeli civic identity. I had 
naïvely assumed that by directly asking about their identity I would receive an array 
of answers that would be useful in my research journey. I learned that asking direct 
questions such as these was not a strategy that proved useful. I was also advised that 
I would have to build up trust within this community before discussing such topics. 
As a researcher from the United Kingdom I became increasingly aware that the path 
to recruiting local residents in Israel needed much sensitivity, patience and, most 
significantly, time. Keen to establish trust and genuine reflections, I dropped using 
the term ‘identity’ and instead asked more open questions that allowed them to tell 
me in their own words their representations of how their life was shaped in and by 
their surrounding communities. This strategy proved much more fruitful for the 
future empirical studies.  
1.5.1. Results: Negotiating identities within an ideological minefield 
It soon became apparent that any conversation surrounding aspects of identity was 
masked by themes of ideology. Not only did I find segregation at the physical level, 
it was clear that segregation was also abundant in the reflective level, with each 
subject defining their own existence according to this physical and ideological 
segregation. The boundaries between them, as discussed in these few interviews, 
were tight and seemingly unbreakable on some level, yet the crossing of these 
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boundaries at an institutional level, in this instance, in the workplace and across 
NGO’s was also evident.  
The role of ideology was made clear during this pilot study. The Jewish 
Israelis had embraced Zionism (to a greater or lesser degree in different 
communities and political outlook), with political developments leading from that 
since its inception. This included the search for a national identity that reflected 
these aims. Whilst for the Palestinian Israelis it was their identity, both as a 
positioning tool with an Israeli society, and a link to the past that was more 
prominent. It appears that constructing a national identity for both communities was 
reliant on not only the relationship between them, but in relationship to their own 
past and perceived future. This exemplifies how theoretical constructs such as social 
identity theory (Tajfel 1981) has been useful in demonstrating the significance of 
belonging to a community where ingroups and outgroups form part of the political 
landscape, but does not adequately encompass a cultural context that implies 
ideological frameworks that holds possibilities of change in the future. Ideologies 
are discursive (Billig, 1991) and so together with shared social explanations, 
ideologies are thus framed in language, which can be investigated through discursive 
interaction, and so categorising entities from a cognitive perspective would appear 
redundant. Van Dijk (2006) argued that ideology can be understood as a system of 
ideas within and between social groups. Social representations and shared axiomatic 
beliefs about a particular ideology have the power to organise socially shared 
entities. It is these shared social beliefs that will be explored in the next empirical 
stages to build a picture that encompasses how different social groups come to 
readily accept intractable conflict and/or explore ways where commonality might 
exist. Or indeed, to explore a plethora of social representations that combines both 
common and conflictual entities within the same representational field. The pilot 
fieldwork highlighted the particularities of the local context, which was not evident 
beforehand.  Most centrally, the pilot revealed that what was of most relevance 
would be an exploration of how these representations of ideology within a political 
context of asymmetry play a part in sustaining conflict and a barrier to commonality 
across the boundaries. Hence the pilot study was a valuable experience in terms of 
refining my conceptual framework, deepening my understanding of the local context 
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and the psychological politics that became evident, as well as highlighting the 
importance of trust and rapport in how I designed the next stages of the research.  
1.6. Conclusion  
This introductory chapter has briefly surveyed the geopolitical context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The intention of this inclusion was to familiarise the reader of 
the thesis with the basis of their intergroup conflict. Both groups have followed 
parallel trajectories and yet remain intertwined with one another as their 
contradictory national aspirations remain to be reconciled. I have also outlined my 
positioning as a researcher, stating that I represent neither group and as a social 
psychologist my interest lies in protracted conflict and what may lie at intergroup 
imagined boundaries.  
 I also described a pilot study that was undertaken in my first year of the 
research journey when I had visited Israel in preparation for the empirical focus of 
the thesis. The experience enabled me to examine the lived reality of the conflict 
first hand and in so doing, I came to understand that some theoretical assumptions 
were not completely compatible with the social reality I found in the field. The 
lessons learned were valuable in developing the theoretical and empirical base to the 
thesis. The following chapter will survey the research literature surrounding the 
social psychology of imagined group boundaries and how the idea of intractability in 
this context has been discussed.    
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2. Social psychology of embedded conflict  
‘What are we doing in the villages that were abandoned … Are we ready to 
protect these villages so that the residents may return, or do we want to     
erase all evidence that a village ever existed at the site?’                                     
(Golda Meir, to Land of Israel Workers Party, 11
th
 May 1948).  
‘We also got on the trucks. The glow of emeralds spoke to us through the night 
of our olive tree. The barking of dogs at a fleeting moon over the church  
tower. But we weren’t afraid. Because our childhood didn’t come with us.       
A song was enough for us: We’ll return in a little while, to our house.’                  
(Mahmoud Darwish, 1995: ‘Innocent Villagers 1948’ (Quoted from Sand, 
2012, p.59).    
2.1. Introduction 
These two quotes represent the beginnings of the potency of the intractability in 
1948 that remains unresolved today, over 70 years later. This chapter surveys the 
social psychological literature surrounding intractable conflict that serves as the 
foundation to both the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. It is 
divided into two parts. The first part discusses the ways in which intractable conflict 
has been examined in relation to intergroup relations. This includes the themes of 
ideology, nationalism and history that serve to power a group’s ability to become a 
collective entity amongst other collective entities. The role of contact with the Other 
has been a significant contribution to conflict research, particularly in terms of 
finding ways of decreasing intergroup prejudice. This will be discussed in relation to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As we move towards thinking of empirical ways of 
exploring conflict, the role of narratives is introduced. What people talk about and 
say about intergroup conflict in relation to their lived experiences is integral to 
conflict research. The way in which we interpret their narratives is as important. 
And so the second part of this chapter discusses the ways in which this can be 
explored theoretically. A subjective description from a participant, although helpful, 
will not by itself develop our understanding of the processes of intergroup conflict. 
The processes of intergroup phenomena need to be explored within a theoretical 
framework that offers ways of developing these ideas. My chosen framework, the 
theory of social representations, provides this opportunity. The dialogical nature of 
social representations, in particular, allows us to explore how each group is 
dependent on the other for the continued conflicting relationship; and further, the 
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theory suggests a thematic means by which to explore empirical findings within this 
dialogical framework. 
2.2 Conflict as embedded unresolved discord   
Conflict has been defined as, ‘situations in which two or more parties perceive that 
their goals and/or interests are in direct contradiction with one another and decide to 
act on the basis of this perception’ (Bar-Tal, 2011, p.1). Conflict is endemic 
throughout all human interactions, from personal conflict across personal 
relationships to intergroup conflict across communities and to nation states within a 
global setting. Without conflict, any underlying tensions between individuals and 
groups would remain unresolved and so unchallenged, paving the way for 
exploitation, an oppressed status quo and stagnant relationships (Kriesberg, 2012). 
Conflict can thus be understood as a necessary aspect of social change, particularly 
structural change, as disputes are resolved and new relationships can begin to 
flourish. Galtung (1969) discussed how the search for a discourse of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, stressed a potential, rather than an empirical, reality in its 
formulation -highlighting the possibility of on-going, multiple and possibly 
contradictory interpretations of the construction of the conflict. With this in mind I 
discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an embedded state of unresolved territorial 
differences over an extensive period of time, interrupted by periods of intense 
warfare, violent and non-violent resistance, and failed peace negotiations.    
2.2.1  Intergroup relations: defining the role of the group 
Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) argued that the meaning of intergroup relations can 
be misleading as it tends to focus on small and closed groups rather than societal and 
more open based groups.  They suggested that the lack of definition of these key 
concepts can cause confusion within the discipline. Sherif and Sherif (1969) 
embarked on an exploration of group behaviour defining it as ‘the actions of 
individuals belonging to one group when they interact, collectively or individually, 
with another group or its members in terms of their group membership’ (p.223). The 
authors further suggested that a functional relationship between groups denotes how 
the action of one group has an impact on the other, regardless of any direct 
interaction between them. This broad definition allows a variety of interpretations 
when discussing intergroup membership and behaviour. It does not assume there is 
an emotional involvement with a particular social category, as suggested by Tajfel 
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and Turner (1979), nor does it assume any integral group cohesion as a requirement 
(Lott and Lott 1965) for membership and/or identification to a particular group. The 
study of intergroup relations tends to be focussed on intergroup conflict (Taylor and 
Moghaddam, 1994). How this is measured or interpreted is somewhat dependent on 
the theoretical approach taken by the researcher. For example, from the beginnings 
of the discipline of social psychology there has been a tendency for an individualist 
approach to the examination of intergroup relations and that has influenced later 
work (Farr, 1996).  
 The level of analysis, from that of the individual to that of group behaviour, has 
become significant when discussing social psychological explorations. Lewin, 
(1936) influenced by Gestalt theories of the time, scrutinised the connection between 
theory and practice and that of an individualist and social approach, in an attempt to 
integrate both the whole and the different elements that make up the whole. His 
propositions relate to Doise’s (1982) assertion that the individual is not the only 
level of analysis and that a wider exploration is considered significant when 
exploring a given social reality. Doise proposed four levels of analysis within the 
field in order to capture these differing aspects of reality. There was no claim that 
reality is clearly structured within these levels, but being aware of them is useful for 
a thorough analysis.  The first level (I), is the intrapersonal level, that of the 
individual; and the ways in which perceptions are organised within a social context, 
remains at the base of much of social psychology work. The second level (II), the 
inter-personal and situational level, follows the dynamics of any given individual in 
any given situation although it is the individuals who remain as the focus of 
analysis. The third level (III), the positional level, explores the effects of differences 
in social positions between different categories that are represented within group 
behaviour. And finally, the fourth level (IV), the ideological level, represents how 
society develops its own systems of representations, beliefs, values and norms. It is 
through groups’ ideologies which serve to validate and maintain a particular social 
order that is reflected at this level. This thesis focuses on this ideological level IV, 
although it will also include instances of I, II and III through interaction with 
individuals to gain access to thinking about and exploring group behaviour.  
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2.2.2. Intergroup conflict: intractability across group boundaries  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often labelled ‘intractable’, (Kriesberg, 1998, Bar-
Tal, 2011, Bar-Tal, 2013), as a state of enduring rivalries (Maoz and McCauley, 
2005) and as protracted (Azar, 1990).   The pioneering work of sociologist Louis 
Kriesberg in the 1990’s suggested conflicts such as these can continue unabated for 
lengthy periods, that they involves a cycle of violence between the two protractors 
with neither party willing to compromise as the economic and psychological 
investment becomes more significant as the parties remain locked in opposition. 
Kriesberg (1998) suggested further that some parties in an intractable situation may 
feel they are unable to extricate themselves because they may perceive that the cost 
of retracting is greater than the cost of remaining in the situation and so a stalemate 
position can prolong the conflict ad infinitum. However, it was the work of Bar-Tal 
(e.g., 2011, 2013) who took the concept further and framed it within a more 
psychological arena through the exploration of conflict supporting narratives and 
adding a further three processes to the ones described by Kriesberg (1998).  First, 
the conflict is deemed to be total, that is, it is deemed existential to the goals and 
needs of each group; second, a zero-sum perspective takes root where compromise 
and concessions play no part in the drive for the adherence to the original goals that 
beset the conflict; and finally, the conflict remains central to the lives when the 
media, political leadership and other social institutions play a significant role.  So it 
becomes indispensable to individuals and collective life as ’routinisation contributes 
to the intractability of the conflict because participants do not feel an urgency to 
terminate it’ (Bar-Tal 2014, p.46).  One of the consequences of the role of 
intractability in the conflict is its dead end road approach, where social and political 
change remains out of view. Galtung (1972) used the language of compatibility 
versus incompatibility in a study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting 
intractability would ensue unless a resolving tactic was included in the discussion. 
Galtung argued that for any change to take place one would have to take into 
account the challenges of the two parties and their international allies, locked within 
a never ending tragedy of territorial sharing. This analysis of intractability focusses 
on the more societal level (Doise, 1982); an approach that includes the social 
psychology of those directly involved may open the opportunity to discuss further 
intergroup relationships, and what may lie at their imagined boundaries.     
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Mazur (2014) argued that intractable conflict stems from normal mundane 
processes that underlie many intergroup dynamics which is often ignored by conflict 
psychologists. He suggested that Sherif (1962) took this approach over fifty years 
ago when arguing for a relative normality of both psychological and societal 
processes underlying intergroup conflict rather than pathologising it. And so, rather 
than taking a pessimistic view of the inevitability of violence Mazur (2014) 
suggested that, ‘normalising the cause of mass violence asserts their intelligibility, 
and precisely in this intelligibility lies the hope of finding ways to deescalate, end 
and even prevent such cruelty’ (p.277).  Mazur proposed that intractable conflict 
(Bar-Tal, 2014) can become a categorised entity rather than a process of 
intractability, where the spectrum of conflict across different characteristics can be 
explored further, as not all conflicts exhibits the mechanisms associated with 
intractability. And further, by suggesting mechanisms that become ingrained within 
the individual and collective consciousness, change may appear to be difficult if not 
impossible, leading to a state of ‘freezing’ that can act as an inhibitor against future 
change.   
 Social psychology can play a significant role in conflict studies (Hewstone and 
Greenland, 2000) where the processes of prejudice, discrimination and identity 
remain at the forefront.  Realistic group conflict theory (Jackson, 1993) suggests that 
intergroup conflict can be interpreted through a prism of rational, but incompatible, 
goals and of competition for resources which would continue until a winner is 
declared and subordinate goals reached. The Robber’s Cave experiments (Sherif, 
1967) explored this model by examining how groups of boys reacted to different 
group conditions at a summer camp in America. Different games and activities led 
to different outcomes of in/out group behaviour, with hostile behaviour resulting 
from a competitive context and a more cooperative outcome through sharing a 
mutual responsibility.  
     Kriesberg (2012) suggested that the world is increasingly integrated, but that 
those involved within a conflict zone are not represented in neatly bounded entities; 
they remain in open systems of porously bounded groupings, and it is this very 
fluidity that allows the possibility of transformation.  The groups do not have to 
remain as fixed entities locked into conflict, as they are a part of a larger whole and 
in a larger context there might be the possibilities of exploring mutually beneficial 
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avenues of cooperation. Allies can be found throughout the world, and that allows 
possibilities of change in intergroup relations. Importantly, Kriesberg (2012) 
concluded that rather than perceiving a particular conflict as one entity, it can be 
viewed as containing a number of conflicts that are both internal and external to it, 
which leads to the possibility of a redefinition where an alternative perspective can 
be explored.   
2.3.   The formation of group conflict: connections to ideology 
The concept of ideology is pertinent to the discussion on conflict as it acts as a base 
from which to explore its antecedents, leading to social representations of intergroup 
hostility. The roots of war and conflict often lie deeply within the social fabric 
(Guilmartin, 1988), with ideological factors coming to the fore when religious and 
cultural differences between opposing parties are played out within a context of 
wider difficulties. Guilmartin also argued that Western analysis of conflict tends to 
be based on an anomalous and recent past, rather than on an examination of conflict 
from the longer past leading to the possibility of illuminating drivers that can remain 
hidden when viewed closer to the present.  
Van Dijk (2006) argued that knowledge is defined by shared beliefs within a 
knowledge community; knowledge is not justified true belief but accepted 
consensual belief resulting in knowledge as both relative and intersubjective within 
the community.  This does not imply that all knowledge is ideology (Jovlechovitch, 
2007) but that knowledge and belief systems are central to ideological claims and to 
the manner of communication of those claims. Ideology can thus be understood as a 
system of ideas (Van Dijk, 2006) whose defining entities include its, norms, values, 
aims, actions and resources and significantly, its relations to other groups. Crucial to 
group development is a shared set of beliefs about the core fundamental conditions 
under which it exists and will exist in the future. Different types of ideologies are 
defined by: 
the kinds of groups that have an ideology such as social movements, political 
parties, professions or churches among others. These are not any kind of 
socially shared beliefs such as sociocultural knowledge or attitudes but more 
fundamentally axiomatic as they control and other socially shared beliefs.  
(Van Dijk, 2006, p.115) 
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Belief systems can act as motivational processes.  They are ways in which 
individuals need to understand their worlds and maintain significant interpersonal 
and group relationships, and result in the acquisition of worldviews that can become 
self-justifying (Jost, Ledgerwood & Hardin, 2008). Such belief systems can lead to 
the acquisition of ideas that may appear as false to an outside group, but are believed 
to be an indispensable medium to legitimate a dominant political power for an 
ingroup (Eagleton, 1991). The establishment structures of dominant political power 
can thus be sustained, often through symbolic forms that bring together individuals 
in a particular collective identity, irrespective of differences that might lie between 
them (Thompson, 1990).   
Nationalism, as an ideological construct, serves to illustrate how social 
groups evolve to reflect the national aspirations, which reflect their historical 
experience as they observe the present and plan the future. ‘We acquire memory in 
society’ (Halbwachs, 1952 / 1992, p.38,) where memory is perceived as a natural 
order of happenings, accepted by society according to the social order of the day. 
Nations create their own histories and interpret them in society as interpretive 
communities (Billig, 1995) that continually narrate their past, present and future to 
reproduce themselves within a globalised world. These interpretations can be 
developed to bolster a collective national ethos regardless of that outcome for others 
(Nietzche, 1980). Nationalism reflects the ‘us’ and, based on ‘we’ and ‘them’, 
outsiders remain foreigners, ‘who do not belong to the state in which we are’ 
(Kristeva, 1991, p. 96).  The world is represented by nations and its peoples, bound 
together in some form of semantic unity, presented as a vision that appears a natural 
and metaphysical entity (Andersen, 2006, Billig, 1995). The expansion of pan Arab 
nationalism between World War 1 and World War 2, a mix of Arab history and 
culture with nationalistic tendencies, found in literary works such as the ‘Wathbat 
al-Arab’ translated as the ‘The rise of the Arabs to power’ (Abu-Ghazaleh, 1972), 
reflected a growing pride for both Christians and Muslims alike, under the banner of 
Islam, to recognise Palestinian Arab status as a possible unfolding world power. 
The history of Jewish nationalism goes back much further. The seeds of 
Zionism began almost two hundred years before the nation state which it envisaged, 
became a reality. Nationalist ideology is evident in the discussions and debates 
surrounding the planning of a proposed state in Israel. This planning included the 
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prominence of a homogeneous ethnic group, whose attributes and beliefs were 
developed to follow a dominant political agenda, resulting in the desire for the 
creation of a homeland (Sand, 2012). The seeds of conflict can be traced back to a 
time many years before the creation of the state of Israel, reflecting how discussion 
within a dilemmatic quality, as suggested by Billig (1991), remained central to the 
themes and representations of ideology.  
 This role of ideology will be explored in this thesis in order to show how 
these themes have played a part in the ontology of group development within a 
specific ideological context, and the social institutions it has created. One of the 
basic tenets of social psychology rests on the relationship between the individual and 
group membership, and how groups, once formed, develop as they do in different 
social and cultural contexts.      
2.3.1.  Ideology in development: ethos of conflict and resistance     
Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) described how representations of Jewish beliefs about 
their own community reflect a siege mentality that has been circulating for so long 
that it has become part of a knowledge system that permeates from individual 
identity to cultural acknowledgement. From biblical times, the Sons of Israel felt in 
some way ‘different’ from others in a hostile world (Mirsky, 1982), and that led to 
the belief for some that Israel would remain a State which other nations would 
forever intend to hurt. The ethos of conflict is a term given to reflect a worldview, a 
specific societal complex belief system that forms an ideological umbrella (Bar Tal 
2000) that can guide behaviours within a context of intractable conflict. The themes 
that underlie this ethos, outlined by Bar Tal (2013), include the justness of one’s 
goals, the delegitimisation of the opponent, the significance of perceiving oneself as 
the victim while having a strong positive self- image, the importance of security, the 
value of patriotism and the on-going societal questions concerning unity and peace. 
These themes become 
a part of  the epistemic base for hegemonic social consciousness of the 
society and for the future direction. It gives meaning and predictability to 
societal life and provides a coherent view of social institutions – the 
structure, history, visions, concerns and courses of actions. (Bar-Tal, 2013, 
p.175).     
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Moreover Bar-Tal (2014) confirmed that the ethos is so well established within 
Israeli society and has become so embedded through socialisation and education, 
public and political debate, rituals and ceremonies, that it has become a driving force 
within society. Its functions can serve both as an engine that fuels conflict and also 
act as an empowerment for alleviating the suffering of the psychological burden 
(Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal and Hobfoll, 2014).  The higher the ethos measured 
on the ethos of conflict scale (Bar- Tal, 2012), the higher the effect of distress 
management and the more the barriers to ending the conflict became apparent. Jost 
and Hunyady (2005) extended the concept by suggesting that the ethos can come to 
justify a conservative ideology, and so the conflict can be maintained,  as one group 
portrays their positioning over and above the other in terms of legitimacy and 
humaneness.   
By constructing a model of the ethos, Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, et al, (2014) 
suggested that ideology, ‘constitutes a coherent worldview often prevalent in one’s 
culture which can provide a sense of meaning in the face of individual and collective 
threats’ (p. 70). The ethos of conflict has been measured across both Israeli Jewish 
citizens and Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem 
(Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit et al, 2014). These measures centred on items that 
represented narratives of the justness of goals, peace, security, victimisation and 
delegitimisation of the opponent. Results showed similarity of an ethos of conflict 
belief system across both groups, of varying degrees of weakness/strength. The 
same measures were subsequently used as a basis for exploring a number of further 
factors such as psychological distress, hatred towards the other group, fear, 
perceptions of personal / national threat and exposure to violence. Several 
differences with the Palestinian group were highlighted showing higher levels of 
exposure to violence, psychological distress, perceptions of personal threat and fear 
and hatred towards the conflicting group. When examining the interaction between 
these findings and the ethos of conflict, it was suggested that adhering to a conflict 
of ethos belief system could, to some extent, limit the more harmful effects of 
intergroup conflict. This is useful research that demonstrates that the ethos of 
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conflict is one that demonstrates an ideological construct to a collective belief 
system that requires further exploration.
1
      
Ideological development in the Palestinian community in the West Bank, 
Gaza and East Jerusalem has tended to be constructed through an ethos of resistance 
to Israeli control and hegemony (Moughrabu, 1992). This position has developed by 
and through the polarisation of the two main political movements, that of Fatah, 
with origins in the secular PLO, and that of Hamas, with ideological leanings 
towards political Islam (Hilal, 2010). Within this vacuum, an ideology of 
constructing a united Palestinian ethos as a collective identity system has taken 
precedence, constructed around traditional values, memories of a homeland stolen 
by stealth with a longing for a return for all those who are connected to this territory, 
wherever they reside in the present day (Khalidi, 1997).  Within this discourse, there 
persists a pragmatic unity where Palestinians of divergent and diverse ideological 
persuasions, backgrounds and geographical places, have come together to work in 
solidarity against the occupation and to find an independent voice and to develop 
ideological narrative for an independent future, (Moughrabu, 1992). 
2.3.2. Boundary formation 
The in/out group identification has been at the base of many conceptual explorations 
into conflict and describes boundaries between groups as entities that can be 
discussed at the psychological and/or cultural level. When groups are in direct 
competition, leading to conflict, the groups’ aims will necessarily include an in/out 
group motivation to achieve those aims. Brewer (1997), for example, used this 
concept as a scheme for intergroup accentuation, concluding that first, all members 
of a group are perceived as more similar to the self than to members of another 
group; second, an intergroup favouritism principle suggests that trust and positive 
evaluations towards the ingroup, but not towards the outgroup, are prevalent; and 
third, the social competition principle rests on the outgroup as being competitive 
rather than cooperative. In times of many seemingly ‘entrenched’ conflicts a ‘them’ 
                                               
1
 A critique of this form of quantitative research, measuring relationships between 
different aspects of psychological functioning, would include the questioning of using a 
minimal of prepared statements to reflect something that may have multiple connotations 
and perceptions and may not be measuring what it purports to do. However, they can 
serve as a base for discussing further how different contexts and experiences can produce 
differing outcomes as a base for further exploration. 
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and ‘us’ dichotomy prevails, leading to the formation of collective identities that can 
be developed as a reaction to the opponent in conflict, or from previous historical 
conflicts with other groups. A binary in/out group distinction can suggest that 
boundaries tend towards the impermeable and become an unintended self-fulfilling 
prophecy. However, as I hope to portray in the thesis, even in these entrenched 
contexts, there is still room to challenge ‘us’ and ‘them’ binaries and to find 
possibilities for different forms of intergroup relations and for other collective and 
social identities to emerge. Indeed, a major aspect of Tajfel’s work on identity 
(1981) was to look at the ways in which identities change in context, particularly in 
response to different forms of prejudice (Billig, 2002). 
  Brewer (2001) alluded to this role of context by suggesting that outgroup 
discrimination is not necessarily an automatic function of ingroup solidarity, and 
that discrimination and hostility towards the outgroup requires other conditions, both 
structural and motivational that may not be inherent in any process of social group 
formation. Thus, although imagined boundaries recreate the  ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
dichotomy, other groups may find the possibility of creating a more permeable 
boundary that allows some sharing of a collective reality.  For example, peace 
groups, and those who recognise the Other on some meaningful level, can reflect a 
situation that represent an alternative positioning where solidarity with others has 
the propensity to develop a reality that holds the possibility of change and 
transformation.  And not all social groups are defined by an in/out group reality, as 
different groups take on different roles at different times in different contexts. All 
identities are social, as the individual develops and relates to others in forming any 
relationship with groups of other individuals (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 
2012), whether it be through positioning oneself (Harré and Moghaddam, 2003), 
representing a role in life and taking a political stand (Gergen, 2007), or exploring 
the essence of part of the self that is expressed with others on a similar platform. The 
naming of an identity construct, whether it be social, collective, national, religious, 
or ethnic, can denote a descriptive component, but it is the dialectical relationship 
between and across individuals that form the group, and how they react to the 
perceptions of other groups, that is of interest.   
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Gergen (2000) further suggested there is no winning factor in victory, as in 
doing so the Other is eradicated. So, waging a war against a constructed Other can 
become futile and self-destructive as fundamentally we are all the Other. Social 
change becomes possible when a relational process is deemed to have a positive 
potential, rather than any attempt to change hearts, minds and political values, as 
suggested here:  
We may move toward practices that replace conflict of competing moralities 
with collaborative processes in which new orders of the good may continue 
to be generated. The alternative is more talk about us versus them, or truth 
versus their falsehood.  (Gergen,2007, p. 377).  
 It is the permeability of the boundaries across both groups that I would like 
to explore in order to shed light on what may lie between them, rather than on any 
impermeable boundaries that can form the basis of intractability.  
An area that remains central to conflict research is that of the contact 
hypothesis. This approach suggests that by spending meaningful time together 
individuals representing groups in conflict can possibly go beyond their differences 
to explore commonality, leading to the softening or even crossing the imagined 
boundaries between them. 
2.4. Contact across imagined boundaries    
Allport (1954) pioneered contact research, exploring how prejudice between majority and 
minority groups in America might be lessened, by establishing more positive attitudes 
and prejudice reduction, in order to improve relationships across these ethnic divides.  Its 
core propositions have been well established in numerous empirical studies (Brown & 
Hewstone, 2005, Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux, 2005, Minard, 1956).  Pettigrew and 
Troop (2006) carried out a meta-analysis of 515 studies involving more than 250,000 
participants across many nationalities and reported a significant reduction in prejudice 
following contact initiatives. This was even more pronounced when contact situations 
were made through group friendships under a cloak of equality. There were however, 
marked differences between the perceptions of minority and majority groups, suggesting 
that these different groups might construe interaction differently (Swart, Hewstone and 
Christ, et al, 2011).  For example, those from minority and disadvantaged groups were 
found to anticipate more prejudice against them than from those members of the majority 
group (Sellers and Shelton, 2003). The challenge for intergroup contact work would be to 
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find a path where intervention can produce a more equal result across opposing groups. 
Work of this nature has been prominent within the context of a long-standing antagonism 
between ethnic groups. In Northern Ireland, for example, following the 1998 Good 
Friday peace agreement, intergroup contact programmes began to flourish to tackle 
sectarian divisions. What was found to be helpful, following the work of Dovidio, 
Gaertner & Saguy (2009), was using  a theoretical base of common identities, leading to 
optimum  mediation processes that would provide a more positive and long-term 
outcome (Hughes, Campbell and Jenkins, (2011). One of the most successful 
programmes occurred within mixed environments where friendships were given the 
opportunity to develop, either through community groups or through identification with 
the neighbourhood. For example, a Protestant woman discussing her relationship with a 
Catholic woman in her neighbourhood described how norms of avoidance were present 
during the early stages of contact, which receded as time developed: 
‘When you get comfortable with people after you know them for a while, you 
can start to talk about politics and religion and stuff. It wouldn’t be 
appropriate to talk about religious beliefs or how you think about things when 
you meet someone for the first time.’ (p.981)  
Contact studies following the Allport (1954) model have been integral to 
research in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They were first initiated following a 1980 
survey assessing attitudes of Jewish Israeli youth towards Palestinian Israelis that 
uncovered not only extensive prejudiced views towards them, but also showed 
support for the curbing of  freedom, and as ultra-right wing parties came to power  
representations of possible expulsion began to circulate (Rabinowitz, 2001). The 
establishment of a national coexistence movement was set up in 1986 to organise 
encounter type programmes, mostly at the grassroots level. However, changes in the 
political climate led to a decrease in funding in the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
right-wing parties became prominent. However, with the international negotiation of 
the Oslo Accords of 1993, heralding a change in the political climate and the 
possibility of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, more projects began to be 
developed.   
Suileman (2004) ran encounter groups for many years between Jewish and 
Palestinian Israeli students at Haifa University and found that any attempt to play 
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down political components wasn’t successful in eliminating prejudice during group 
work. He concluded that these sessions can reflect: 
a ‘microcosm’ of life outside the group where salient intergroup processes can 
dominate as, ‘a basic contradiction exists between the structure of the 
encounter group and its potentiality to advance intergroup contents and 
processes’ (Suileman, 2004, p.325).  
The tendency of Palestinian Israeli participants to focus on political elements 
with Jewish Israeli students preferring to discuss neutral and non-political issues has 
been a common theme (Katz and Kahanov, 1990; Maoz, 2011). The asymmetry of 
power of between the two groups has often been ignored with Jewish Israeli students 
holding on to a more powerful position, allowing discrimination towards the 
Palestinian Israeli group members. At the same time, the Palestinian Israeli students 
felt obliged to hold a greater degree of involvement in topics that surrounded 
intergroup conflict. Interestingly, it was found that an interpretation of such 
encounters might signify that Palestinian Israelis might lead to a softening of the 
boundaries and even possibilities of crossing them. However, in reality, it was found 
that they had often led to a pride in the richness of their Palestinian language and 
traditions, and paradoxically to a possible increase in intergroup tensions (Suileman, 
2004) due to the dominance of the Jewish Israelis wanting to focus on the 
interpersonal level, whilst avoiding confrontation about the conflict.  
The contact hypothesis has been a central core of the encounter group 
concept within Israel and will be discussed further in Chapter 5, when the findings 
pertaining to contact between medical professionals in Israel are discussed.  
The first half of this chapter has introduced how intergroup conflict has been 
discussed in the research literature in terms of intergroup relations, ideology, history 
and nationalism. The role of intergroup contact has been influential when exploring 
ways of softening imagined boundaries, especially in Israel, where the idea of 
encounter groups has been developed. The role of narrative is considered to be 
significant in conflict research, as we ask those entrenched within a conflict to tell us 
about it from their perspective.  
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 2.5. Narratives as a medium of communication    
Narratives can be defined as a primary form of communication that can be used to 
make sense of social realities and behaviour by organising human memory and 
experience (Mink, 1987, p185). Narratives can be viewed as representing events, 
whether real or fictitious, and captured to denote temporality (Prince, 1980) 
interpreted according to an individual’s or a group’s positioning. Narratives are 
constructed, not as a record of what happened but as an interpretation of what has 
happened, and interpretation continues as other events come into play. Narratives 
can be perceived as historical works, as literary creations, where explanations of 
their reality differ depending on the motivations for their telling, the ways in which 
they are presented (White, 1978), and the voice behind their telling (Roth, 1988).  
The exploration of narratives thus holds the ability, ‘to transcend the simplistic 
account of structure versus agency that plagues the social sciences’ (Hammack and 
Pilecki, 2014).   
   Historical narratives can be viewed as extensions of actual events, but the 
telling of them cannot re-produce these events; rather they hold the capacity to 
create new structures of these events (Carr, 2008). Master narratives are integral to 
any particular culture at any particular time, with assumptions of their content as a 
natural phenomenon, rather than being understood as cultural and social artefacts of 
communication. Narratives might be felt to be resistant to change while others are 
open to transformation, but nevertheless, master narratives can form the bedrock of a 
culture’s very existence, and can be inherited, reproduced and /or resisted and 
rejected.  
The narrative approach has been useful within social psychology to explore 
acts of meaning (Bruner, 1990) through description of an interpreted lived time that 
is deemed relevant and significant to a particular individual and/or group, where 
‘narrative imitates life and life imitates narrative’ (Bruner, 2004, p. 692) and thus, 
‘we become the autobiographical narratives by which we tell about our lives’ (p. 
694). The individual continually constructs stories and so externalises dialectic with 
a shared developing group construction.  This approach, like others where 
qualitative data becomes the source of exploration, rejects methods that emphasise a 
casual trajectory that relies on essentialist and individualist approaches 
(Monteagudo, 2011). Narratives, by the nature of their telling, can embrace 
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complexity as a forum for discussion and development rather than being objective 
analysis. Individuals’ narratives can be explored from within their own, ‘meaningful 
and heterogeneous life worlds’ (Wagoner, 2012, p.6.1), where meaning is 
contextualised in everyday communication. Narratives reflect how thought is 
organised in language that serves to connect a sense of personal meaning with 
collective solidarity, in order to legitimise collective beliefs and actions (Hammack, 
2011b). 
2.5.1. Narratives as mediators across ideological group boundaries 
The research work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the discipline of social 
psychology in Israel has tended to follow a quantitative Cartesian methodology 
through survey research or experimental work (Halperin, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2007). 
Qualitative work, to reflect personal trajectories, has tended to be positioned outside 
the discipline, often as journalistic pieces. For example, Shehadeh (2012), a 
Palestinian lawyer, has described his personal life under occupation. An account of 
two Jewish Israeli women described their lives with Palestinian Israeli communities 
(Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 2005) and recorded personal accounts of Jewish 
Israelis concerning their lives and their relationships with the Other in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories has been discussed (Neslen, 2006). Kanaaneh & Nusair (2010) 
presented essays and narratives of Palestinian Israeli women describing their 
positioning as a minority in a land of their forbears. These works have provided a 
detailed, rich and informative description of the landscape. But a more theoretical 
perspective is also required to understand the social psychological processes 
involved in intergroup conflict. Hammack (2011b) pioneered the way for a 
qualitative and cultural approach to this subject by asking a sample of Israeli and 
Palestinian youth about their perspectives on how they were affected by the conflict. 
Through a thematic analysis it was found they engaged with a tragic master 
narrative that centred on dispossession and loss, supported by contemporary social 
structures of an on-going intractable conflict through Israeli military occupation. In 
contrast, narratives of Jewish Israeli students were based on perceived, rather than 
realistic threats from the Palestinian population, centred on the representations of the 
Holocaust as an eternal threat from all those around them (Sonnenschein, Bekerman 
and Horencysyk, 2010). Hammack (2011b) based his research within a context of 
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transformative voice, (Sampson, 1993) that gave the opportunity for young people to 
talk about the tragedies and triumphs surrounding the murky contexts of war.  
Hammack (2011a) argued that narratives offer an, ‘integrative prism through 
which to interpret lives in their social and political complexity’ (p. 312), and so for 
those enmeshed in conflict, narratives can provide a means of exploring how groups 
develop through a transformative processes of stasis and change, unveiling social 
structures that reflect inequality and injustice. Hammack and Pilecki (2012) 
reflected on the political significance of narratives, suggesting, ‘narrative provides 
an ideal paradigmatic lens through which to consider thought, feeling and action in a 
political context’ (p.76). Hence narrative research often highlights the connections 
between ‘everyday’ narratives from ordinary people and dominant narratives in 
political debate, in a similar way to the connections between consensual and reified  
universes in social representations theory (Jovchelovitch, 2012).     
2.6   Interpretation of conflict through social representation theory  
Social representation theory (SRT) has provided both the theoretical and pragmatic 
framework to the thesis. SRT encompasses ways in which we can begin to describe 
our sociocultural worlds within a particular context in order to portray and 
understand these worlds. SRT is simultaneously an empirical and a theoretical 
concept (Moscovici, 2001) and neither simply a cognitive nor a social process, but 
simultaneously both, where a social object is not simply reproduced in the mind of 
an individual, but is embedded within a social construction of knowledge systems 
within the public sphere (Moscovici, 2000).  Thus SRT represents both a process 
and a medium of social knowledge that provides a means to theorise the ontology of 
human knowledge systems.  
The theory was devised and developed through the exploration of how a 
scientific theory, in this case, psychoanalysis, was diffused through different 
communication systems applicable to different social groups in French society in the 
1950’s (Moscovici, 1961/2008). Moscovici wanted to explore a natural way of 
thinking, rather than a form of logical or syllogistic thinking. Instead, common sense 
thinking can capture shared knowledge across social groups. It is this thinking that 
judges, evaluates, criticises, and makes proposals for action. Common sense 
thinking uses knowledge and beliefs generated by established cultural and historical 
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experiences, making inferences from them; thus social representations can be 
described as modalities of knowledge that functions to shape activities, 
communications and creating social realities. Human thinking is full of 
contradictions and is influenced by the thoughts of others as well as by historical and 
cultural ideas transmitted over generations Moscovici, 1961/2008). By using this 
approach it is possible to explore complex social phenomena, for example, HIV 
(Marková, 2008), human rights, (Doise, 2013), disability (Farr and Marková, 1995), 
race (Howarth, 2009) and other socially significant issues. 
Marková (2003) argued that the concepts of Ego, Alter and Object are key to SRT 
in order to describe and define interacting components whether they represent an 
individual, a group or even a nation, and where the relationships between them become 
the focus of attention rather than the object under scrutiny. By adding a temporal 
dimension to this interactional model (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999), social representations 
over time can be explored as a way of exploring the present. Central to SRT is the 
dialectical relationship between the self and Other, where Other’s worlds, ‘become part 
of our own consciousness and all aspects of culture ﬁll our own life and orientate our 
existence towards others’ (Marková, 2003, p. 256). Social representations are thus 
embedded within a given culture, are co-constructed by its members within a given 
context and are not only understood by them, but act as catalysts for both reflection and 
action. The relationship remains dialogical as each subject under investigation cannot be 
separated from the relationship with the Other, as they each act on the positioning of the 
Other.  
Social representations can provide the structure of knowledge systems within a 
community that can be perceived as two-way processes of constructing reality between 
top-down and bottom-up institutions (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995).  Social objects 
can be created that motivate behaviour through its diverse streams of communication 
(Moscovici, 1961/2008). By constituting knowledge systems, social representations 
reflect common sense through language embedded within a particular community, 
‘Representation, communication and language are the only path to knowledge that we 
have’ (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 99), and so act as containers of the complexities and 
contradictions of social life. Representations can work to continually maintain social 
structures and institutions through different communication systems, or to reflect 
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resistance to the status quo. Hence representations can be hegemonic and support 
systems of ideology, or be emancipatory and provoke systems of change (Howarth, 
2014).  
  SRT provides the opportunity to explore how different knowledge systems are 
produced, defended, contested and transformed in everyday encounters and social spaces. 
At the same time some representations, once constructed, can reflect certain patterns of 
thinking and action, which collectively holds the capacity to create new constructions of 
a social object (Wagner and Elejarrieta, 1996). By following these relationships we can 
reflect the fundamentally dynamic and collective on-going re-productions of meaning 
and social relations in daily life. Through a dialectical understanding of the connections 
between the psychological and the political embedded in our collective and competing 
histories, analysis of representations can explore how they are simultaneously reworked, 
resisted and transformed to discover new ways of mastering constantly changing 
realities. Social representations can be described as, 
Systems for the interpretation of the world and of events, they are in this way 
the essential vectors of opinions, judgements and beliefs, directed at ensuring 
the relevance and regularity of our bonds and of our conduct as a community. 
(Moscovici and Vignaux, 2000, p.157). 
Social representations can further be imagined as receptacles of knowledge 
containing heterogeneities and complexities, ambivalences and scepticisms, 
contradictions and tensions, building on common cultural assumptions that can be 
grouped into ‘big themes’, deep-seated cultural belief systems that we think and talk 
from, rather than about (Marková, 2008).  By exploring these knowledge systems within 
zones of conflict it is possible to explore how representations are produced, defended 
and/or contested in everyday encounters within social spaces, intergroup relationships 
and positioning.  This leads to presenting possibilities of how the psychological is 
framed, but not completely determined by the historical and the material, and so allows 
space for possibility, for participation and change (Howarth, Andreouli and Kessi, 2015).   
The intermediary between the individual and the collective is explained through 
different communication systems, which Gaskell and Bauer (1999) describe as being a 
significant contribution to SRT.  First, the contents of communication through the 
processes of anchoring and objectification give rise to both the filtering of new 
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information to existing structures and how they might be so defined. Within 
representations of conflict, this is of interest. There might be resistance to new 
suggestions of resolving conflict at a point in time when it appears to be intractable, but it 
might have the capacity for change and transformation over a longer period of time, as 
representations shift reflecting the changing external world. Second, the types of 
communications suggested by Moscovici (1961/2008), that of propaganda, propagation 
and diffusion, play a significant role within conflict research. There will be little 
transformation of social representations of conflict if societal communication follows a 
line of propaganda, allowing no alternative viewpoints to be taken or communicated by 
modes of propagation and diffusion. Third, the consequences of a particular 
communication that give rise to stereotyping, opinions and attitudes, will rely on both the 
content and process of communication. It is this point that can be explored empirically to 
examine social representations of conflict, to see how they might be resistant to change 
or open to change and look for possible avenues of explanation as to why this may or not 
be so. On-going transformation through multi interactions, developed through available 
communication structures, exemplifies the changing nature of understanding and 
positioning on a given topic as it embeds itself into particular life worlds. 
Communication structures are modified to suit a particular medium between the giver or 
source of the information and the receiver, set within a particular cultural background. 
Thus hegemonic representations reflect a more authoritarian stance than emancipated 
representation, where alternative viewpoints are respected with polemic representations 
confined to arguments and discussion of disputes. Duveen (2008) notes that differing 
forms of social-psychological groups might be related to particular forms of 
communication.  
2.6.1. The role of themata and social representations    
This significance of creating new systems of knowledge shared across a community is 
useful if prior social representations that have motivated events of the past can be 
identified in order to understand a present social reality. This understanding is 
particularly significant in conflict research if both groups reach a point where negotiation 
of their relationship is based on aspirations of a more peaceful future. Identifying 
foundational themes of groups in conflict that have developed and flourish in the present 
foundational field would be a useful exercise to follow. The figurative, or semantic 
kernel, identified thematically using the concept of themata (Moscovici and Vignaux, 
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2000), acts as a foundational base where actions and events are mediated through 
language and linguistic traces as ideas and representations. Themata are created through 
the community, filtered through social discourse and preserved in some way, the 
meaning of which extends beyond any particular individual. Themata can be said to lie at 
the centre of some form of consciousness, where both knowledge and experience 
constitute a particular foundation; this differs from other thematic constructions such as 
themes, due to the centrality and significance of the kernel related to the construct under 
observation. Themes can be described as recurrent topics (Marková, 2000) used as 
steeping stones to explore larger themes and clusters, whilst themata are posited by the 
researcher to underlie the discourse and reflect unquestioned forms of social knowledge. 
Central to the concept of themata is the significance of antinomies reflecting tensions 
between and across oppositions, for example, what might be considered moral versus 
immoral (Marková, 2000). Themata both generate and activate the formation of social 
representations reflecting antinomies that stand in opposition and yet at the same time 
take into account a continuum of polarising positions between each thema. For example, 
when discussing social representations of democracy, themata such as justice/ injustice, 
free/ not free, would be salient, (Marková,1998). This would differ further according to 
local historical and political trajectories, and so democracy in one nation state or group  
will mean something quite different in another. The construct of themata has also been  
described as a conceptual coat hangers that give form to socially generated ways of 
understanding phenomenon (Moscovici 1993),  latent drivers of action, (Smith and Joffe. 
2013), central notions of knowledge, (Moscovoci and Vignaux, 1994), and focal points 
from which nascent representations emerge and keep re-emerging within a particular 
prevailing social context, (Marková, 2000).        
The interplay between base structures that remains conceptually central to 
existing sets of social representations and the addition of relating this to antinomies is 
pertinent to my research. For example, the antinomies of conflict and consensus can 
begin a discussion based on a line of positions along a continuum rather than reflecting 
conflict as one particular entity and peace as another within an ‘either/ or’ polarising 
relationship. By interpreting data from conversations with those who directly experience 
representations of conflict across their personal and professional lives, underlying 
themata can be identified that that play a central role within these contexts. Marková 
(2000) suggested that all social thinking is embedded with their respective antinomies, 
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between which lies mutual independence and tension of thinking in oppositional ways as 
part of any given culture. In times of crisis, taxonomies that remain close to the issue can 
become a subject for debate, dialogue and negotiation. Maloney, Gamble, et al (2015), 
for example, in a study exploring themata and blood donation in Australia, explored the 
paradox that the majority of Australians agree that blood donation is a worthwhile 
exercise yet just 3% of those eligible actually donate. This tension was examined as the 
researchers identified the meaningful themata as ‘self’ and ‘other’. Social representations 
of the ‘self’ were manifested in needles, pain and anxiety, whilst those of ‘other’ 
manifested in saving lives. This contradiction along a heterogeneous trajectory was 
dependent on the salience of the social context, activating different components within it. 
Liu (2006) suggested that the notion of themata is ‘eternally resided in human thought. 
The antithetical dyad of yin / yang for instance is taken for granted in explaining the 
dynamics of the universe in Chinese common thinking.’ (Liu, 2006, p.253). Both yin/ 
yang are perceived as being mutually interdependent, yet also in a state of continual flux 
and change, reflecting how a dialectical unity of opposites generates and transforms 
social representations. The inclusion of themata as a theoretical concept became more 
significant to my thesis as the research developed and progressed through the three 
empirical studies.  
 The theory of social representations underpins both the theoretical and empirical 
journey of the thesis. The next section observes how narratives can be combined with a 
SRT approach, to develop the significance of social representations within a community.     
2.6.2. Narratives as social representations  
Jovchelovitch (2012) discussed how narratives can be viewed as being part of the 
architecture of social representations, told and retold as experiences that can tell many 
versions of stories that become embedded within cultural life. These stories can shape the 
internal organisation of social representations as they develop within the public spheres 
and survive, or not, dependant on which narratives the communities choose to remember 
and which to put aside. Jovchelovitch borrows from Bartlett (1923) who defined 
narrative, not as straight stories from one individual, but as containing a slice of social 
and historical life that produces and re-produces mythologies and traditional practices; 
collective memories that remain embedded within institutionalised rituals. Jovchelovitch 
(2012) explored how specific narratives in the Brazilian public sphere were reinvented 
within a mythological framework to build intergroup solidarity for the purpose of 
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maintaining social cohesion. Lázló (2008) also discussed the link between the concepts 
of narratives and social representations by suggesting that retrieving narratives which 
portraying the process of storytelling is central to the making of social representations 
and social life. Storytellers are intersubjectively bound to a community of other 
storytellers that shares sets of values and representations of a specific vision of their 
world (Liu and Lázló, 2007) where complexity and contradictions generate states of 
cognitive polyphasia in the representational field.  
 The theoretical construct of a master narrative has been applied to denote a 
dominant discourse that represents cultural belief systems. For example, Bar-Tal (2014) 
suggested that the key to social representations of intractable conflict is a collective 
master narrative that, ‘focuses on its entirety ... provides a complete and meaningful 
picture of the conflict’ (p. 5.4). And further, that these master narratives characterise a 
group in a particular way and can regulate collective thinking through the significance of 
moral codes that remain implicit within them. Lázló (1997) used the term ‘frozen 
historical stories’ where the culture communicates to its members the possible set of 
story skeletons’ (p. 70) whilst Wertsch (2008) referred to a ‘cognitive narrative template’ 
that emerged from different interpretations of history and that became conductors of a 
collective communication affecting individual and group public discourse and dialogue. 
Hammack (2010) described how Palestinian youth engaged in a tragic master narrative 
around loss and dispossession that was entrenched in the cultural interpretation of 
intractable conflict led by Israeli military occupation. These examples demonstrate the 
close conceptual relationship between narratives, master narratives and social 
representations in areas of conflict that I would like to explore. 
 Ideology was discussed earlier in this chapter to denote the belief systems that 
different groups develop over time and which become part of their evolving knowledge 
system. The role of ideology, as discussed through a SRT approach, is explored as to 
how each might complement the other when discussing intractable conflict.  
2.6.3. Ideology as representations of societal markers   
SRT offers a way of exploring and understanding how these different systems are 
represented within society and how society can accept, deny and continue to develop 
these systems/ideologies within the evolving public sphere. One of the functions of SRT 
lies in its relationship with ideological systems that abound in political, cultural and 
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social life (Jovchelovitch 2001). Social representations become part of the social fabric of 
a shared reality where historical myths and beliefs are continually re-worked, re-
evaluated and communicated as present day reality. Corbetta, Cavezza and Roccato, 
(2009) considered the differences between ideologies and social representations by 
asking, ‘why are ideologies no longer able to render political conflict intelligible, 
whereas social representations can?’(Corbetta, Cavezza and Roccato, 2009, p.639). Thus, 
social representations can be seen as ideological tools that can provide a critique of social 
and cultural relationships where inequality and stigma can be explored (Howarth 2009); 
furthermore, they can act as an intermediary between the individual and all other 
individuals to make sense of their worlds as a reflective tool, as a shared understanding 
and as a motivator for social action and social change. 
It is suggested that ideology follows a more reified universe, a development 
incorporated by political and intellectual elites that defends its orthodoxy and so makes it 
prone to inflexibility. Social representations on the other hand, are developed within a 
consensual universe that shapes them in such a manner that they are understood by those 
involved. Ideologies become directly part of an institutional network, while social 
representations, although indirectly related to institutions, remain free from this 
relationship:  
We need to turn to the role of social representations and the ideological 
construction of social reality, for we cannot present a comprehensive 
understanding of social reality without the recognition of the political … we 
need to put the theory of social representations into an ideological framework. 
(Howarth, 2006, p.78). 
Both the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups might consider the Other as 
holding biased perceptions and thus holding false views of a given reality. However 
the anchoring of core processes of developing social representations into classifying 
social objects on a position based on consensus: 
It’s impossible to have a general unbiased system any more than there exists a 
primary meaning for any particular object. The biases that are often described 
do not express, as they say, a social or cognitive deficit or limitation on the part 
of the individual but a normal difference in perspective between heterogeneous 
individuals or groups within a society. (Moscovici, 2000, p.48). 
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  Whether these groups are localised in the Middle East, as here, or related to the 
wider global community is pertinent to the thesis.   
2.7. Conclusion  
During this chapter I have examined the research literature that relates to intractable 
conflict and in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The text was loosely 
divided into two parts with the first discussing how conflict and intergroup 
boundaries have been contextualised in social psychology and the second, the 
theoretical approach that I propose to follow throughout the thesis. The Israeli-
Palestinian context is an interesting example of an intractable conflict which has its 
roots starting many years before the state of Israel was founded in 1948, when two 
nascent nations made claims to the same territory. The winner and the loser 
represent an unresolved status, unable to find a compromise that is acceptable to 
both groups. Themes of history, nationalism and ideology have all played a part in 
the research literature to account for intergroup tensions and on-going conflict. The 
role of interpersonal contact within a context of improving relations across groups, 
was discussed; with mixed results, as the structural asymmetry evident in Israel has 
tended to seep into the situations. The in group and out group dichotomy has been 
central to the work with conflicting groups suggesting impermeable imagined group 
boundaries. I argued that alternatives can be discussed through framing the conflict 
from a different perspective, using the theory of social representations as my 
empirical and theoretical framework. By gaining common sense knowledge from 
those embedded within the conflict, through their narratives, it becomes possible to 
explore how group boundaries might be softened, or even crossed, depending on the 
context of the research enquiry. The concept of themata was noted for its promising 
approach in exploring antinomies that serve to contextualise the perspectival 
foundations both within and across the groups. The dialogical relationship across 
group boundaries remains central to this thesis and will be explored during each of 
the three empirical studies 
The main focus of the thesis concerns the exploration of imagined group 
boundaries that result in the intractable conflict. I propose to examine these 
boundaries across three empirical studies. The first study explores how Jewish 
Israelis and Palestinians living in London think about the conflict from afar, as they 
reflect on their perceptions of their own positioning and that of the Other.  From this 
53 
 
baseline, the second study explores how Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics 
navigate their working and social relationships with each other in Israel. The third 
study explores imagined boundaries between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians further 
by examining the semantic barriers and bridges that serve to harden and soften, or 
even cross these boundaries. The next chapter gives a detailed account of the 
rationale for choosing to explore these empirical contexts and the ways in which the 
explorations were carried out. 
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3. Empirical focus: research strategy and methodology    
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of my research is to explore social representations of consensus and conflict 
across two groups embedded in protracted conflict. In particular I am interested in 
exploring their group boundaries that both separate and bind within an inescapable 
dialogical relationship. This chapter reports on my research journey, the chosen 
methodology and the theoretical base behind  it.  Each of the three empirical studies 
that form my thesis is discussed in terms of its strategy for following a particular 
course, the sample chosen and the framework for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation.       
 3.2. Theoretical positioning underpinning research strategy  
To research such a complex topic as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict I wanted to feel 
confident that the theoretical approach underpinning my research strategy could 
reflect this complexity as far as possible. My research was exploratory in nature, 
starting from the premise that the memories, perceptions and experiences of those 
who have lived within the conflict could provide important insights for a social 
psychology of conflict. In particular, the research participants could reveal how they 
saw both their group and the other group. Would I find a mirror image where each 
thought about and discussed the Other in similar terms? Or would their worlds and 
representations of each other be completely different? What might be found on the 
edges of their group boundaries?  Could there be any connections or similarities that 
demanded further exploration? These questions guided me towards finding a 
research strategy and methodology that allowed an opportunity to think about these 
issues in their complexity and help me to keep an open mind for further strategies 
that might arise throughout my PhD journey.  
 The discipline of social psychology is one that allows an exploration of 
intergroup imagined boundaries as a starting point in an unknown representational 
field. The positioning of the individual as a representative of a particular community 
is central to this exploration.   I was not directly interested in developing a political 
discourse, nor an international relations analysis, nor the part played by national and 
international media, even though they remain integral to the on-going study of the 
conflict.  I was more interested in what the people who were directly affected by the 
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conflict had to say about it, how their common sense reflections were paramount to 
their understanding of both themselves as a group entity and that of the Other. I 
wanted each individual to tell me about his or her experiences, in his or her own 
words, without agreeing or disagreeing with any preformed statement  suggested by 
a third party (such as a researcher).   
A Cartesian paradigm approach appeared to be unsuitable for three reasons. 
First, the philosophical foundation of such an approach within the discipline is based 
on propositions surrounding the significance of casual mechanisms to explain 
behaviour. A rigid adherence to a cause-effect theoretical base can lead to a 
discussion about the laws of universality from a particular Western cultural base. 
The resulting implication of 'what causes what', can lead to a certain reductionism, 
that is, the tendency to reduce matter to the smallest units possible (Harré and 
Moghaddam, 2003). Second, by following a Cartesian framework, the search for 
categories in which events and processes could be placed (Harré and Secord, 1972) 
can lead to the institutionalising of an established order which in turn, can become a 
constructed  reality that might differ from alternative perceptions of that same social 
reality. And third, the Cartesian trajectory is centred on the individual in a culture 
where individualism has become culturally embedded (Farr, 1996). This can ignore 
the individual’s collaboration with his or her construction of social reality with the 
many facets of differing interpretations of the world. To follow a truly social 
psychology I needed to look beyond the individual (Moscovici, 2000). 
Mead (1934) took up the discarded reins of Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie 
written as a ten volume treatise towards the end of the 19
th
 century as an alternative 
branch of psychology, where the exploration of language, religion, magic, myth and 
customs was thought to be more fruitful than a Cartesian approach to the study of 
human behaviour (Farr 1996).  Mead proposed that the self emerges from social 
interaction, ‘by assuming the role of the other with regard to ourselves, we become 
an object to ourselves  … the nature of consciousness in humans is an awareness of 
self in relation to others, thus consciousness is inherently social’ (Farr, p.67).  The 
seeds of dialogism were sown by Mead when discussing the relationships between 
others, through the significance of meaning processes: 
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Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation between the gesture of a 
given organism and the subsequent behaviour of the organism by that gesture. 
If that gesture does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or 
resultant) behaviour of the given organism, then it has meaning (Mead, 1934, 
p.1063).     
The acceptance of the Other in the meaning-making process reflects a 
significant move away from the Cartesian philosophy. Farr (1996) suggested 
Marková’s (1982) approach to the divergence of philosophical approaches from a 
Cartesian to a Hegelian one, by positioning them as distinct paradigms, was a 
fruitful one. It is this latter approach that I have followed. In particular, the two 
Hegelian themes in his analysis of human consciousness, which are relevant to my 
research, are  significant. First, the ‘importance of recognition for human beings, and 
secondly, the importance of activity and creativity in the acquisition of knowledge’ 
(Marková, 1982, p.132).  To recognise and be recognised by the Other is perceived 
as fundamental to human activity.  This was developed further by Buber (1962), as 
suggested by Marková (1982), who maintained that ‘actual humanity exists only 
insofar as the capacity to confirm or be confirmed is exercised’ (Marková (1982, 
p.133).  A lack of confirmation of the Other can only lead to misunderstanding and 
conflict of mutual interests where stigma and prejudice stand at the intersection 
between recognition and non-recognition.  In zones of conflict stigma can become 
institutionalised (Echebarría and Echabe, 1997); ‘the tribal stigma of race, nation 
and religion … can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all 
members of a family’ (Goffman, 1963, p.14).  Stigma is collectively constructed and 
maintained but can also be contested, with the possibility of transformation as each 
knowledge system remains contextually and historically specific (Howarth, 
Nicholson and Whitney, 2013).   
To explore these intersections, a Hegelian approach seemed beneficial to 
acknowledge divergent perspectives in seeking a version of a reality that can be 
encapsulated into a theoretical entity. Versions of truth might not be made 
immediately available (Marková, 1982) as truth can only be defined as a process 
‘and can be reached only by penetrating under the surface of things, behind their 
appearances’ (p.163).  Reality is not expressed in abstract forms, but more in 
concrete ones, where the relationship between the immediate and the essential is 
expressed within the opposing contradiction. Marková (1982) suggested that within 
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a Cartesian paradigm a law of non-contradiction remains at the essence of activity 
where an entity cannot be both one thing and not at the same time, and so becomes 
an abstraction; yet ‘if anything is to develop it must have internal contradiction ... if 
a thing is unable to withstand contradiction within itself, it dies,’ (p. 164/5). At the 
core of intergroup conflict is the bipolarity between the groups, where layers of 
contradiction can obscure the foundational themes that might serve to stand as 
markers for resolving the conflict. Hence it is vital to explore these contradictions, 
which may help us understand the social psychology of intractable conflict through 
the imagined boundaries that divide them.     
3.2.1. Social representation theory as a foundation to methodology    
The theory of social representations implies an alternative approach to mainstream 
positivistic psychology and methodological individualism, where the subject and 
object remain separated from the social context from which they arise (Farr, 1996).   
It seemed to me that we are concerned with symbols, social reality and 
knowledge, communicating about objects not as they are but also all to be, so 
what comes to the fore is representation. In other words I thought that 
psychology of knowledge implies the primacy of representations. This is what 
fixed this notion in my mind, how it was associated with certain ideas on the 
relationship between communication and knowledge and the transformation of 
content of knowledge. (Moscovoci, 1961/2008, p.233).  
Moscovici (2001) argued that SRT is neither an empirical nor a theoretical 
concept but both. Thus it can provide an instrument for conceptualising the gap 
between the individual and the social group. A social object is not simply 
reproduced in the mind of an individual, but is embedded within a social 
construction of knowledge systems within the public sphere (Moscovici, 2000).  
Marková (2012) interpreted this epistemological significance as central to SRT, 
developing a methodological base from which researchers could move away from a 
Cartesian to a Hegelian approach, one which focuses on dynamic processes, rather 
than single entities. This trajectory takes on a dialogical rather than monological 
approach and reflects ‘natural thinking and communication is multifaceted and 
heterogeneous’ (Marková, p.470). For this thesis, I have found that there are various 
synergies between a SRT approach and grounded theory.   
58 
 
3.2.2. Grounded theory  
SRT research uses many different types of methodologies (Breakwell and Canter, 
1993; Gaskell & Bauer, 2000) that are designed to answer particular research 
questions. My chosen methodology was a qualitative one using depth interviews and 
thematic and dialogical analysis. This gave me the opportunity to explore and 
understand a multiplicity of perspectives within the social context of those who had 
experienced the conflict. Miller and Glassner (2011) suggested that depth qualitative 
interviews provide a medium to explore the phenomenon of interest within its 
cultural context, and how people make sense of their social worlds and experiences. 
The strength of qualitative interviewing is ‘its capacity to access self-reflexivity 
among interview subjects leading to the telling of stories that allow us to understand 
and theorize the social world’ (Miller and Glassner, p.137.) The opportunity to listen 
to the participants’ beliefs and private doubts allows the interviewer to explore their 
ambivalences and resistances towards different groups’ positions (Kleinman, 
Stenross and McMahon, 1994). This qualitative approach opens up a space to 
consider the multiplicity of factors that underlie social understanding and social life 
(Flick & Foster, 2008).    
My research was exploratory in nature; I attempted to begin the research 
with no preconceived assumptions as to the content of the answers to my questions. 
As far as was possible. I followed a grounded theory trajectory (Glaser, 2010) in 
order to produce my own empirical and theoretical story emanating from the 
qualitative data collected over a period of nearly three years. This gave me the 
opportunity to, ‘find out directly what is going on and how we can account for it ... 
to explore what is, not what should be, could, or ought to be’ (Glaser, p.6).  My 
research journey was not predicted at the outset, but developed over time as new 
empirical and theoretical vistas came into view.  This inductive approach reflected 
the fact that my research data was derived from qualitative interviews that neither 
attempted to explain the causative nature of their content, nor reach a conclusion 
based on the data alone.  One of the lessons learned from the pilot study was that 
using a concept such as ‘identity’ as a foundation for the research questions, without 
taking into account the complex social and cultural reality was unhelpful. A more 
open stance was required to go beyond this as, ‘advances in knowledge that are too 
strongly rooted in what we already know delimit what we can know’ (Gioia, Corley 
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and Hamilton, 2013, p.16). In trying to make sense of this complexity, an inductive 
approach was necessary where the perceived realities of the participants, and the 
relationships between them as individuals and members of competing groups, 
became the object of study.  
We live in a conversational reality (Shotter 1993) whereby language provides 
the basis on which to understand aspects of social knowledge. By exploring 
dialogical knowledge systems through the narratives of those embedded in conflict, I 
could explore imagined boundaries, and so build a sense of the significance of the 
processes of the relationship that lies ‘between’ them, rather than solely examining 
the groups as single entities. It was the dialogical relationship between them that was 
of interest, as each group remained dependent on the Other for their positioning and 
action, based on their co- representational fields. I was also aware of the ease within 
which one can too easily categorise others through membership of certain cultural 
groups where cultural norms might be understood to follow patterns that do not 
actually adequately reflect lived or perceived realities. All groups undergo change, 
and they move between categories as each culture remains a hybrid where 
differences within groups can be as profound as differences between them 
(Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012). All social categories are understood from 
particular (and changing) perspectives,  so, ‘to say that categories are perspectival 
means there is no independent way of assigning a person to a ‘true’ category, but the 
processes of categorisation always stems from a social position, the historical way of 
seeing and particular interests (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012, p.2).    
3.2.3. The use of the term ‘Other’ 
When using the term ‘Other’ it is intended to be understood as a reference to the 
other being, that is being discussed, or as a generalised third party, depending on the 
meaning of this is made clear in the context. 
 3.2.4. Researcher positioning in the chosen representational fields    
I was aware that my positioning could not that be that of objective researcher, but 
rather that of an interested researcher, and that would affect the participants’ own 
positioning in the research context. The participant – researcher relationship is also a 
dialogical one where meaning is not an individual outcome but influenced by the 
Other. The research interview is a social event in itself, it remains, ‘an exchange of 
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ideas and meanings, in which various meanings and perceptions are explored and 
developed (Gaskell, 2000, p.45. As Reisman suggested, ‘the story is told to a 
particular people; it might have taken a different form if someone else was the 
listener’ (Reisman 1993, p.11). By not being a member of either group, nor showing 
any allegiance to one or another, I hoped that my positioning was that of a bystander 
who wanted to know more about their story of the conflict. A Jewish Israeli PhD 
colleague suggested that I represented the international community, to whom both 
groups could give their views as a way of justifying their positioning based on any 
preconceived ideas that they thought I might have. My positioning reflected that of 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) where the construction of a lived reality through social 
relationships with others remains paramount.  I am a social product of British liberal 
socialisation and I am aware that this socialisation is set within a cultural milieu that 
has incorporated some Judeo-Christian thought. Because I appeared to represent an 
internationally renowned university, participants may have felt they wanted to 
discuss their narratives as a way of making a contribution to international academic 
research. Many commented positively on the fact that I was interviewing both 
Jewish Israelis and Palestinians to see how each viewed the Other, and they saw 
their input as representative of their own group.  There was a veiled acceptance of 
the intractability of the conflict.  There was also a certain eagerness to ‘tell it is how 
it is’ rather than accept the positions of the British media. Participants from both 
groups, for example, felt that the BBC was biased in its reporting, each giving their 
own preferences of media channels. Thus, my positioning was not one of objectivity 
but that of a subject in partnership with the participants, reflecting the two basic 
elements of interviewing as suggested by Farr (1982).  First, language as a medium 
of exchange cannot be neutral as it contains a particular world view; and second, 
language contrasts different perspectives.  
3.2.5. Depth interviews 
Depth interviews were chosen over focus groups, partly due to the sensitive nature 
of the subject. I was not sure how a group might react when discussing group 
boundaries where group loyalties might have inhibited discussion. With depth 
interviews, individual participants would have the opportunity to discuss their own 
perspectives without concern for other group members’ perspectives. But there 
remained the possibility that their narratives would remain guarded, self-conscious 
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or defensive; telling me what they thought I might like to hear. My main motivation 
was to allow the participant to feel comfortable, by being empathic, to their 
positioning as a stranger participant (Gaskell, 2000). Creating a rapport with the 
participants was crucial to building trust, which allowed more sensitive topics to be 
tackled. I have had ten years’ experience as an interviewer of depth interviews in 
social (non-academic) research for charities and organisations such as The 
Wellcome Trust, Macmillan, the NHS and associated agencies, interviewing people 
in areas where sensitivity was an issue, for example, chronically ill patients, medics, 
teachers, charity workers, parents and government officials. This experience was 
significant in helping to build a rapport with the participants in this research. 
However, not all interviews went as smoothly as others, each differed according to 
the relationship between us. But as the hour, or hours, passed, the developing 
relationship allowed a softening of boundaries; that allowed the participants to drop 
their defences and to acknowledge their social reality of the conflict. A handful 
remained guarded throughout, perhaps deliberately.          
Corpus construction   
I chose a corpus construction methodology as suggested by Bauer and Aarts (2000) 
to develop a valid sample that would represent the two groups in some meaningful 
way. To choose a method, when using so few participants to represent national 
groups, even in some minimal sense, required certain parameters to be drawn. 
Without any criteria for choosing participants there would be little accountability; 
the strategy of corpus construction can help with this. Barthes defined a corpus as, ‘a 
finite collection of materials which is determined in advance by the analyst with 
(inevitable) arbitrariness, and with which he is going to work’ (Barthes, 1967, p.96, 
taken from Bauer and Aarts (2000).  This rather loose definition tended to apply to 
linguistic studies and yet can also be applied to choosing a sample for a research 
project, by applying a method where transparency is uppermost. A suggested way 
forward was to choose a sample that was relevant to the aims of the study, and 
homogenous in its overall thematic trajectory. Central is to reach a saturation point 
of the subject under discussion.  However, one does not know at the outset when 
that might occur with the chosen sample. My rationale was to start with a set of 
criteria and follow the guidelines as suggested by Bauer and Aarts (2000) to, 
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‘proceed stepwise, select, analyse, select again’ (p.35) until a saturation point had 
been reached.  
Fifty two interviews in total were carried out: thirty two in London followed 
by twenty in Israel. Details of these, and the strategy for each empirical study, are 
outlined under the heading of each subsection.          
Ethics and consent  
Prior to the field research I explained my research strategy to the Ethics Committee 
at LSE and it was approved both by them and by my supervisor.  It was based on 
guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society (BPS) of which I am a 
member.  
 My protocol at the beginning of each interview explained the following. 
 A brief outline of my PhD - exploring perceptions across Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian relationships;  
 My positioning of having no political interests and following an academic 
journey in the field of social psychology;  
 That the session would be recorded for my own analysis for transcription and 
recordings would not be passed on to any third party at any point; 
 That anonymous quotes from the session might be given in my thesis and 
subsequent work;      
 LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed. Confidentiality 
is central to this.   
Each participant was asked if there were any other questions before being asked 
to read through and sign the consent form.  A copy of the consent form is found in 
the Appendix. It set out the conditions under which the interviews were conducted: 
 The interview was confidential and anonymous:        
 Making sure that the interviewee understood the nature of the interview; 
 Permission to have the interview recorded for transcription and analysis:   
 Permission to allow anonymous quotes to be used in the thesis and any further 
publications in the future;  
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 That the interview could be stopped at any time if the participant so wished; 
and  
 Any question could be ignored.  
My name and contact details were given to enable the participant to get back in 
touch if it was felt to be necessary.  No one did so. The interviews lasted 
approximately one hour, with a few shorter and a few taking longer. The interview 
ended when I felt the topic had been saturated. Interviews were held in the Social 
Psychology Department at LSE, local café’s, participant’s homes or their 
workplaces, with two using Skype.     
Discussion guide  
A semi-structured approach was taken in the designing the discussion guide, 
(Gaskell, 2000).  It gave participants the opportunity to answer a set of particular 
questions as well as allowing the exploration of individual narratives (Wengraf, 
2001). The aim was to explore as widely as possible, not only their thoughts on how 
each reacted to each other’s groups, but also why they had come to these narratives, 
probing further as to any facet or future aspiration that was deemed to be useful 
(Malinowski,1989). The qualitative depth interview is often seen as a critique of a 
question-response interview (Jovchelovich and Bauer, 2000) as with the latter it is 
easy to impose an unintended structure, for example pre-selecting themes and 
framing questions that reflected my own positioning. I wanted the interviews to flow 
without me having to ask too many questions, thereby enabling the participants to 
explore the boundaries they felt to be inherent in their perspectives, and any 
commonalities between them and the Other.  The participants were in the spotlight, 
expressing themselves -  not only what they knew, but what they might be thinking, 
as if for the first time, and hence being reflective and open to new interpretations.  
The discussion guide did not represent a strict set of questions; an 
approximation of the discussion guides for all studies can be found in the Appendix.  
The areas of questioning applicable to each stage of the research are discussed under 
the relevant sections in this chapter.    
Constructs of identity were discussed with the participants in both groups 
when the participants directly mentioned it, but the actual word ‘identity’ was rarely 
used in the question format. I learned from my pilot study that the participants 
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discussed identity in terms of ideological positioning or social and knowledge 
positioning. Condor (2006) probed English participants about their own 
representations of nationality, not by direct questioning, but by asking questions 
about general social attitudes; once the participant opened up a topic that included 
nationality this was probed further. It was found that just 25% of these responses 
concerning identity were attributed to people, with the majority talking of places, 
activities and events, and just 8% alluding to displays of in-group favouritism and 
pride. In my research, representations of belonging and identification to institutions 
and other people were commonplace. But the heterogeneity observed in their many 
different positionings might have been impeded had I used the term identity as a 
starting point.  Further research to clarify this would be interesting. 
Coding of data  
All recordings (N=52) were transcribed by myself, apart from four, from the second 
study, which were transcribed by a known and reputable professional agency.  The 
first stage of analysis was to read through the transcripts to note any possible 
emerging themes (Fereday and Cochrane, 2006) before using the qualitative 
software system, NVivo. The strength of such a system lay in the opportunity to 
build knowledge through the coding of categories (Bazeley, 2007, Strauss, 1987) 
when handing large amounts of data. A code is defined as an abstract representation 
of a given phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), either as a description of an 
utterance or as a more thematic connotation.  At the beginning of each analysis of a 
new study, and for each group, I would begin by categorising the more descriptive 
aspects of each transcription into a variety of ‘nodes’, often linking them with other 
nodes that contained similarities. From that base I would code a more thematic 
category into further ‘nodes’, so nodal relationships could be built.  This linking of 
data to possible themes and back to support the data was useful for identifying 
interesting ideas from the participants that could be then linked with the ideas of 
others. By starting with a general outline and developing it into more specific 
categories, a knowledge system was built that acknowledged the participants’ 
perceptions.  A list of all categories for each sample (x4) is listed in the Appendix.  
Analysis and interpretation  
The subsequent stage of the analysis was the interpretation of the data. This was 
based on suggestions by Attride-Stirling (2001) for analysing and interpreting 
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qualitative data, following a procedure of steps to follow in order to arrive at a 
thematic interpretation from a host of concrete categories. This method will be 
described more fully as it pertains to each chapter in the following sections, as they 
differed slightly in their approach.  It can be argued that this stage of the analysis 
presented a thematic descriptive overview of the findings. It was useful to have such 
a body of knowledge to discuss representations around a chosen cluster that could be 
mapped diagrammatically for further interpretation, as shown in the results section 
in the appropriate empirical chapter. Further interpretation from this basis of 
organising and base themes could subsequently be followed in order to explore 
further areas of interest. For example, the highlighting of historical representations 
(Chapter 4) became evident during this analytical / interpretive stage of the research 
and it might not have been so obvious had I not followed this procedure. It was 
possible to think about how other conceptual journeys might be conceived from the 
original thematic foundation.  A dialogical analysis (Chapter 5) was made possible 
by sifting through original thematic content and subsequently reverting back to 
NVivo for possible inclusions of further examples. The exploration of semantic 
barriers and bridges (Chapter 6) was another example of using data from the original 
thematic organisation. Finally, exploring examples of themata was possible through 
having a strong thematic foundation from which to work. These examples will be 
discussed in more detail under the analysis section in the appropriate chapter 
headings.    
Naming of participants   
Finding a way of naming the participants was a challenge because of the differences 
between the groups when positioning both themselves and the Other in a world of 
different interpretations of citizenship. ‘Israeli’, for example, would apply both to 
Jewish citizens of Israel regardless of their birth place and also those of Palestinian 
descent who remained in Israel post 1948. After much thought, the following 
criterion was used throughout: I refer to those from a Jewish heritage with lived 
experience of Israel as ‘Jewish Israeli’. Not all of the participants in the sample 
would consider themselves as Israeli and not all Jewish people have experience of 
living in Israel; by naming them as ‘Jewish Israeli’ I refer to both their Jewishness 
and their lived experience in Israel.  Palestinian participants born in the West Bank, 
East Jerusalem or Gaza, are generally referred to as Palestinian by both themselves 
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and others. However, in Israel it is more complex as they are generally named by 
Jewish Israelis as ‘Arabs’ (Muslims) or ‘Christians’ with no recognition of their 
Palestinian roots. Left wing Jewish Israelis often name them ‘Palestinian citizens of 
Israel’. Some Jewish Israelis name them as ‘Israeli Arabs’. However, this can also 
cause confusion as it might also refer to Jewish people who were born in Arab 
counties such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Morocco, for example, and known officially 
as Mizrachi Jews who immigrated to Israel. Therefore, I shall refer to those who are 
of Palestinian descent and have Israeli citizenship as ‘Palestinian Israelis’. When 
quotes are given they are identified by gender, age and national status as follows: 
Jewish Israeli; Palestinian Israeli; West Bank, Palestinian; Gaza, Palestinian or East 
Jerusalem, Palestinian. I am aware of the sensitivity surrounding labelling. I have 
named  them to correspond with the groups as stated, for identification purposes 
only and not intended to represent or deny any other positioning or cause any 
offence. 
When there are full stops positioned within the quotes ( … ) it refers to a short 
gap in the conversation when the deleted words are not relevant to the meaning that 
is being conveyed.   
 Each of the three studies will be discussed in turn, in terms of the research 
strategy chosen, sampling, analysis and interpretation. As each study progressed, I 
developed my thinking across the empirical / theoretical dimensions and how I 
might make a contribution to the discipline based on these. They are explained and 
discussed in each empirical chapter (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), moving to a discussion of 
the theoretical contributions of the thesis more generally.  
3.3. Empirical study ONE: reflections from afar of living in a conflict zone   
This section describes the methodological journey taken in my first empirical study; 
the strategy taken, the recruitment of the sample, and finally how I approached the 
analysis and interpretation.     
3.3.1. Research strategy 
The strategy chosen was one of exploration starting with a blank canvas on which to 
draw provisional ideas before embarking on further exploration.  This followed the 
experience I gained in the pilot study in Israel, when thinking carefully about who 
might constitute my empirical base in this first study. One of the lessons I learned 
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was the possibility that that those living within the reality of the conflict were 
somewhat suspicious of a (somewhat naïve) Western researcher with little first-hand 
knowledge of those whose lived reality was embedded in an unfamiliar culture. It 
seemed sensible to pull back from the immediate context and explore the 
relationships from a distance, with those who had a lived experience of the conflict 
but were now living outside of it. In this way, I hoped to gain insight into the 
imagined boundaries between the two groups through a detailed examination of their 
social representations of the conflict taken from their lived experience, but with a 
reflection of living away from it.  Once this was completed, I could then use this 
knowledge to return to Israel for further theoretical and empirical exploration. 
3.3.2. Sample 
This first study consisted of Jewish participants who had lived in Israel though not 
necessarily born there (N=17), and Palestinian people who were born and lived their 
formative years in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza or East Jerusalem (N = 15). 
There were differences between the groups that I considered when developed 
a sample. For example, there were differences in terms of national status, and 
freedom of travel to and from the UK. Jews worldwide have the right to live in 
Israel on a temporary or permanent basis, so those representing the sample may have 
been born elsewhere but immigrated at some point and subsequently chosen to live 
in the UK, either temporarily or permanently. The majority had dual nationality with 
a European country, including the UK, and so free to travel between there and Israel. 
For the Palestinian sample it was more complex. Palestinians born in Israel (20% of 
the total population), and direct descendants of those who had remained following 
1948 Israeli statehood, carried Israeli citizenship with full passport travel 
documents. However, for those Palestinians who lived in the Occupied Territories 
and Gaza their continued statelessness led to having no access to a national passport. 
Their travel to Europe was more restricted as travel documents and visas were 
required by Israel to exit the country and by the visiting country to enter it. These 
could be refused. For the Palestinians born and living in East Jerusalem there was a 
further difference as access to travel documents was dependent on a variety of 
factors, for example, some Palestinians have chosen to opt for an Israeli citizenship 
document that is available to some residents. Five of the Palestinian participants had 
UK nationality or permission to stay as a resident, one with refugee status, with the 
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remainder in the UK on a more temporary basis with study or work visas, either 
planning to return home or hoping to remain in the EU on a more permanent basis.   
The consequences of these differences led to the challenge of matching the 
sample in terms of time spent in the UK and place of birth. For example, the Jewish 
Israeli participants may have been born in Europe and immigrated or born in Israel, 
whilst all the Palestinians were born there as at the present time it is not possible for 
a Palestinian to have been born in Europe and immigrated there. I set criteria as 
follows: for the Jewish Israeli group they would have to have had spent at least five 
years living in Israel with the majority continuing to travel to Israel to be with 
families for extended holidays. I did not talk to any Jewish Israeli participant who 
had lived or presently live in settlements in the West Bank. For the Palestinian 
sample I wanted to interview a cross section from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, 
Gaza and within Israel itself. The majority were living in the UK on a temporary 
basis, with post grad study or travel permits. Tables summarising both groups is 
shown below:  
 
 Table 4: Jewish Israeli participants (Study 1) 
Participants  Female  Male  Total 
Israeli born   x 6 x 4 10 
Israeli 
immigrants  
x 4 x 3  7 
Total  10 7 17 
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Table 5: Palestinian participants (Study 1) 
Participants Female Male Total 
Gaza x 2 x 4 6 
West Bank  x 1 x 4 5 
East Jerusalem  x 1 x 1 2 
Palestinian 
Israeli 
x 1 x 1 2 
Total  5 10 15 
 
 
Table 6: Age ranges across all groups (Study 1) 
Participants 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s Total 
Jewish Israeli x 3 x 6 x 5 x 3 17 
Palestinian 
Israeli 
- x 2 - - 2 
Palestinian x 6 x 4 x 3 - 13 
Total 9 12  8  3 32 
  
I attempted to match for age and gender but as illustrated this was not 
entirely successful. There were more females in the Jewish Israeli group (10:7) and 
more males in the Palestinian group (5:10). This might be because more Palestinian 
men than women leave their families in their home country to study or make an 
independent life elsewhere, but this could not be substantiated. The Jewish Israeli 
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group tended to be younger, as illustrated in Table 3, which may be accounted for by 
the higher number of Palestinian participants coming to the UK for post graduate 
study and returning home later. Participants from both groups were highly educated, 
with most having a Bachelor’s degree, and many from both groups also had a post 
graduate degree or post graduate qualification. All spoke fluent English and could 
express themselves clearly. None from either group would consider themselves as 
being part of a fundamental religious group, where their religion was the main focus 
of direction in their lives. Most would describe themselves as secular, with an ethnic 
or cultural attachment to Judaism, Islam or Christianity which varied by degree from 
absolute atheism to recognition of the religious values as part of their socialisation. 
 Their political leanings were more difficult to compare. All the Jewish 
Israelis identified with the left-right continuum.  In Israel this left-right continuum 
has tended to signify a ‘dove’ and ‘hawk’ positioning, where the former stands for 
those who seek a more peaceful agreement with a future Palestinian state, with the 
latter taking a more ambivalent position and often an anti-Palestinian position.  In 
this Jewish Israeli sample there was a good mix of self-identified left and right wing. 
There appeared to be no such left/right continuum equivalent positioning within the 
Palestinian group, reflecting a more homogenous positioning. However, participants 
talked about a Fatah-Hamas divide, with the former perceived as the more moderate 
political party, while Hamas, an Islamist party, was seen as being more extreme. 
This does not easily translate to a left-right wing orientation, possibly due to the 
complications of the Palestinian’s lack of self-determination as a nation state.    
Recruitment: Jewish Israeli participants    
Participants were initially found through contacts and snowballed to include contacts 
of contacts, members from Jewish Israeli organisations and LSE student groups. I 
needed to employ a recruitment agency to find three right wing participants, as until 
that point, there had been a tendency towards an imbalance of political orientation. 
The Jewish Israeli interviews were the first to take place, from December, 2012 and 
May 2013 before embarking on the Palestinian recruitment.  
Recruitment: Palestinian participants 
Finding participants for the Palestinian sample proved a lot more challenging than 
the Jewish Israel sample, taking from June 2013 to April 2015 to complete.  Overall 
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there were fewer interviews (15 compared to 17) due to the difficulty in recruiting 
within a specified time frame.  I started to recruit participants with known contacts, 
and snowballed to find more through contacts of contacts, local organisations and 
London universities. Many potential participants ignored my communication, or 
having made contact would then ignore further communication, or they would delay 
fixing a time to meet, or preferred not to be part of the study. Participants had to fit 
my criteria of being born in the designated areas, so no one born in a refugee camp 
in surrounding countries to Israel, nor the offspring of a Palestinian and born in the 
UK, could be part of the study. This may have been a factor as to the few who would 
fit these criteria. A professional recruitment agency was unwilling to take this on at 
a reasonable cost.  
There also appeared to be a lack of trust in my positioning as a British 
student from London, and it took some time to build a sense of trust through the 
contacts I had made. When I questioned some participants as to the possible reasons 
why it was so difficult to recruit the sample, it was evident that there was some 
hesitancy in discussing Israeli-Palestinian relationships. This was partly because 
they were not used to discussing these topics with a stranger; but it also appeared to 
be due to a concern that details of their inclusion might be passed on to a third party 
at some point. The following quote exemplifies this.  
‘Most of us are afraid about talking. I think the Palestinians are the most 
frightened about speaking because I think that as we are outside we don’t want 
any trouble and usually we become afraid of intelligence services, the secret 
services. Because most of us usually, they keep a close eye on us. I think also 
that things are exaggerated … At the beginning when I was told about this 
(research), I thought, well, I’m happy to do it, but I need to know more.’   
(Male, 20’s, Palestinian, West Bank)   
I had to stress the importance of anonymity to the possible Palestinian 
participants, that their identity would always remain anonymous before some would 
agree to the interview. However, once the timing of the interview had been agreed 
and begun, and my positioning explained as a doctoral student exploring conflict 
across both groups with no allegiance to either (apart from a willingness to learn), 
the participants were open and candid about their experiences.   
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Discussion guide  
This first empirical study included the following areas of questions and 
discussion:    
 How each defines his or her own nation or homeland, in terms of what is 
significant for the group and the individual;  
 How the Other is defined both by them and the wider society; personal 
experiences with the other community; 
 Their perspective of how the Other might perceive them and their positioning;  
 The significance of being Jewish Israeli or Palestinian Israeli in the UK;  
 The influences that have formed and sustained their present narrative;  
 Any perceived segregation as a result of conflict / group preference; 
 A vision of the future that may include both communities living together or 
further conflict; and  
 Concluding thoughts.  
I was confident that I had reached a saturation point with both groups where no 
new information was being given that would have any overall effect on the findings.   
3.3.3. Analysis and interpretation     
The protocol for the analysis followed that as described in section in 3.2.5. The 
original coding nodes as identified in NVivo were used as a base from which to 
explore the large amount of data to analyse it into a meaningful way to discuss the 
findings within a theoretical framework. For example, NVivo node categories (as 
listed in the Appendix) that were identified for over 75% of the sample were given 
particular attention. These category nodes in the Jewish Israeli sample in London, 
included statements around issues of  belonging, fear, threat, memories of the 
Holocaust and historical themes, Jewish identification, loyalty, the military, 
Zionism, co-existence, transformation, politics, intractability, relationship with 
Palestinians, righteousness, stigma, and barriers to consensus.  For the Palestinian 
sample in London, category nodes with at least 75% of the sample discussing them 
included barriers to consensus, co-existence, contact with the Other, emotions  (for 
example, of anger, frustration, sadness), the future, the role of history, the 
Holocaust, identity, injustice, intersubjectivity (i.e. the relationship with Jewish 
Israelis), the occupation, peace hopes and politics. From these coding nodes base 
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themes were identified to reflect either a consensus or conflict positioning. 
Following this, a thematic analysis, following the suggestions by Attride-Stirling 
(2001), was carried out to identify base themes to reflect the different categories that 
participants had talked about as being central to the conversation. From these base 
themes, a set of organising themes were deduced as representing these base themes, 
set out across two global themes signifying the context of the study, as illustrated 
here:  
Figure2: Sets of global, organising and base themes 
 
 
 
 
 
This form of implementing an analysis from the NVivo coding system was 
useful to explore themes interpreted at their most basic levels, within a framework of 
a hierarchy of themes to implement a discussion about a meaningful set of inferred 
social representations, as suggested by the conversations with participants. The 
global themes represent the main claims and arguments as distinct entities; the 
organising themes summarise the abstract principles taken from the base themes, the 
lowest order, which in turn summarises the identified themes from the codes taken 
from the original coding frame. A coding frame, with quoted examples for each set 
of base and organising themes, can be found in the Appendix. The resulting matrix 
of themes is found in the results section of chapter 4.  
Further analysis and interpretation was carried out exploring historical 
representations. This was followed due to the significance of this subject area in the 
data. This was not a subject on which I had directly questioned the participants and 
yet it was prominent enough to be a source of interest both empirically and 
theoretically. NVivo was useful here for linking this theme with the nodes that had 
been implemented as categories when inputting the original data.  
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3.4. Empirical study TWO: living and working side by side in Israel 
This section describes the methodological approach taken in the second empirical 
study when I returned to Israel for further exploration into imagined intergroup 
boundaries across Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis.  
3.4.1. Research strategy 
The experience of the pilot study in Israel in the summer of 2012 was not only 
useful for my theoretical journey.  It also gave me the opportunity to meet 
academics at Haifa and Tel Aviv University to hear of their perceptions of 
intergroup relationships between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis and to attend a 
conference in Haifa on this topic. I returned the following summer, in 2013, to 
familiarise myself more with the area and to make contacts for the second study in 
2014. My intention was to study people who represented a way of co-existing 
together in the same geographic area, that is in Haifa, a city in northern Israel which 
was said to be a place of co-existence between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. If the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered intractable, and both groups were perceived 
as enemies to each other, how do Jewish and Palestinian Israelis manage to co-exist 
in daily life?  Or were their lives too segregated for relationships to form? What 
might contact with each other mean for their perceptions of the Other? I wanted to 
explore cross group relationships within a social, intellectual and physical context.   
 The answer came during an interview in London with a Jewish Israeli 
participant whom I interviewed in the UK.  After discussing his ambivalence, 
bordering on loathing, towards the Palestinian population as his enemy, he 
contradicted himself quite openly and without irony by suggesting that he would 
trust his life with a Palestinian doctor. The quote is reproduced here:     
“If I was to live or move into an apartment block I can’t imagine myself 
moving into an apartment block where there are Palestinians. I wonder why - 
for me from day one they are the enemy they are the enemy they are the enemy. 
They killed my uncle they killed my father whatever, everyone knows someone 
who is affected. It’s really deep. It’s really deep … 
(15 mins later) …. I will trust my life with an Arab doctor. 
 
Why? 
Because there is a shortage of doctors so of course we compromise.   When 
blokes like me go into the Army, and as there’s a loyalty issue with the Arabs 
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most of them don’t go into the Army, they go to Italy or the Czech Republic to 
study medicine. So a large percentage of the population of Arabs are doctors.  
And for that there is no issue. Jews are happy with that. No problem at all.”  
(Male, 30’s, Jewish Israeli)  
 
This contradiction allowed me to think about its significance. I was 
particularly interested in his narrative about Palestinians as the enemy and assumed 
he was referring to Palestinians outside Israel; and yet he discussed the possibility of 
sharing an apartment block with a Palestinian which would have referred to a 
Palestinian in Israel, a Palestinian Israeli. The trust in an ‘Arab’ doctor was key. 
Was this due to medical ethics playing a significant role? Or was it a more 
pragmatic solution for finding the relevant manpower when Jewish Israelis were 
doing their mandatory military service, giving opportunities for Palestinian Israelis 
who do not have to sign up. It was this quote that led to the planning of the second 
study.  I had been looking for a context where Jewish and Palestinian Israelis 
worked together on an equal professional footing and this example gave me the 
opportunity to explore further.    
Narratives concerning a national ideology had been prominent in the first 
study and will be discussed further in the empirical chapter; I was interested in how 
boundaries between the groups, identified through the individual, might differ when 
national ideology played a role in forming social representations of, and 
relationships with, the Other.  If an overriding ideology can act as a mediating force 
between groups in conflict, how might the ethics of medicine have an impact on 
these relationships?  Desivilya (1998) studied this very phenomenon by examining 
Arab / Jewish professional medical relationships. Most of those involved in the 
study felt that they were satisfied with their professional communication across 
boundaries, ‘that no barriers were posed on interpersonal communication, because 
this would be considered a violation of professional ethics standards’ (Desivilya, 
1998 p.435). If this ideology of ethics was considered to be significant with their 
cross boundary relationships, a discussion about the role of ideology in a wider 
context could be explored further. Moreover, if professional co-existence was found 
to be successful we can ask if this was carried further into social and personal 
friendships where the boundaries between them may become more diffused and 
permeable across a variety of contexts. 
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 Exploratory depth qualitative interviews formed the base of the fieldwork, 
as had been the case in the first study. Ethics, confidentiality and consent followed 
the same practice. Interviews were held in hospital departments, clinics, local café’s 
and one in a private home. All interviews were recorded and transcribed personally.      
3.4.2. Sample and recruitment  
My trip was delayed for two months due to the conflict ‘Operation Protection 
Edge’ in Gaza (8th July to 26th August 2014). I was advised by the LSE Research 
Degrees Unit not to venture into Israel because of security concerns at that time.  
And further, my contacts in Israel suggested that during these times of conflict, 
relationships across the Jewish and Palestinian Israeli divide can become intensified 
with a possible escalation of violence within Israel itself, leaving the local 
population more prone to negativity about the Other.  As my topic of interest was of 
co-existence as well as conflict, this bias would affect my findings and the thesis as 
a whole. It was hoped that the delay would alleviate this. However, the conflict was 
still very much part of the local narrative two months later, and so played a role in 
the life worlds of some of those interviewed - as will be discussed in the empirical 
chapter (Chapter5).     
I followed the same strategy in finding a corpus (Bauer & Gaskell 2000) as I 
did in the first stage of the research. Through contacts I had made in previous visits 
and though London based Jewish Israelis, initial communication was made with 
medical professionals in the area before my arrival in October 2014.  I also enlisted 
the help of a local organisation that had held a conference in 2013, where medical 
professionals from both Jewish and Palestinian Israeli backgrounds had come 
together to discuss their future working relationships. From this starting point, those 
contacted and willing to be part of my research would often pass on contacts to form 
a snowball effect. I wanted to talk to mostly doctors, but also a minority of senior 
nursing staff whose narratives may have differed slightly in their approach to 
working with the Other. The doctors who made up the sample ranged from junior 
doctors to senior consultants, both medical and surgical, and there was one Jewish 
Israeli, and one Palestinian Israeli, senior clinical psychologist. The difficulty of 
recruiting Palestinians in London was not repeated in Israel, although I was aware 
that confidentiality appeared to be particularly important for some participants in the 
Palestinian Israeli group. Loyalty to the state was considered to be significant and 
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any deviation from that could have been misconstrued as being critical, with 
possible consequences to one’s career.   
 I planned on completing twenty interviews that represented heterogeneous 
views across the sample pertaining to the permeability of boundary crossing, both 
professionally and personally. This number was reached during my field visit and I 
was confident that I had found a point of saturation across both samples that reflected 
their narratives taken from their positioning and perspective about both themselves and 
each other. Tables showing details of both samples are shown below: 
 
   Table 7: Palestinian Israeli medical professionals  (Study 2) 
Participants 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s Total  
Doctor  F x 1 F x 1 F x 1 
M x 4 
- 
M x 1 
F x 3 
M x 5 
8 
Senior Nurse F x 1 - F x 1  - F x 2 2 
Total  1 2 6 1 F x 5 
M x 5 
10 
 
      Table 8: Jewish Israeli medical professionals  (Study 2)  
Participants 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s Total  
Doctor  F x 1 F x 2 F x 3 
M x 3 
-  9 
Senior Nurse - - F x 1 -  1 
Total   3 7 - F x 7 
M x 3 
10 
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There were more women than men in the Jewish Israeli sample which may 
reflect cultural differences across gender from the two communities. The doctors 
were employed as hospital physicians, clinicians or surgeons, with those aged in 
their 40’s and above, holding senior consultant positions, whilst the younger ones 
were more junior and still practising in a training capacity.  The inclusion of three 
senior nurses was felt to be important to gain access into a more patient-related 
discussion, and two were matched in terms of age and seniority while the third, a 
younger Palestinian Israeli, was working as a midwife as well as a nurse. The Jewish 
Israeli sample mostly had a secular lifestyle, with just one describing herself as an 
Orthodox Jew, although personal details were not discussed in any detail. The 
Palestinian Israeli sample was made up of mostly Muslim medical professionals 
although none describing themselves as being overtly religious. There were also two 
Christian and one Druze participants as part of the sample.  The political orientation 
of the Jewish Israelis was, a good mix from left to right to wing, but as in the first 
study there was no comparable positioning for the Palestinian Israelis; this does not 
assume that no such orientation exists, but they did not feel it necessary to include it 
in the conversation.  The sample was not intended to be representative of all Jewish 
and Palestinian Israeli hospital medical professionals in Israel but their in-depth 
views of their hospital experiences represented a plethora of perspectives that 
constitutes a robust contribution to my thesis. The sample represented a group of 
Israeli nationals who were highly educated, spoke fluent English, were most bi-
lingual in Arabic and Hebrew - certainly enough to converse with their patients. All 
participants spent their professional working life with the Other and so had much to 
offer in terms of their life world being embedded together, leading to rich and 
interesting data from which to explore the boundaries between them. Their 
contribution cannot be said to be generalisable to other groups within Israel, but it 
can act as a base line from which to draw possible conclusions and from which 
further research can be undertaken.     
Discussion Guide 
The second empirical study in Haifa, included the following areas of questioning 
and discussion:    
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 The motivations for following a career in medicine and the route that was 
taken to achieve this; 
 Their perspective of the area in which they lived / came from, in terms of 
co-existence  / segregation across both groups; 
 Their working relationships with those from the other group and how that 
may have developed / changed over time; 
 Their relationships with patients from both groups and how they have found 
that may have changed as their training and experience developed;  
 Their perspectives on how their values and beliefs have been formed and 
sustained through their significant relationships, education and institutions, 
linking this back to their professional life world; 
 A vision of the future that may include both communities living together or 
further conflict; and    
 Concluding thoughts picked up from the interview.  
3.4.3. Analysis and interpretation of themata   
The identification of relevant themata was a process that needed careful 
consideration. Not only did I want to uncover themata that was felt to represent 
foundational themes of the conflict, but I also needed to observe how they might 
differ across the dialogical relationship between and within the groups. By exploring 
the thematic content of the data, and noting possible themata, I arrived at a point 
where I felt the identification of a proposed set of themata would sit comfortably 
with the data. However, this was not a simple process and needed reformulating on a 
number of occasions until I was satisfied that the chosen themata fitted the data 
better than any alternative. NVivo was central to the placing of categories taken 
from the transcriptions in a similar fashion as I had followed in the first study. Again 
I followed the approach as suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) by paying attention 
to base themes gathered from Nvivo nodes, then further interpreting these into 
organising themes that encompassed these more base entities. The organising 
themes fed into the global themes that reflected the antinomy inter-relationship 
across the experiences of two groups working alongside one another, compared to 
the one outside, where other thematic content was evident. However, the inside / 
outside work status is not so clear cut as to provide a descriptive element, but more 
of a deep thematic reflection that appeared to stand for deep seated differences 
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across the groups. And so although the context of work is significant, by identifying 
the thematic content discussed as themata we can discuss a further level of 
representation that may lie deeply in the epistemology of the knowledge systems of 
the participants.  
 From the nodes that were classified at the first stage of coding those that were 
relevant in more than 75% of the participants responses to be included in further 
thematic interpretation - for the Jewish Israeli sample this included details of 
personal biography (including identities and Jewish identification both in the present 
and the past), the recent Gaza war, imagined futures, feelings of threat,  relationships 
with their Arab Israeli colleagues, the media and the IDF (Israeli Defence Force).   
Included in more than 75% of the Israeli Arab sample were classifying nodes that 
represented the Gaza war, identities (both present and past), Israeli discrimination, 
and land rights, relationships with their Jewish Israeli colleagues, barriers to 
consensus and bridges as a way of crossing a divide. From these categories, base 
themes were interpreted to take into account the dialogical relationship across the 
groups that fed into my interpretation of organising themes leading to the 
identification of four antinomy pairs of global themes, two for each group: 
exclusivity-inclusivity and threat-security for the Jewish Israeli group and 
recognition-non recognition and equality-inequality for the Arab Israeli group. This 
process of identification was not one that was as simple as it might suggest but 
required examination and re-examination over time and discussion with colleagues 
(through presentation seminars and lab work). Mapping of the levels of thematic 
content resulting in the identification of themata showing each antinomy pair and 
how they related to organising and base themes, can be found in the Appendix.  A 
coding book showing examples of quotes for each thematic category is also given.  
By incorporating themata in my methodological approach, I hoped to explore 
how two groups perceived both themselves and each other across their dialogical 
relationship in the context of their professional working lives and their lives outside 
it. The discussion of the theoretical aspects of themata can be found in Chapter 2.   
 Dialogical analysis 
After identifying relevant themata within the data, I also carried out a dialogical 
analysis with chosen texts to exemplify the dialogical relationship across the two 
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groups. There have been a few methodological studies that have succinctly set out 
how to carry out a dialogical analysis. For example, Wagoner et al (2011) 
demonstrated how a group of six dialogical scholars each analysed a piece of text 
taken from a short story The Guerrillero Each used their own approach to explore 
the relationship between the self and the other, concluding that a dialogical analysis 
of the six analyses showed the possibility of a multiplicity of different approaches. 
Gillespie et al (2008) used a dialogical analysis approach to discuss a set of diaries 
written by a woman in World War II reflecting her relationship with her local 
community during a time of tension and change. The advantage of such an approach 
highlighted the different layers of her thinking as she attempted to resolve her inner 
dialogue during such times. Gillespie & Cornish (2014) suggest a possible step by 
step approach for a dialogical analysis when interpreting multi voiced dialogue, 
which I have used as a base for my analysis.  This included coding pronoun 
utterances as follows: those that represented the subject, ‘I’, ‘we’ and ‘us’, and 
subsequently those that represented the Other, ‘them’ and ‘they’. All sets of 
pronouns encapsulated the ‘ego-alter’ dialogical relationship (Marková, 2003) and 
highlighted in the so-called Toblerone model of SRT (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). The 
third coding represented the ‘you’ pronoun that tended to represent either a neutral 
subject or, depending on the context, used to denote a ‘third party judge’ - either as a 
direct or indirect invitation for my inclusion as the interviewer within the dialogue. 
By following this methodological approach I hoped to gain insight into the 
relationship across the groups held in intractable conflict, including the 
contradictions and ambiguities that might enfold in such a process. The imagined 
boundaries between them can then be discussed in terms of impermeability, 
juxtaposed with the possibilities of permeability. My third study explores the 
semantic bridges and barriers that might serve to harden or soften such imagined 
boundaries.   
3.5. Empirical study THREE: semantic barriers and bridges across imagined 
boundaries  
This final study takes the empirical and theoretical journey further by considering 
how imagined boundaries can be both impermeable and permeable. This study aims 
to explore these boundaries arising out of local and societal contexts as discussed by 
the participants.   
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3.5.1. Research strategy 
The findings from my first empirical study served as a base from which to explore 
intractable conflict further by returning to Israel to explore a context of co-existence. 
Findings from this study revealed how deep seated themata remain active in the co-
representational field. However, not all social representations discussed could be 
described as belonging to an intractable paradigm. Narratives of hope and optimism 
were also present in the field. I wanted to explore how these positions suggested 
within the prevailing themata, could be voiced. By re-introducing semantic barriers 
as originally noted by Moscovici (1961/2008) and further developed by Gillespie 
(2008) I hoped to add to this development by exploring the concept in my study. 
Further, by introducing the concept of semantic bridges, I hoped to include more 
hopeful positionings that were also present in the representational field, where 
imagined boundaries fluctuated in response to the Other, as they remained bounded 
by their dialogical relationship.    
3.5.2. Sample 
The sample for this study was created from the previous two studies to form two 
new groups from which to base my exploration. I wanted to use a sample that 
represented the two groups in conflict, one Israeli Jewish and one Palestinian, who, 
under the present geo-political reality, would not meet, yet still remain dialogically 
bound together. Transcripts from twenty participants were chosen to match each 
other approximately in terms of age, political orientation for the Jewish Israeli 
group, and heterogeneity of perceptions in the Palestinian group. I chose ten 
Palestinians from the London group rather than include Palestinian Israelis, as I 
wanted to make a direct comparison with those separated by intractable conflict, that 
is, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza an East Jerusalem. I 
included ten Jewish Israeli transcripts: five from the Haifa group and five from the 
London group to form a new Jewish Israeli group to reflect my criterion of matching 
across the groups. By using a data set that had already been part of a previous study 
(Chapters 4 and 5) I followed a triangulation methodology as suggested by Flick 
(2007). Data triangulation refers to using different sources of data to maximise a 
particular methodology through ‘a purposeful and systematic selection and 
integration of persons, populations and temporal local settings is used’ (Flick, 2007, 
p.10). By using this newly formed data set I could directly contrast the groups and 
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match them accordingly. These samples are illustrated in Tables 6 and 7 below. 
There remained an imbalance of gender that was evident in the original samples 
with more men in the Palestinian grouping and more women in the Jewish Israeli 
group. This was difficult to eradicate, bearing in mind that an approximation of age 
and place across the groups was considered significant. All of the Jewish Israeli 
group had lived most of their life in Israel and had experienced military service in 
the IDF. 
Table 9: Palestinians by place, gender and age 
Participants 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s Total 
West Bank  - 
M x 1 
- 
M x 2 
F x 1 
- 
- 1 
3 
Gaza  F x 1 
M x 1 
- 
M x 1  
F x 1 
- 
- 
- 
2 
2 
East Jerusalem   
M x 1  
F x 1  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
1 
Total 4 4 2 - 10 
Table 10: Jewish Israelis by place, gender and age     
Participants 20’s 30’s 40’s 50’s Total 
Jewish Israelis 
London  
F x 2 
- 
F x 1 
M x 2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
3 
2 
Jewish Israelis 
Haifa   
F x 1 
- 
F x 1 
- 
F x 2 
M x 1 
- 
- 
4 
1 
Total  3 4 3 - 10 
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Half of the Jewish Israeli sample suggested they were left wing and half right. 
As suggested in the section above, there was no direct comparison with the 
Palestinian group as to their political orientation, with the Palestinian groups in 
general reflecting more homogenous perceptions. Bearing this in mind I included 
those whose perceptions tended to follow a more heterogeneous positioning.  Most 
of the Palestinian group were living temporarily outside the conflict zone and at the 
present time will have returned home, or they will have close links with frequent 
travel to the area.   
3.5.3. Analysis and interpretation    
For the analysis of this empirical study I returned to NVivo to examine those 
transcripts I had chosen to form the new sample group to explore what might be 
perceived as being a barrier that stood between the groups to inhibit intergroup 
understanding and bridges that might stimulate understanding.  The identified 
barriers and bridges were listed in tables and used as a base to begin a thematic 
interpretation. These tables amounted to 5,000 of text and so too large for the 
Appendix but can be seen on request. As in the previous study I followed the 
approach suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) in finding base and organising themes 
that would demonstrate the identification of themata that related to these perceived 
descriptive semantic barriers and bridges. Through a process of applying this data to 
base themes which were then structured as organising themes and ultimately into 
themata of global themes that reflected the underlying base and organising themes.  
This final chosen themata were felt to be a satisfactory reflection of the foundational 
representations of both groups’ perceptions of their imagined boundaries. Not only 
did I need to consider relevant themata for each group but I also needed to check 
that these reflected the dialogical relationship across the groups. Four antinomy pairs 
of themata were identified: exclusivity-inclusivity and threat-security for the Jewish 
Israeli group and recognition-non recognition and oppression-freedom for the 
Palestinian group. As can be noted, themata for both the second and third study of 
Jewish Israelis remained the same, whilst for the Palestinian group, themata of 
recognition and non recognition was found to be the same as identified in the second 
study, but the second themata pair, of oppression-freedom reflected the difference in 
status between the Arab Israeli participants as citizens of the State of Israel and the 
Palestinian group whose national status was less defined. The antinomy relationship 
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of global themes as themata reflected an approximation of semantic barriers on the 
one hand and semantic bridges on the other. For example, the thema of ‘exclusivity’ 
represented a discussion around semantic barriers to consensus and ‘inclusivity as a 
semantic bridge to begin a dialogue away from conflict. Likewise, ‘oppression’ 
reflected a thema of semantic barriers to consensus and ‘freedom’ towards a reality 
that steered away from conflict. However, it must be noted that this form of thematic 
analysis is not exact as such, as the data represents a complex set of social 
representations with inbuilt contradictions and paradoxes, with no clear pattern to 
observe. However, the identification of themata and its organising and base themes 
opens up a discussion that reflects a social reality as perceived by the participants. It 
is the dialogical relationship across the groups that was felt to be of significance in 
the study that demonstrated the different sets of semantic barriers and bridges that 
each represented, related to their own experiences and set within an asymmetric 
context of intergroup conflict. .             
Tables showing the mapping of each set of themata, with the base and 
organising themes as identified, with quoted examples of each category can be 
found in the Appendix under the relevant chapter headings.         
 3.6. Limitations 
A thesis using qualitative data throughout is not without its limitations. It was never 
my intention to produce a research study that could be said to reflect a given social 
reality that might be applicable to any universal theme, or used to predict any future 
phenomenon. I was influenced by a Hegelian approach and in particular, by the 
significance of social recognition in social relationships and the importance of 
creativity in the acquisition of knowledge. By following a grounded approach I 
explored what was felt to be necessary at any particular point in time. Robustness 
and transparency remained central to my thesis. This is discussed in terms of the 
samples chosen and the interpretation of data.     
3.6.1. Samples  
Trying to match groups divided by conflict was always going to be problematic due 
to the large differences of life experiences between them. A total of fifty two depth 
interviews that formed the bases of the thesis cannot be said to be representative of 
those who live within the conflict. They represent a select group that can be 
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described as being highly educated, many of them having the opportunity to live and 
work away from the conflict. None of the participants belonged to any fundamental 
religious or militant group. However, they were matched in ways that I believed  
would provide an interesting opportunity to discuss the boundaries between them 
that would contribute to conflict research in social psychology. By following a 
corpus construction methodology (Bauer and Aarts, 2000) in sample choice, I felt 
confident in reaching a point of saturation from my discussions with the participants. 
From this base, further research can be explored with additional samples 
representing different contexts. It would be of particular interest to examine with a 
wider population range further evidence of similar thematic trajectories and the 
salience of themata that were found to be significant in this thesis.   
3.6.2. Robust analysis and interpretation  
Robust analysis and interpretation were important in my research strategies and data 
collection, where the need for accountability and transparency was paramount 
(Flick, 1998, Seale, 1999). By noting my entire research journey in this chapter, the 
methodological basis of the thesis has been discussed and remains open to scrutiny. 
The inclusion of carefully chosen quotes, of which there are many, demonstrated 
particular instances of a conceptual point or descriptive entity. My thesis was 
entirely reliant on the discussed perspectives of all of those whose experiences and 
reflections resulted in social representations of intractable conflict that forms the 
basis of my thesis. The Appendix shows examples of the way in which the data was 
analysed and interpreted. Any further clarification can be requested.  
The passage of time was considered significant in re-visiting coding frames 
in NVivo. This was recommended during Methodology classes held at LSE as a way 
of checking the original coding frame. I found there were few changes to alternative 
categories, but the number of categories increased as other perspectives came into 
view. My PhD colleagues at LSE were helpful and constructive in the interpretation 
process during workshops, social labs and seminars within the Social Psychology 
department. By discussing examples of texts it was possible to verify a chosen 
methodological / theoretical journey as well as receiving a creative input concerning 
new ways of thinking about the data. This was also developed during meetings in 
Europe (Neuchâtel, Aalborg and London) for invited doctoral students to come 
together to discuss their qualitative data in a collaborative manner.  
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Finally, my positioning as a researcher cannot be judged to be objective 
either as a social researcher or as a person who represents the international 
community from a liberal perspective. My aim was to act as an interpreter to those 
who spoke of their direct experience of the conflict, to hear their stories through 
their eyes in a way that encompassed a robust methodology in setting these stories in 
a constructive theoretical framework.                    
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter reports on the methodological journey of my thesis from its theoretical 
base to the chosen strategies, which were followed to explore the dialogical 
intergroup relationships of concord and conflict in Israel-Palestine. I chose a 
Hegelian approach that widened my scope to think about two particular aspects of 
human consciousness that Hegel considered significant in the study of human 
behaviour: the importance of social recognition and the premise that activity and 
creativity lies at the base of the acquisition of knowledge. This theoretical avenue set 
the scene for a reflexive approach where internal contradictions remain central to 
human thinking. The significance of the social within the individual, as argued by 
Mead, contains the seeds of dialogism which was developed by Marková later in the 
20
th
 and which contributed to this theoretical journey. Social representation theory, 
particularly the construct of themata, formed the foundation of my second and third 
empirical studies. The choice of using depth interviews to produce qualitative data 
was discussed to demonstrate the significance of following a grounded theory 
approach. The methodology for each of the three empirical studies was discussed in 
turn. This included the research strategy for each, followed by the reporting of the 
chosen samples and how they were recruited; the importance of research ethics and 
consent and finally, the outlines of the discussion guides that formed the 
groundwork of the research. The way in which the data was analysed and interpreted 
was explained with emphasis on robustness and transparency. Finally, the 
limitations of the research were discussed in terms of the relative narrowness of the 
samples, indicating that these findings are not applicable to wider or alternative 
communities. However, it is hoped that the findings can be useful as a starting point 
for further theoretical and empirical research. 
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The following three chapters introduce, describe and discuss the empirical 
studies.  We turn first to look at the lived realities of both Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians living in London.  
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4. Conflict and consensus as reflected experience  
4.1. Introduction  
This first empirical chapter examines the reflections of conflict and consensus of 
those who have experience of living within a conflict zone in Israel / Palestine, yet at 
the time of their interview were living either temporarily or permanently outside of 
it. The participants had experienced an alternative life world within Europe that 
allowed a space for reflection, distanced from the conflict. It is not assumed that 
their perceptions will echo those of people who remain embedded within the 
conflict, not least because the participants left of their own volition, either 
temporarily or permanently. However, their narrated experiences have been central 
in exploring relevant themes related to living within a conflict zone, where the 
identification of social knowledge systems affecting the permeability of imagined 
intergroup boundaries can be discussed. The chapter will be divided as follows.  
First, the idea of imagined boundaries is introduced. Second, base and organising 
themes that were interpreted from the categories identified when coding data in 
Nvivo, are presented and discussed. Third, historical narratives, taken directly from 
the data are explored to reflect the significance of past and /or mythical constructs 
that remain omnipresent in the current representational field. Fourth, by contrasting 
these intergroup group narratives through the processes of objectification and 
anchoring, we can discuss how each of their trajectories has developed over time. 
Finally, a theoretical argument is developed that examines how a narrative approach 
in conflict research has been useful to highlight particular meta narratives as a way 
of understanding intra and intergroup perspectives in relation to a SRT approach.  
4.1.1 Imagined boundaries of consensus and conflict  
The boundary line between two groups in conflict is one that can be imagined 
symbolically.  First, one where a closed border predominates, where a ‘them and us’ 
typology becomes essentialised, leading to ingroup / outgroup present and future 
orientations, or second, one where cross border relationships give rise to possibilities 
of acknowledging the Other. There has been a tendency for the former to take 
precedence, both in the historical and political literature about the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (Sharkansky, 1996; Khaladi, 2006) and also in terms of theoretical 
discussions concerning nationality, social identity and contact (Reicher and 
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Hopkins, 2001; Kelman, 1994, 1999; Billig, 2002; Brewer, 2011). There are two 
possible ways in which this dilemma can be dissected to uncover an alternative 
approach where an imagined crossing of imagined borders can be discussed. First, 
by shifting the concept of boundary to one of a membrane (Joffe and Staerklé, 2007) 
where a boundary zone can be crossed or blocked under certain conditions as human 
activity continually creates new boundaries.  Discussing boundaries as a membrane 
is explored further in Chapter 6 when I consider how semantic barriers and bridges 
can inhibit or aid conflictual group relationships.  Second, using a thematic approach 
in this chapter and the concept of themata in Chapter 5 open a dialogical framework 
to explore cross group relationships without assuming division and difference is the 
only stance from which study the social representations of conflict.      
4.2. Base and organising themes across group boundaries   
A summary of the base and organising themes, encompassing the two global themes 
of conflict and consensus across both sets of participants, is shown diagrammatically 
in Figure 1 on the following page.  These themes were deduced from the categories 
coded in NVivo from individual transcriptions, following a thematic framework as 
suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) and discussed in chapter three. Stemming from 
the global themes of conflict and consensus, organising themes served to indicate 
subject areas from which to consider base themes that were directly related to the 
participants’ ideas, judgements and reflections discussed during the interviews.  
Subject areas included ideological themes, collective positioning, themes around 
collective agency and security themes.  By setting out these themes in a 
diagrammatic format it is possible to view base themes within each organising 
structure across both groups. A comparison can then be made within and across 
group boundaries to explore points of similarity, difference and polyphonic 
expressions.   
The organising and base themes can be said to depict an overall summary 
description of the data that represented the participants’ own narrated descriptions of 
the conflict. Each of these thematic constructs remains significant and represents 
complex subject areas in their own right. Discussing them at this stage of the 
research journey demonstrates the different positionings of both groups and does not 
imply a social psychological reading of their significance. This mapping of what 
was considered to be relevant by the participants was a useful part of the research 
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Figure 3: Global, organising and base themes  
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journey, following a grounded theory approach. I subsequently chose to explore 
the role of the past in researching the present due to the way in which its role was 
depicted in developing perspectives. Without this first summary description, its 
significance as a subject to explore may not have been noted.          
The two global themes, ‘Consensus’ and ‘Conflict’ are set out as antinomies 
where each can be observed through their dialogical relationship with each other 
that represent both polarising positions and those that remain more complex 
where a more polyphasic positioning is observed. The term conflict is given to 
represents difference and opposition, as exemplified here: 
‘In 1948 if they had accepted Israel they would have more land than there 
would ever have got in any peace agreement. I don't see any solution to the 
problem because the Arabs can’t get rid of their resolution of destroying 
Israel and from the other side you don't see Israelis thinking that this land 
belongs to the Arabs.  And therefore they should occupy it. And as long as 
we have the two groups holding that kind of things for years, we have a 
conflict.’      Male, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
 The term consensus is applied to loosely signify a sharing of common 
attributes, as exemplified below:  
‘I would make this into a state of its citizens not just a Jewish state. That is 
what I would do and give the Arabs equal rights as citizens and dismantle 
those privileges that are given at the moment only to Jews.’       Male, 50’s, 
Jewish Israeli.  
 These two quotes underlie the bipolarity of the Jewish Israeli participants 
who tended to take an either / or position. This bi-polarity tended to follow group 
positions of right /left or hawk/dove as discussed by Helman (2002), with 
exceptions surrounding themes of security where more homogeneity was 
observed. The social representations of the Palestinian participants did not reflect 
any left/right polarity and were more homogenous. The examples below 
represent a general framing of conflict, as in the first quote, and that of 
consensus, in the second:  
‘They have all this power and they are destroying our lives, and women and 
children. You want to stop them but you cannot do anything. So that’s why 
you don’t accept what they’re doing and you really hate them because, I 
mean, they’re doing so many unacceptable things and that makes you think 
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that we will never forget. We will never forgive them. It adds to the history 
of hatred and the conflict with them. It doesn’t help. It widens the space.’     
Male, 20’s, Gaza, Palestinian.   
‘There would be a general law for all people and there would be no division 
between the people, whether he’s Jewish or Muslim or a Catholic or 
Christian  under a universal law. If we all under the law we would be 
treated the same and have our rights. We could achieve this because that’s 
what I grew up to believe.’  Male, 30’s, West Bank, Palestinian.  
4.2.1. Base themes surrounding themes of conflict and consensus 
The reporting and discussion of these themes are based on the organising and 
base themes as shown in Figure 1, under the subject headings as described. The 
base themes that stem from the organised themes are presented to explore the 
positionings of both groups, both within and between them. Quotes are given as 
examples that reflect social representations of conflict and consensus to 
demonstrate the rich array of data taken from the transcriptions of interviews. 
However, this does not assume that my interpretation of allying base themes 
under organising themes headings is the only one possible. For example, 
‘resistance’ placed under an organising theme of ‘ideology’ could well have been 
placed under ‘collective agency’ as a form of collective action, yet by placing it 
under an overarching theme of ‘ideology’ this reflects the significance of 
resistance against Israeli hegemony that impacts an ideological thrust to counter 
balance this. The choice of placing base themes into an organising thematic 
structure allows a discussion to develop where classification within a thematic 
structure is a useful starting point, but this does not necessarily assume that a 
particular choice is the only one possible.      
a) Themes of ideology  
Social representation of both conflict and consensus contained themes of 
ideological positioning across both groups.  Representations of nationhood and 
self-determination played a dominant role within the realms of conflict.  Jewish 
Israeli nationalist representations centred on Zionism as a reason for the 
establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 as a haven of peace and security for the 
Jewish people, as exemplified here:   
‘I think that 2000 years of exile has created a sort of deep structure leading 
to Zionism that was bubbling for years and years. All those messianic 
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hopes, hopes for a different life, different realities. They are so deeply 
embedded.’   Male, 50’s, Jewish Israeli.   
‘I think it was during my youth groups when I bought into the Zionist myth. I 
think being aware and being born into the shadow of the Holocaust and it 
made some kind of difference that we needed a homeland. The whole Israeli 
was sold to me as a refuge for Jews against anti-Semitism and this was the 
place that we needed for own survival.’   Female, 50’s, Jewish Israeli.  
The embeddedness of Zionist ideology is portrayed above as a necessary 
and valued factor in attachment to the national cause.  A safe and secure 
homeland stood at the root of many Jewish narratives about Israel, yet at the 
same time, for those who suggested that the root of the conflict lay in the 
occupation of the Other, a pursuit of the Zionist dream without this recognition 
would leave the conflict intractable. 
‘We were very very Zionist. Very much ‘love your country, love your land’. 
We thought we were going to be driven into the sea.’    Female, 50’s. Jewish 
Israeli.  
‘It’s a racist colonialist ideology. At the period it was set up, at the time 
when the British Empire and colonialism was rife across the world, and 
Herzl saw that because of anti-Semitism the Jews needed a homeland, and 
he wasn’t even a religious person … ‘Israel really wants to be part of the 
western world. It’s like, this tiny country and it’s really trying to be part of 
the Western world and in contradiction to the neighbourhood that they are 
located in. One way to separate from the neighbours is to reject them so 
much. To hate.’      Male, 40’s Jewish Israeli.  
 
The trajectory for the Jewish Israeli participants, who positioned 
themselves along a more consensus positioning, included social representations 
of Jewish responsibility for changing the course of the conflict by accepting the 
asymmetry and the need to end the occupation. Some talked of how they had 
transformed their thinking after they had found that their initial Zionist beliefs 
contradicted their own Jewish values. 
‘For me being an Israeli means responsibility, it means having privileges at 
the expense of non Jewish people, both in Israel and the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories. It means that if I don't have responsibility, then I am 
passive, then I am part of the on going problem that will not have its own 
solution until people are active. And so for me it’s a responsibility.’   
Female, 30’s, Jewish Israeli. 
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These participants who followed such a trajectory also talked of universal 
justice and human rights through legal channels such as the United Nations and 
other official bodies. This mirrored the Palestinians whose positioning towards 
consensus also centred on the importance of human rights through an 
international legal framework.  For them, any entry into the global human rights 
arena would require international assistance, due to Palestine being barred from a 
seat and a voice at the United Nations. The UN General Assembly resolution 
67/19 was passed in November 2012 accepting Palestine as a non-member 
observer state after failing to win enough votes to become a full member. This 
route was one that was discussed by many of the Palestinian participants who 
reflected a non-violent resistance strategy.     
‘I don’t believe that violence is the solution. Even at a certain age I thought 
we could coexist, which is why I took the human rights path... the language 
of human rights that everyone is using now is within the NGOs. 
Documenting what the Israelis are doing, what’s going on, and we call it 
non-violent resistance. It would be like more acceptable to people in the 
West because nobody likes the language of violence. I don’t think it’s 
something that gives a good image for us, so hopefully following this line, 
as non-violent resistance I can do something with that.’  Male, 20’s West 
Bank, Palestinian.  
The Palestinian ideological themes were set within a nationalist agenda 
centred on the loss of their homeland for the advantage of the Other as 
exemplified here:  
‘I can’t deny their right to live in this piece of land. The only problem we 
have, the Palestinians have with Israeli government is the state politicians 
who represent the brutal policies of controlling of Palestinians, not only 
land but to the right to live in peace, the right to have their own state.’      
Male, 20’s, West Bank, Palestinian.  
The sense of injustice was particularly felt. 
‘There should be a reason that justifies Israel to continue their, settlement 
expansion, to continue with the enclosure of Gaza, to continue with all its 
policies against Palestinians. What is the reason? What is the facts for them 
that justifies them to go on with their colonial policies?’  Male, 20’s, Gaza, 
Palestinian.   
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Although none of the Palestinian participants expressed a personal 
religious perspective, there was some discussion of the role of religion. Some felt 
that Islam was becoming an increasingly significant force of political strength, 
particularly in Gaza, as a result of oppression and hardship, changing the 
meaning of religious faith from one of spirituality to one that played an 
increasingly important part of their lives within some communities.  
‘When the Israelis attack more and more, and so people begin to think that 
the West is not responding to it by any reaction to the occupation.  Suddenly 
everybody became religious and especially in the first intifada. If you look 
at the images you would hardly see any women wearing a hijab or anything, 
but suddenly everyone became religious. I don’t know why, maybe they felt 
it was really hopeless. Maybe because Hamas was created in 1991, and that 
has had a lot of influence on people as well. And they convince them that 
that we should be more religious, we should stick to our religion, this is like 
a crusade war and so people think more about religion. It’s like a kind of 
reaction. And it’s become like a phobia and people think they should defend 
their religion. And so it changes from everyone is attacking me to everyone 
is attacking religion.’    Male, 20’s, E. Jerusalem, Palestinian.  
 Ideological themes remained central to representations of consensus for 
both groups where a sense of universal justice, within a framework of human 
rights, took centre stage. A difference of their trajectories is significant, as the 
power asymmetry remained inherent within their representational fields.  
The boundaries between the groups tightened and hardened when themes 
of nationhood, leading to the taking of ‘sides’ in an ingroup / outgroup 
dimension, were discussed; and loosened when both groups discussed looking 
beyond the present impasse. Both groups suffered through the impasse of 
intractability and yet at the same time, the positioning was not held to be finite, 
but open to possibility and change. However, within the Jewish Israeli group, 
heterogeneity was visible across a diverse representational field, whilst for the 
Palestinians this was much less evident. A more homogenous stance, with 
representation reflecting their asymmetric status that had the effect of tightening 
boundaries between the groups further was noted.   The role of asymmetry is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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b) Themes of security  
 The most impermeable boundary between the groups was around themes of 
security. Fear, through memories of the Holocaust and thousands of years of 
stigma and anti-Semitism as well as suicide and rocket on civilians in Israel by 
Palestinian militants, was never far from any conversation with Jewish Israeli’s 
from all political persuasions. Their deepest fear was expressed in social 
representations of the annihilation of the state of Israel, as in the following 
quotes:   
‘Things like suicide bombings in Israel they are fading now but nonetheless 
they were pretty horrendous I would never say they weren't. A kind a 
hardening of, it’s hard to explain. It’s the fear barrier ... I am frightened 
that you are taking my land away from me.’    Female, 40’s Jewish Israeli.   
‘The name of the game is fear. If you go to Nazareth you are going to be 
killed. if you go to Bethlehem you're going to be killed and therefore you 
don't go there. It’s nothing to do with reality’    Male, 30’s Jewish Israeli.    
The Palestinian participants described social representations of fear of 
aggression by Israeli soldiers, narratives of being personally abused by them, and 
witnessing violence during armed conflict in the Gaza wars (2008/9, 2014) and 
the second intifada in the West Bank (2001-2005) when the death and injured toll 
was high within the Palestinian population. Again, it was the asymmetric 
relationship that was felt be responsible for the disparity in experiences of direct 
conflict. These actions appeared to increase social representations of hostility and 
hatred in the Palestinian group reflecting their weakened status. 
 ‘I cannot say whether it’s fear or something else that comes from their 
history in Europe -  resentment, anger with Europe or that dislike and 
hatred of people who are not Jewish. Fear is something that you feel when 
you have immediate threat somehow to you, to your security or something. 
And they do perceive threat coming from the Palestinians. Well, if you go 
and kill somebody’s children, you might be scared of  them, that they’ll 
come back to you and take revenge or something. So they put themselves in 
this relationship with Palestinians taking their land, destroying their homes, 
put them in jail and so obviously they know what they are doing. So they 
know that these people have it in for them because they are angry with 
them. And I think that’s more of the fear defining their fear. Because it’s a 
projection it’s imagining that this person will want revenge, will want to 
come back because of all the nasty stuff you did to them. So I think maybe 
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more, I believe that is more about the genuine source of fear.’   Female, 
40’s, West Bank, Palestinian.   
This long quote can be interpreted in many ways but as a concrete 
example of a rejoinder to the Jewish Israeli sense of fear, it encapsulates the gaps 
across the groups in terms of positioning of the Other. The quote also 
demonstrates the significance of the dialogical relationship with the Other, 
exemplifying what can be described as a co-constructed reality that serves to 
develop a narrative based on their intersubjectivity. The dialogical relationship 
across the groups is the focus of the next empirical chapter and will be explored 
further then.    
The descriptions of social representations of security were homogenous 
within each group. All the Palestinians and the left wing Jewish  [Israeli’s] talked 
of an end to violence as it appeared to them to haves served no useful purpose, as 
discussed previously. However, those right wing Jewish [Israelis’s] from a right 
wing stance were more inclined to discuss representations that reflected 
justification of violence as a way of keeping Israel safe from her perceived 
enemies.  
  c) Themes of collective positioning 
The contrast between both groups’ social representations of collective 
positioning highlights both impermeable boundaries and those where a softening 
of boundaries, and even a crossing of them, becomes within the realms of 
possibility.  When discussing conflict, the Palestinians’ representations centred 
on oppression and non-recognition leading to a loss of their individual and 
collective dignity, as they perceived the relationship across the boundary as one 
where they had been dehumanised. By holding on to their historic Arab traditions 
through stories of their homeland pre 1948, their positioning as a people without 
a homeland was perceived as temporary, and that one day they would be free to 
follow their own destiny through self-determination or in a bi-national state for 
both peoples,  as described here: 
‘My opinion is that two states is a little bit hard to achieve for different 
reasons and maybe one state is easier to achieve. There are many reasons, 
for example, I believe if we have a justice and everybody gets his right we 
will be able to live together since we don’t have a divided country by 
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geographic or mountains or something to isolate us that would be Israel or 
Palestine. it doesn’t matter where you go, as long as we have our security 
for everybody and the law.’  Male, 20’s West Bank, Palestinian.   
  For the Jewish Israelis, social representations of Jewishness within a Jewish 
state were central to their existence in Israel, in a safe homeland free from 
tyranny and persecution, where their victim status following the atrocities of the 
Holocaust could be laid to rest. The boundary admitted of no softening as non-
Jews were not welcome in such an enclosed secure environment, and so their 
presence would forever remain a threat. 
‘So the minute you're going to insist on the law of return there's no way, as 
you'll get them all back in the Arab villages and the Jewish state will 
evaporate in thirty or fifty years.  And this is why Netanyahu has said that 
they have to accept the Jewish state or that’s the end of Zionism. The old 
movement of Zionism was to create a Jewish state. And if you come and say 
that it’s not important that it’s not categorised as Jewish or that the 
majority are not Jewish people, That’s the end of Zionism.’ Male, 50’s 
Jewish Israeli  
However, representations that reflected a collective positioning towards 
consensus, demonstrated not only a looser boundary but also one in which the 
boundary could be crossed. Some Jewish Israeli participants also talked about 
their shared past as a conduit for future relationships, co-existence and even a bi-
national state, where Jewishness would no longer be considered a requisite for 
nationality. This approach was felt to be the only viable alternative to a conflict 
that would provide a just and equitable solution as exemplified below: 
‘I think a lot of Arabs feel, they want to stay put, they want peace. My dream 
would be that it would be one country for Israel and Palestinians and the 
West Bank. It would all be one and that's my dream. And those who live 
outside would have to apply to come.  It wouldn't have to be automatic right 
of return.  It’s a lot to me, from my background, from the Holocaust. I love 
the feeling that I have Israeli nationality and I would never give it up … The 
word bi-national state is something I would never state in front of my 
family. But for me that would be great.’    Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.  
 Further, a shared cultural heritage across entities such as cuisine and 
music was already felt to be anchored across both groups. The Palestinian 
participants who discussed representations of collective positioning towards 
consensus similarly talked of a bi-national state, again giving the example of a 
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shared past over centuries of living peacefully together that would lay the 
foundations of a future relationship based on co-existence. However, the balance 
within the representational field of collective positioning for both sides, and 
particularly the Palestinian participants, was more towards representations of 
conflict rather than consensus.  A participant from Gaza and another from East 
Jerusalem demonstrate their sense of being stigmatised in a no win situation.   
‘Most people in Gaza have been treated as some sort of contagion that 
needs to be contained. They have been deprived of anything related to just 
being humans. They have been deprived of their rights, they have been 
deprived of their humanity. So how are you going to make people like that 
interact with people who are supposedly normal, who have lived in a very 
stable society?’    Female, 40’s, Gaza, [Palestinian] 
‘They don’t trust us, they just think that were going to do something bad. I 
think they think we’re violent, but at the same time you see Israelis when 
they don’t differentiate between you and other people, and so you are seen 
as a radical Palestinian. I think  if you are treated the same and they 
humiliate you and treat you like an animal than of course you’re going to 
say ‘Fuck this, who cares? That’s why I’m sort of like I am where I am.’  
Male, 20’s East Jerusalem, Palestinian. 
Some Jewish Israeli participants felt the sense of intractability across 
closed boundaries strongly, as illustrated here: 
‘Collective identities are constructed around opposition to the other. We 
have to define ourselves by the enemies and everyone who doesn’t think so 
is weak.’   Male, 30’s Jewish Israeli.  
And yet others demonstrated an alternative path where the softening the 
boundaries between the groups was more than imagined.     
‘Living reciprocally is the way. It means living shoulder to shoulder. Not 
just co-existence but really living together and looking in the same 
direction.’   Female, 30’s, Jewish Israeli.   
d) Themes of collective agency  
Finally, themes of collective agency demonstrated the intergroup asymmetric 
relationship.  Racist overtones were discussed by some Jewish Israeli 
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participants, whose preference for a Jewish only state was referred to, as 
exemplified here: 
‘They treat us like animals. And they treat themselves like animals and their 
own kids. And there is a saying that we will have peace with them when they 
start loving their children more than they hate us ...  the way they behave I 
don’t think of them as people. Because people don't behave like that. And I 
know they see us as probably the same, but like I said I wish everyone would 
let others live and leave them alone. I of course, I don’t have to like them 
but I'd much rather hate them and have them out of our lives, you know.’   
Female, 20’s, Jewish Israeli.   
The Palestinian participants discussed representations that demonstrated 
their lack of agency whilst living under an occupied more powerful Other: 
‘I feel that they are occupiers, they are oppressors and they also lie. They 
are all from different countries and now they have more rights than me. I 
feel that they don’t belong to the country. That’s the general idea they are 
occupiers. I do know some Israeli people and they are really nice but that’s 
en masse what it feels like.’ Female 20’s, E Jerusalem, Palestinian.  
However, a positioning that also generated representations of consensus 
was evident in the data with both groups acknowledging the Other, and the 
Jewish Israeli group showing signs of empathy and identification that portrayed a 
willingness to be open to facilitate change. 
’When I lived in Israel it was different. Here I can see it in a different way 
because I have met Palestinians, can see what’s going on, hear their own 
personal stories. And I can identify with that.’     Female, 40’s, Jewish 
Israeli.   
The Palestinian group further discussed representations surrounding the 
need for the input from international agencies, as they remained powerless 
without such an intervention. Some spoke of the need for a ‘normal’ life free 
from the strains of occupation and conflict. The experience of life in a liberal 
western democracy had been welcomed, not only as an escape from conflict but 
also as an opportunity to reflect on it.  Certainly by leaving the specific geo-
political space of the conflict, different representational fields had been opened 
for both groups to consider.  
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‘I’ve always had to kind of think that we do have a right to the land, and the 
Jewish people claim they have a right to be there and in a way I’ve always 
chosen to stick with the international law, and perspective ... As long as you 
respect other people’s rights, and I’m talking about basic human rights, and 
you are not infringing that, then you can practice your own religion, 
atheism or whatever you want to do. Nobody will come bashing that and tell 
you why you are doing that.’    Male, 30’s, West Bank, Palestinian.   
The framework of the organising and base themes was a useful exercise 
in this first stage of the research journey in order to explore imagined boundaries. 
By setting them out in the way recommended by Attride-Stirling (2001) I was 
able to become familiar with the data and acknowledge the inter and intra 
groups’ differences and commonalities.  Exploring the themes gave the 
opportunity to describe the conflict as perceived by the participants in general 
terms, initially as a sketch waiting for more detail to portray more depth and 
allow a more focused and explanatory picture to emerge. I was able to 
understanding the perceived asymmetry, which will be discussed further in the 
next section.  I then consider how a thematic approach relates to the literature of 
conflict, before highlighting the role of the past in understanding the present.      
4.2.2. Asymmetry and power relationships  
The social representations that were discussed throughout the interviews 
demonstrated an asymmetrical relationship of control and power affecting group 
boundary formation and development. The presence of asymmetry across the 
groups is central to the Palestinians’ narratives and resulting thematic constructs. 
Although violent conflict has led both groups to perceive the Other as the enemy, 
with representations around themes of mutual destruction,  this does not assume 
military or political equality. Israel’s military capacity is far superior to that of 
Palestinian resistance or militant groups. There is no formal military capability in 
place to protect the Palestinian people due to their occupied and / or controlled 
status.  Powell and Maoz (2014) argued that greater military power and greater 
political authority does not necessarily lead to an empowered status; rather, it 
may lead to an even greater drive to suppress any potential risk, even from 
relatively weak parties. Each group assesses their weak/strong antinomy in 
different ways. The weaker group might fear total domination and so act on that 
by contesting and resisting it (Maoz, 2010, 2011), whilst stronger parties, 
103 
 
although less fearful of domination, can become more sensitive to levels of threat 
and so become motivated to act before any potentiality can be realised  (Powell 
and Maoz, 2014). The Palestinian participants discussed their relationship with 
the Other in terms of a sense of powerlessness, not only when under military 
attack, but also in their lived experience of subordination, humiliation and loss of 
collective and personal dignity. The Palestinians’ descriptions were often based 
on the consequences of the asymmetry and its effect on their lives, whilst the 
Jewish Israeli participants described ways of justifying the asymmetry, for 
example through themes of threat and security. This does not suggest that a 
comparison is not feasible because of the said asymmetry. It is the space that 
stands between the groups’ sets of perceptions that will be highlighted and 
discussed, so as to explore the permeability of their imagined intergroup 
boundaries.    
4.2.3. The role of themes in conflict research  
 The discussion of themes evident in these interviews with those with a lived 
experience of conflict has been a useful exercise. It has provided an overall 
summary of where the two groups position themselves, both in relation to their 
own group and that of the Other. It has provided a base from which to explore the 
conflict further by the identification of thematic subject areas that were deemed 
to be central to the conflict. Themes of ideology, security, collective positioning 
and agency, set within the conflict context of asymmetry, affected each set of 
organising and base themes.  
The social psychology of intractable conflict has been discussed along the 
lines of an ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013), where the justness of ones’ own 
goals, the delegitimisation of the Other, and the influence of self-imposed 
victimhood, all play a significant role.  I found examples of this in my data. The 
rules of behaviour that reflect a national societal belief system can guide 
behaviour and actions that are intrinsically value laden (Kohlberg, 1984) and 
where collective emotional orientations remain paramount (Bar-Tal, 2013).  
 Bizumic et al (2013) surveying over 4,000 Americans and Danes, 
reported that ideological beliefs were a significant factor when exploring 
attitudes towards peace and war following a similar thread found in my study. 
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Attitudes towards peace centred on ideological themes such as egalitarianism and 
empathy, international harmony and equality. Conversely attitudes towards war 
were influenced by right-wing tendencies, national loyalties, national security 
and defence against threats, right-wing tendencies, national loyalties, national 
security and defence against threats influenced attitudes towards war. These 
results support the importance of ideological beliefs and values in a war / peace 
continuum, (Braithwaite, 2009). The concept of a ‘lived ideology’ and 
‘intellectual ideology’ (Billig et al, 1988) is useful in interpreting the data, as 
each participant’s narrative reflected his or her own experience of living within 
an ideological framework - in whatever form it was perceived by the individual.  
Billig (1987) argues further that individuals within a ‘lived ideology’ engage in a 
narrative that takes on counter positions in order to arrive at a particular point of 
view. By using open ended interviewing, where my participants were encouraged 
to reflect on their own and the Other’s positionings, I have been able to map out 
these themes that appeared central to the conflict. Themes of ideology intersected 
with those that reflected these positions in terms of agency and security in a 
framework of intergroup asymmetry. This has enabled me to consider 
multiplicity across the social constructs of conflict, as reflected by the by the 
participants, where a priori categorisation might inhibit such an approach. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often discussed in terms of essentialised 
constructs based on religion, ethnicity and culture and yet the boundaries across 
the groups remain murky and unclear (Hallward, 2007). By exploring boundaries 
between Israeli and Palestinian peace activists it was found that there were some 
common trajectories based on a just peace: 
‘Boundaries are differentially permeable to different groups of people … 
members challenge official boundaries imposed by the state and seek to 
reconstruct boundaries of belonging, one that allows for membership of 
multiple categories.’ (Hallward, 2007, p.99).  
Although peace activists form a small minority in Israel and Palestine, the 
example of these groups show that impermeable boundaries that separate and 
homogenise their societies into perceived monolithic categories of Other and Self 
are being resisted. Social categorisation works to simplify the social world, and 
so can also inhibit further exploration through the reification and essentialisation 
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of social groups (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012). This is particularly 
significant where conflict is often represented by the ‘good guys’ against the ‘bad 
guys’ (Moghaddam, Harré and Lee, 2008) and yet as this chapter has shown, a 
variety of thematic positions have been discussed that widen the discussion of 
conflict to include how boundaries are imagined by both groups, often in quite 
complex ways. One way, which heralded further interpretation, was the role of 
the past in the coming to terms with the present. All participants spontaneously 
talked of the past in justifying a present positioning. The following section 
explores this in greater depth to take into account the theoretical journey of the 
thesis.   
4.3. From the past to the future via the present   
Narratives about a collective past were often spoken of spontaneously across 
both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian participants. This appeared to serve the 
purpose of placing a participant in a particular position within the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict - often as a means of justifying that positioning.    
 ‘They claim the land because they were the generation who was born on 
the land. You know nobody actually promised them on their Bible - the 
Koran obviously doesn't say anything about Israel. The Palestinian 
generation was born there so they have the same claim as I have, but we 
historically and biblically have a claim.’     Male, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
 ‘I went to Jaffa, which is very beautiful, and there you see the parks. And I 
think ‘Oh my people - what they used to have.’  It’s kind of sad. There is a 
sort of evidence there, we used to... we used to live there you know… and 
it’s part of, that’s the reason, like most of the people do not have to go to the 
past. But in our case we don’t have this. And that’s a problem. We know 
that. That we see the past and what happened in the past and we go back 
there.”     Male, 30’s, West Bank, Palestinian.           
The above quotes contain themes of ‘what they used to have’; unresolved 
loss for the Palestinian participant and a justification for the claim of the land 
through historical biblical myths for the Jewish Israeli participant. The number of 
references to the past was such that it merited further exploration to discover the 
relevance of these narratives in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today.   
This can show how historical representations continue to develop group 
relationships, build or undermine intergroup and intragroup solidarity, cohesion 
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and identification. This section explores first, the significant role of perceived 
past events in the public consciousness and second, on a more theoretical level, 
the relationship between the role of narratives and social psychology - with 
particular reference to the conceptual ties with SRT when exploring a 
representational field. This is discussed in relation to how the roots and history of 
this conflict not only remain in the present representational field, but also act as a 
mediator for future action.  
4.3.1. The significance of interpreting the past: what did or didn’t happen  
The significance of the past in studying the present was introduced in Chapter 
two to review the literature related to conflict research and will be further 
discussed after I report on the empirical findings concerning historical 
representations. The motivation for the constructions of perspectives of the past 
includes building and rebuilding political legitimacy, resisting criticism to 
authorise the preferred version of specific points of history, and demonstrating a 
political reality (Misztal, 2003). Political events hold the capacity to acquire the 
simplicity of essences and myths that can organise the world as ‘it establishes a 
blissful clarity’ (Barthes, 1957 / 1993 p. 143). War can be glorified within the 
collective memory of victorious nations (Olick, 2003) opening up the willingness 
to fight in the future where the interpretation of history can be indistinguishable 
from the propaganda of the victors (Shlaim, 2009). The connection between the 
significance of the past when discussing the present can be explored further 
through the processes of objectification and anchoring, to demonstrate 
developing social representations over time.    
4.3.2. Objectification and anchoring, from experience to collective memory   
The concepts of objectification and anchoring, introduced in Chapter 3, 
demonstrates how new phenomenon can be incorporated, constructed and 
reconstructed into developing social representations in order to denote new 
justifications or ideas within a prevailing cultural tradition. The significance of 
creating new systems of knowledge shared across a community is only useful if 
preceding social representations, that have motivated events of the past, can be 
identified in order to understand a present perception of reality. This 
understanding is particularly significant in conflict research if both groups reach 
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a point where negotiation of their relationship is based on the hope of a more 
peaceful future.  
‘Objectification saturates the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, turns it 
into the very essence of reality’ (Moscovici, 2000, p. 49) and so transforms the 
abstract social object into one that is considered to be a more concrete. As these 
newly objectified representations become more familiar, they become reified 
within the community as they swirl into a developing conversation within the 
representational field.  From this objectified reified base, further related 
perceptions, ideas and other social objects can be anchored. As time passes, these 
representations can become embedded within the particular cultural domain and 
become potentially resistant to change.  As semantic barriers (Gillespie 2008) 
they serve to inhibit alternative representations from entering the field. This 
fashioning of a perceived reality is significant in the study of conflict research as 
it enables the researcher to explore a kernel of present reality located in the past 
and then show how representations relate to key themata.  An understanding of 
these processes and knowledge of their contents would be required if both parties 
wished to negotiate a path from less conflict to more consensus. At the same 
time, these developing representations can also serve to establish and extend a 
positional ideological and political rhetoric leading to a hegemonic positioning 
by the more powerful group (Nicholson, 2016).  However, representational fields 
also hold the possibility of being contested when competing constructions can 
lead to splintering, where some representations are recognised as being more 
legitimate than others (Jovchelovitch, 2012). Nations, as any other social 
community, continually create their own histories and interpret them to reflect a 
desired positioning (Billig, 1995).   
For the Jewish Israeli participants, the collective memory of the 
Holocaust, when half the world’s Jewry was exterminated, remains in the present 
day collective consciousness. The narratives of the present contained these 
narratives of the past.  In this following example, a reference to the Holocaust 
positions the speaker as one who believed that Israel stands for a ‘homeland’ or 
safe haven, free from the fear of further ethnic cleansing in the future:    
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‘I was about ten and in primary school and we had a questionnaire leading 
up to 'What do you think is the consequence of the Holocaust?' And they 
didn't give you an answer and through a series of questions it led to a 
narrowing down to: ‘An establishment of the state of Israel.’ That's your 
answer. A homeland for the Jewish people.  And everybody saw it and the 
turning point was the Holocaust.’   Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
 
This narrative reflects how the Holocaust was objectified as an 
everlasting memorial to those who lost their lives so tragically into one of 
‘security in statehood’, representing a perceived fundamental need for a secure 
homeland within one’s own nation state. And further, that it was anchored across 
domains of suffering and solidarity of the Jewish cultural community throughout 
the centuries of living in the diaspora. 
‘My family’s origin is Yemen... they believe that Israel is the only place that 
people can live. They suffered from hostility, not on a daily basis but, they 
always dreamt about coming to Israel, to the Holy Land, not so much about 
being extreme about it, but it’s about yearning. Every aspect of their lives 
basically was directed to that point.’   Female, 30’s, Jewish Israeli. 
Over time, the social representations surrounding the Holocaust have 
evolved, demonstrating this original objectification and anchoring. Sonnenschein 
et al (2010) explored identity in terms of an existential threat, between Jewish 
and Arab university students in Israel during an encounter group. The Israeli 
Jewish students discussed identity in terms of their perceived threat to Jewish 
hegemony, and the threat to the moral worth of Israeli Jews’ national identity, 
rather than the real threat from the Palestinians. In Sonnenschein’s study, the 
Holocaust was seen as an eternal experience leading to the perception of the 
conflict with the Palestinians as a continuation of that.  
‘I am a Jew, meaning that my family went through the Holocaust and we 
are a persecuted people everywhere and we have to have somewhere to be. 
The Holocaust for me is my identity; it is almost the identity of a Holocaust 
survivor… I was born into a reality where all kinds of nations hate me…  
the whole world hates us… I need a strong, strong place to have as a home.’  
(Sonnenschein et al 2010, p. 51)    
These objectified representations anchored in the need for security in a 
safe homeland have continued to flourish.  They can be discussed in terms of the 
organising themes of security where the insecurity of the past remains firmly 
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based in the present representational field.  The question of uncertainty in the 
future relates to the perceived continued need for a secure and protective state.     
‘I was living in Miami and there were lots of people with tattoos from the 
concentration camps. My grandparents were there. And these people are 
dying. Most of them will be gone in the next ten or twenty years.  Once they 
have gone then what? So what you do? Because that’s why you need a 
strong state of Israel, so it never happens again.’        Male, 40’s, Jewish 
Israeli.                                                             
The degree of reification of representations within this thematic 
framework reflects the on going fear of extinction that has not only remained 
embedded within the community but has been transferred to another community 
who had no involvement in the Holocaust:    
‘We are encouraged to believe that the Arabs are the new Nazis, that the 
same teachings of the third Reich that they really do constitute both a 
security threat and ideological threat.’   Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.   
In contrast, the Palestinian participants’ narratives describe their own 
version of events surrounding 1948 signifying their own displacement elsewhere. 
This has been objectified as a tragedy, and referred to by Palestinians as ‘The 
Nakba’, perceived as their homeland being taken by the Other’s ethnic cleansing 
strategy. Those displaced, along with their dependents, described how they their 
fate remains inconclusive as they remain in waiting sixty years later. These social 
representations have led to narratives anchored in terms of their collective 
positioning, where they remain politically and structurally unrecognised, 
oppressed and lacking in dignity.    
‘The thing is, and I know many other Palestinians feel so bad about what 
happened to them. But what makes us, makes this whole connection, that 
ever since they came to occupy Palestine, that every time you hear anything, 
they always bring the Holocaust card. That has made us a little fed up. Not 
that we don’t feel sorry for them, or we didn’t feel sympathy for what 
happened. Ok. But the fact that we have been paying the price for them 
since then is not fair.’   Female, 40’s, West Bank, Palestinian.    
Representations are further anchored in the Palestinians’ sense of 
victimhood and powerlessness, reflected in their present geo-political status of 
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being stateless through the actions of the Other with a loss of any national 
identification and positioning.    
‘So most people, all Arab people, they understand the Holocaust. They 
understand the consequences of that, right? The thing is, no-one will 
understand the Nakba. They say it’s just because you want to revolt against 
the Israelis. But they don’t understand ... they have Independence Day. So 
not only do you have to take that. That’s like a rape, that they also accept 
the rape... It’s in our psyche this whole Palestinian thing. And it goes from 
one generation to the next. Even if you’re living as a second generation. I 
have friends who have been brought up and never visited Palestine in their 
lives, but they know everything’.     Male, 20’s, Gaza, Palestinian.     
References to the Bible, as in the quote at the beginning of this section, 
were often used to justify Israel’s claim to the land. These representations were 
objectified as a form of unquestioned divine right, and anchored to beliefs that 
justify the right of a deity to define a legal status. As a further justification, the 
sale of land from the indigenous Palestinians to newly arrived  Jewish 
immigrants in the years leading up to 1948, was anchored within a similar 
hegemonic framework but then related to a more modern concept of land 
ownership – that is, buying it from willing vendor through a legal process.   
‘It's the history behind it all. If you want to go back to that, we were there 
two to three thousand years before anyone else. It’s a moot point but we 
were there first . It’s really complicated.  Because there was no Palestine, 
there was just a mandate given to the British to look after it.’  Female, 50’s, 
Jewish Israeli. 
‘We were there 2000 years before them … They lived on our land quite 
frankly and if you really want to go on about it  we bought it back again two 
hundred years ago.’ Male, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
The acknowledgement of these justification representations is illustrated 
here as a narrative anchored in resignation of the positioning of the Other 
embedded and reified within their representational field: 
‘I remember a reporter coming to this guy, a Haredim Jew. And he asked 
him, he said to him - you know you’re in Hebron (a town in the West Bank) 
with 120,000 Palestinians and 400 settlers, what are you doing here? And 
he goes to him - Abraham promised this to Hebron 3000 years ago. And 
that was his answer. I’m always talking about these arguments, they keep 
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coming up and I can tell you with my eyes closed.’  Female, 30’s, West 
Bank, Palestinian.     
The boundary between the groups in the example above is both a 
collective and a security thematic positioning, beginning over two thousand years 
ago. It began in a loss of dignity to the Jewish people who were ‘sent into exile’ 
and then returned in order to flee persecution and destruction after the Holocaust. 
This is mirrored in the Palestinian indigenous population being forced to flee 
from their homeland. For the ancestors of Palestinians displaced during the 
conflict in 1948, their refugee status remains objectified as a people without 
nationhood, and is anchored in a loss of dignity at their perceived loss at the 
hands of a powerful Other. These narratives, embedded with the base themes of 
loss of collective agency, reflect further the anchoring of family traditions of 
collective songs of mourning as a way of keeping a possible future narrative 
alive.   
‘I am a refugee actually. I remember my grandfather talking about his 
village - it´s called Shafiar – it’s like 30 km north of Gaza. There are three 
small villages next to each other. So he kept telling me the stories and 
singing the songs and the day they left, when they left the village. And my 
father as well. And they encountered different refugees in different 
countries.'  Female, 20’s, Gaza, Palestinian.   
The Palestinian participants narrate their representations based on themes 
of oppression and asymmetry. 
‘Most people in Gaza have been treated as some sort of contagion that 
needs to be contained. They have been deprived of anything related to just 
being humans. They have been deprived of their rights, they have been 
deprived of their humanity.  So how do you like going to make people like 
that interact with people who are supposedly normal who have lived in a 
very stable society?’    Male, 20’s, Gaza, Palestinian.   
Social representations surrounding themes of oppression, with a strong 
desire for both an individual and collective dignity, were central to this 
representational field. Although these narratives were born of the past they are 
still instilled within present day life. These historical representations of loss 
continue to be anchored within the individual and the community’s memories of 
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their displacement and statelessness, permeating the present and future - as 
illustrated here by a young man not born until many years after 1948. 
 ‘And we are thinking that being Palestinian is one part that came before 
’48, to keep and protect your personhood as you are Palestinian. Of course, 
the conflict makes it more important for us to keep our roots, to keep our 
dignity as Palestinians. It means a lot for me. I’m sure if I, for example, was 
born in some double nationality, or another, that is not so important that I 
am from where or I belong to, but not so important as when I am saying that 
for me, my identity is Palestinian.’        Male, 30’s West Bank, Palestinian.   
 This young man’s assertion demonstrates a direct relationship between the 
need for a continued sense of belonging to his past roots, as part of his present 
positioning, and the significance of the conflict on that challenge, both as an 
individual and a community. This suggests a denial of an identity born of the 
conflict lying within these themes of oppression under the guise of loss and gain 
for the Other. The events leading up 1948, their consequences, and their 
subsequent interpretations by both groups, show clearly the difficulties of 
crossing group boundaries without some recourse to these historical 
representations.           
4.4. Discussion: The reified world of historical narratives    
The narratives quoted in this chapter have been chosen to illustrate how 
objectification and anchoring of social representations have developed across the 
groups. They reflect reified narratives that have become part of their common 
sense knowledge systems, where imaginary boundary positions are explored.  
This relates to the concept of narratives, as suggested by Jovchelovitch (2012), 
which cannot be attributed to the stories of one individual. Instead narratives 
contain slices of social and historical life; they produce and re-produces 
mythologies and traditional practices as collective memories that remain 
embedded within institutionalised rituals. Bar-Tal (2014) argued that 
constructions of the past feed into societal beliefs during intractable conflicts; 
they then take their cue from the social representations that are anchored and 
communicated within the informal and social narratives of the individual, and by 
formal discourse through the media, education, and governing bodies. The 
perspective of the past builds and rebuilds a political legitimacy (Misztal 2003) in 
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order to resist criticism, to authorise a preferred version of specific points of 
history and to institute a particular political reality.  
4.4.1. Kernels and meta narratives 
The fashioning of representational field where objectification and anchoring of 
representations of conflict have become central to representational themes 
between the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups, as illustrated in this chapter. 
Their development has served to strengthen a positional rhetoric, narrated from 
the past to justify the present and culturally embedded reflecting how “nations 
continually reproduce themselves as nation states in an international world of 
nations” (Tileageă 2014, p.113). The notion of a kernel 2 refers to the original 
development of the social representations forming foundational themes is 
suggested as being interesting to conflict research. By exploring and identifying 
the intersecting kernels of both groups to understanding the core of the divisions, 
a way forward towards consensus and away from conflict can at least be 
imagined. The idea of a kernel was first mooted by Moscovici and Vignaux 
(2000) to reflect an underpinning that stems from language and linguistic traces, 
perceived as ideas and representations. These traces can be filtered through the 
discourse of others, and are created and preserved within the community; hence 
the contextual meaning extends beyond any particular individual.  The kernel is 
set within the relevant themata, where both knowledge and experience constitute 
a particular foundation. The concept of themata as a development from 
discussing a more general thematic background will be discussed in the 
following empirical chapter, Chapter 5.    
The idea of a foundational base has also been suggested by others when 
discussing historical narratives.  Lázló (1997), for example, used the term ‘frozen 
historical stories’ where, ‘the culture communicates to its members the possible 
set of story skeletons” (p. 70) whilst Wertsch (2008) referred to a cognitive 
narrative template that emerges from different interpretations of history that 
become conductors of collective communication affecting individual and group 
public discourse and dialogue.  Bruner (1990) referred to this similarly with the 
                                               
2
 
2
Mosovici and Vignaux (2000) name this as both a figurative kernel and a semantic 
kernel. For simplicity I have used the term kernel without any prefix. 
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concept of a shared cultural toolkit made up from inferences from such sources 
as the media, formal education, public holidays and family communications 
collected over time. At the same time other scholars have used the term ‘master 
narrative’ to denote base themes that stand as a positioning device for a particular 
purpose. Bar-Tal (2014) defined a master narrative as a cluster of beliefs that is 
applicable in the context of intractable conflict, and which superimpose and 
support sets of positions.  Hammack (2010) used the term tragic master narrative 
to represent the positioning of loss and displacement of Palestinian youth living 
under occupation. Tileageă (2008) also used the term when discussing the 
Romanian revolution in 1989 to denote political strategies related to category 
membership.  Wertsch (2002) suggested that these templates become cultural 
tools that continue to be shaped as people continually reflect on past 
representations mediated by present day events. Olick (1999) added that cultural 
tools don’t only reflect group solidarity, but are instrumental in developing group 
formation. Collective memories can attempt to establish an essential truth 
(Novick, 1999) by detaching from it any historical complexity that would require 
multiple perspectives as, ‘it is impatient with ambiguities of any kind that reduce 
events to mythic archetypes’ (p.4). These truths can then become resistant to 
change as those with political power may want to preserve these underlying 
narrative templates for their own ambitions. Where prevailing memories become 
an active reconstruction of the past (Tileageă, 2008) they lead to developing 
social representations where individuals are, ‘saturated by the implicit and 
explicit presence of others relations’ discursive and dialogical resources, 
narrative tools and wider social frameworks of meaning making’ (p.111). Using 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an example, Bar-Tal (2000) suggested that a 
societal ethos continually re-constructs historical patterns through a selective 
interpretive manner, in order to provide legitimacy. This is similar to Liu and 
Lázló (2007) who use the term ‘charter’, borrowed from dynamic systems theory, 
to explain a dependence on certain conditions for collective actions; and also 
refers to the significance of historical representations in justifying societal 
positioning.  
These theoretical positions can be understood in relation to my own data 
from those who have had a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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The participants’ historical narratives have provided a rich source of material to 
demonstrate a plethora of different positions between the groups. Both groups 
were familiar with these narrative templates and used them as a positioning tool 
for their own perspective or as an alternative one that strays away from a 
particular template, for example:  
 ‘Many many Israelis will argue that there is no occupation, that we didn’t 
occupy anything. It’s written in the Bible, yes. It’s written in the Bible or 
because when Israelis bought land from the Arabs in Jaffa and Tel Aviv. 
They are saying they wanted to sell and if you decided in 47 then it’s their 
problem. And people will find thousands of reasons that there is no 
occupation. There is a problem. There is a conflict. If you’re not going to 
listen to the other side, if you’re not going to think, it’s not going to change 
anything.’  Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
The concept of a kernel has been useful when discussing historical 
narratives. First, conceptually it adds to the research that uses terms such as a 
master narrative, frozen stories, cultural tools and templates. Through these 
prisms, collective belief systems can be explored and described, not only within 
the groups but through a dialogical relationship with the Other.  By defining how 
these kernels have developed through objectification and anchoring, becoming 
culturally embedded, can show how imagined boundaries between the groups can 
harden. Conversely, kernels that reflect contesting social representations and 
highlight the possible permeability of boundaries that may result in an alternative 
positioning, can be explored. 
4.5. Conclusion   
This first empirical chapter outlined the foundation of the thesis by exploring the 
significance of the conflict on the lives of those who had a lived experience of it. 
By using an open interview style that allowed each participant to narrate their 
own perceptions of themselves and the Other, a rich and substantive data set was 
created. With the assistance of NVivo, an array of categories was established in 
order to start the process of coding the data into global, organising and base 
themes. The results of this were shown diagrammatically to demonstrate how 
each group positioned itself in relation to itself and the Other. Quotes taken from 
the data exemplified the meaning and standing of these portrayals and accounts 
of their experiences. Many were discussed as social representations that had been 
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communicated within the communities and that also related to their dialogical 
relationship with the Other. Of particular interest were the significant social 
representations about the past that affected their present positioning. This was 
explored further through the processes of objectification and anchoring to help 
understand how historical representations developed over time; representations 
that both presented a particular collective positioning and / or justified it in 
relation to the Other. The idea of a foundational kernel that stood at the base of 
the participants’ understanding of the conflict was discussed, both as a descriptor 
and as a theoretical concept.  It can serve to start a conversation about how each 
side remains trapped by the foundations of the past and also how they might be 
open to alternative trajectories once the systems underlying these foundations 
have begun to shift. The asymmetry across the groups was demonstrated through 
these thematic pathways and was discussed in relation to the conflict.  
From this base, my research journey returns to Israel to explore the dialogical 
relationship between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis who have co-existed along 
segregated trajectories since the birth of Israel in 1948. By examining how they 
work together as professional medics it will be possible to assess their working 
and social relationships, intersected with their foundational relationships, and 
explore further the imagined boundaries that may lie between them 
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5. Conflict and consensus as lived experience: Jewish and Palestinian 
Israeli medics sharing their working lives  
5.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter explored the social representations of those who had a lived 
experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet at the time of the interview were 
far from it. An array of themes in the data was deemed to be significant to reflect 
both consensus and conflict across their representational fields. A notable finding 
was the role of the past when discussing the present as a prerequisite to looking 
to the future. Historical narratives from both groups, served as kernels of social 
knowledge that acted as justifications to verify a variety of group positions. This 
empirical chapter explores the experiences of group members (Jewish and 
Palestinian citizens of Israel) who trained and worked together as professional 
medics in Northern Israel where their lived experience was based on the 
structural segregation of the two communities closely related to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The concept of a kernel as a foundational entity is taken 
further to encompass the role of themata as a base from which to explore the 
social representations of a shared professional life amidst a conflicted 
relationship.  
The seed of this research journey was planted during an interview with a 
Jewish Israeli young man living in the UK as part of the first study. He had 
commented that he would never live in the same block of flats where a 
Palestinian Israeli was known to be a resident and later commented that he would 
trust his life with a Palestinian Israeli doctor. When questioned on this anomaly 
he reported that although it appeared to be a contradiction, there was a shortage 
of doctors in Israel with Palestinian Israelis willing to fill the gap having been 
denied access to ‘High Tech’ professions due to the close relationship with the 
Israeli military and he suggested most Jewish Israelis felt this was a satisfactory 
compromise. By exploring these relationships, I wanted to consider the following 
questions:  
 Do Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics satisfactorily work together on an 
equal footing in an environment that welcomes both groups to share a 
professional career path?  
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 How might this relationship differ outside this ‘protected’ professional 
environment in terms of mixed social friendships and perceived structural 
differences? 
  What, if anything, had the effects of professional contact with the Other 
had on their social representations of the conflict?   
The chapter is organised as follows: first, the sample and the research field is 
introduced. Second, the role of imagined boundaries is considered followed by a 
brief revisit of the contact research literature as discussed in Chapter 2. Third, the 
theoretical concept of themata is discussed as a development from the previous 
chapter where foundational myths were discussed alongside thematic processes. 
Fourth, the significance of intergroup relationships within the framework of 
themata is explored through a dialogical analysis to reflect on the social 
positionings of the polyphasic nature of communities in conflict. Finally, a 
discussion on how these findings relate to the research literature on contact is 
considered.   
The sample consisted of twenty medics: seventeen doctors and three senior 
nurses divided between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis, as described in the 
methodology chapter, Chapter 3. Individual semi-structured interviews took 
place in northern Israel during October 2014. Recordings were all transcribed by 
me, apart from four that were transcribed by a professional transcription agency. 
Data was categorised with NVivo as a base from which to explore further 
analysis. Relevant themata were identified to broach the dialogical relationship in 
the contrasting environments of work and outside work.      
5.2. Contact as a harbinger of acknowledging the Other 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on contact has been central to any social 
psychological discussion about intergroup conflict.  The core propositions have 
been well established in numerous empirical studies, (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; 
Dixon, Durrheim & Tredoux, 2005). Pettigrew and Troop (2006) carried out a 
meta-analysis of 515 studies involving more than 250,000 participants across 
many nationalities, reporting a significant reduction in prejudice following 
contact initiatives. This was even more pronounced when contact situations were 
made through group friendships in a context of equality. There were however, 
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marked differences between the perceptions of minority and majority groups 
suggesting that these groups might construe interaction between groups 
differently (Swart et al, 2011). For example, those from minority and 
disadvantaged groups were found to anticipate more prejudice against them than 
from those members of the majority group (Sellers and Shelton, 2003). Maoz 
(2011) addressed contact work over a period of twenty years between Jewish and 
Palestinian Israelis and found that particular ways of approaching encounter 
groups was key to more positive outcomes of reaching across group boundaries.  
Encounter groups that followed programmes based on the sharing of narratives, 
as well as those that offered possibilities of confrontation, were found to be more 
successful in softening boundaries.  There has been very little research into 
exploring the effects of contact between Jewish and Palestinian professionals 
working together. However, Desivila (1998) explored professional relationships 
within a medical setting on levels of coexistence amongst Jewish and Palestinian 
Israeli physicians and nurses in Northern Israel and found that in their work 
setting, contact had resulted in satisfactory professional relationships with both 
colleagues and patients. At the same time, there were no perceived changes in 
any individual sense of national identity across the groups. The softening of 
boundaries where groups in conflict may reach a position of sharing a socio-
cultural entity has been a major interest and concern of the contact hypothesis 
research.    
5.2.1. Exploring themata across imagined boundaries  
The concept of themata is particularly useful in conflict research as a tool for 
exploring intergroup imagined boundary lines, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
significance of themata became evident in Chapter 4 after using a thematic 
structure as a base for analysis as suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001). The 
organising and base themes fell into opposing antinomies that reflected polarising 
consensus / conflict developments both within and between the groups. Not only 
did this reveal a continuum of positions but it also pointed to the underlying 
essences that were argued to be of significance to the conflict. This finding led to 
the exploration of finding a theoretical journey that echoed this. It was found in 
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the concept of themata, 
3
both as a foundational process and as a starting point for 
a discussion of polarity. Moscovici (1993) coined the term themata as a way of 
identifying a kernel of knowledge to denote the structural components of a social 
representation that exists in the collective memory of society and through 
discourse, using oppositions as a way of generating meaning. Not only can we 
begin to trace the foundational myths of groups in conflict that may serve to 
encapsulate particular positions, but we can also use a continuum of positionings 
that represents knowledge systems that refer to ‘culturally shared assumptions 
that underlie dialogue … where they rise from an un-reflected common sense 
thinking to the level of active consciousness,’ (Marková et al 2007, p.135). The 
role of objectification and anchoring (see Chapter 3) demonstrated how new 
phenomenon can be incorporated, constructed and reconstructed into developing 
social representations to denote new justifications and ideas based on previous 
culturally shared phenomenon.  
5.3. Shifting themata across group boundaries 
Four themata were identified from this data base, two each for Jewish and 
Palestinian Israelis to encapsulate their positioning of self and Other in the 
context of their professional relationships with each other and their lives outside 
of it. The self / Other pairing is discussed in the same way as Marková (2003) 
discusses ego / Alter. There is no intention to change this from the original 
pairing as suggested by Marková (2003 but the self / Other combination matches 
the many other occasions throughout the thesis when the Other is cited. The 
contrast between an integrated community within their place of work (hospitals 
and clinics) and a more segregated one outside was found to be indicative of a 
relationship in tension. The four themata, as illustrated below, can be said to 
represent the tensions of their unresolved national aspirations that have been 
swirling in the representational field since 1948: 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 Themata, as discussed, is presented in the plural as the minimum of a pair denoting 
more than one thema (singular) antinomy.  
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exclusivity – inclusivity   
   threat - security  
 non recognition – recognition 
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Figure 4: Unresolved tensions in national conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second themata (on the right above) approximately reflects their 
working relationships where inclusivity, recognition and equality reflect mutual 
respect for one another in a secure and professional environment. However, once 
outside this space, the opposing antinomy for each pair comes to the surface. A 
discussion around exclusivity in terms of a preferred Jewish space leading to a 
perceived non recognition by Palestinian Israelis where structural inequality 
becomes more prominent was manifest. At the same time, the Jewish Israeli 
vulnerability of threat of the Other was never far from the conversation. 
However, this does not suggest that the themata interpreted from that data 
reflected only polarising positions neatly divided as described above; it reflected 
a much more complex reality as the dialogicality of their perceived positionings 
was probed in more depth. It is within this boundary space between the two 
groups and across individuals’ social representations that I can begin to interpret 
and discuss their relationships with the Other as a dialogical process that is 
related to its contextual phenomenon.   
The section will be organised as follows: first, examples are given that 
illustrate imagined boundaries of similarity and difference across the groups. 
Data is then further examined within the themata constructs across the contexts 
of the professional medical environment versus the external one that reflects 
these dialogical relationships.  A dialogical analysis within each set of themata is 
then carried out to explore the array of positionings across the representational 
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field. Each one is analysed in a slightly different manner to highlight possible 
ways of exploring the data that was of interest. Each example of text that was 
used in the analysis is quoted in full before the subsequent analysis, where parts 
of the same text are repeated to exemplify the point discussed.   
5.3.1. They are people exactly like me  
Interviews with participants reflected a positive and enriching working 
environment within their medical setting that appeared to cross imagined 
boundaries through professional contact and working alongside one another. In 
this context, themata that mirrored social representations of integration and 
mutual recognition, rather than segregation was evidenced:  
‘My colleagues, I think they are people exactly like me, and they are better 
than me because they have much more medical knowledge. The head of X is 
an Arab and is amazing, he’s smart and clever and good and I never for a 
second think he treats me differently because I’m Jewish, or any of that. 
Never never, not even for second.’   Male medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli.     
The satisfaction of being part of a highly trained team reaching senior 
positions was expressed, showing further the permeability of boundaries between 
them, reflecting a sense of acceptance and inclusiveness of the Other. This was 
often discussed as a working environment that emanated from an institutional 
base of an ethos of ethical governance in the Israeli medical world, where equal 
integration of staff across all cultural groupings was prominent.  
‘I think it was a difficult journey, not because I’m an Arab. It was a difficult 
journey because the journey I chose was difficult … I worked in this 
hospital which is doing its best to choose the best people, no matter where 
they came from – Arabs, Jews, new immigrants, everybody is nominated and 
appointed on their qualifications and of course to the best of the hospital 
and to the best of the Department. So my journey was difficult because I 
believe in science. We work together, we like each other on the level of the 
person and the family levels. We interact nicely and are very friendly.’ Male 
medic, 50’s, Palestinian Israeli.  
A sense of valued equality of the working relationships across the 
boundaries was evident throughout the interviews:     
‘It’s very good. Because we are doctors, and we are mature and our main 
activity is to help people so we work together and do the best from patients. 
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I think we are equal, and it’s very very good.’  Female medic, 30’s, 
Palestinian Israeli.   
However, the presence of a ‘bubble’ of an inside / outside environment 
was made during some interviews suggesting that imagined boundaries 
represented two distinct social knowledge systems, one of equality, acceptance, 
inclusiveness and security within an integrated community and one where the 
antinomy  was hinted at:   
 ‘The hospital is kind of a bubble. Everyone is equal. You don’t look at 
Arab, Muslim or Christian Arab or Jewish.  It’s not something you look at.’ 
Female medic, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.        
‘We get along at work we get along in this environment in the secure place, 
in the Department that we work together and that’s it. But when you go 
outside it’s different.’ Female medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli.  
5.3.2. They are people not exactly like me   
Although some reciprocity or semantic bridges (a concept developed in Chapter 
6 which conveys the ways in which boundaries are sometimes hardened or 
softened) were evident, the overall picture suggested that significant divisions 
remained embedded across the groups. Outside the more ‘protected’ professional 
environment, the boundaries began to shift to its opposing thema. For both 
groups, the environment of inclusivity within the ethos of an ethical working 
context shifted outside of that to one of exclusivity where boundaries tightened 
and the groups diverged into a more segregated pattern of existing. Instead of 
equality for all at work, themes relating to inequality were evident in interviews 
with the Palestinian Israelis. Finally, instead of a sense of safety and security 
within the hospital environment for the Jewish Israelis themes of threat became 
more dominant, expressed through the experiences of the Gaza war two months 
previously:  
‘First of all in my private life, I have nothing to do with Arabs. We live 
totally segregated.  But as opposed to most of my friends, or certainly with 
most of the people I live with, or certainly in the way my children are 
brought up or whatever, I have a lot to do with Arabs during my day to 
day.’ Female medic, 50’s, Jewish Israeli.   
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5.3.3. Themata of exclusivity - inclusivity: A national home for Jewish people   
The themata of exclusivity - inclusivity was evident where exclusivity represented 
the foundational premise of the State as a Jewish entity. Social representations of 
loyalty to Zionism and a continued need for a secure and safe nation, was never far 
from the discussion. Examples of these positions are given, demonstrating the 
dialogical relationship across the groups between these two contexts where 
organising themes of ideology, segregation and cultural differences were found to 
be pertinent to the discussion.  This is followed by a dialogical analysis of two 
narratives about the rights to exclusivity through land ownership. One was quoted 
by a Jewish Israeli medic exemplifying the justification of her positioning and the 
Other, in relation to this, from a Palestinian Israeli perspective.             
In the professional working environment, themes of inclusivity were 
freely given where all medics worked together to provide the best possible care 
for their patients regardless of their ethnicity:   
‘There are a lot of Arab nurses  and doctors and there is lot of respect 
between us and we work as a team. There is never a feeling of ‘oh he’s an 
Arab I don’t want to work with him’. Never. They are colleagues first of 
all.’   Female medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli. 
‘Inside the hospitals you can see a very nice interaction and 
relationships. We work together, we like each other on the level of the 
person and the family levels. We interact nicely and very friendly.’ Male 
medic, 50’s, Palestinian Israeli.  
Outside this working environment conversations that included themes 
pertaining to the importance of Israel as a national entity for the Jewish people 
were frequent across both groups. It is from these foundations of the inclusivity – 
exclusivity pair that relationships have been built and knowledge systems 
developed across Israeli society. Right wing Jewish Israelis were clear about 
Israel as a land for the Jewish people. This was described as a haven of safety 
within a Zionist cultural and political ethos requiring its own knowledge system 
set within a bubble of segregation. The boundary between work and home, 
between a life centred on a Jewish, rather than a more inclusive community, was 
evident. The Other was positioned as an entity that had no name nor identity, but 
considered as a threatening presence:      
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‘The one thing I never ever talk about, and I would never ever want to talk 
about with any of them is politics ... if I don't know what they think or what 
they think about me, or what they want to do with me and my people, then 
I'm perfectly okay with it. I came here because I was Zionistic and I felt that 
the place for the Jewish people to live is in Israel, and I still believe that. We 
want the Jewish race to carry on. I want our children to be Jewish and our 
grandchildren to be Jewish.  If we start intermarrying with Arabs then that's 
not going to be ….  and don't forget that Israel was founded because of what 
had been going on in Europe at the time.  The people then felt nobody wants 
us, everybody's thrown us out and killed us and slaughtered us, and we've 
got to survive on our own. We've got to show the world that we'll do 
whatever we want, whatever you say. I don't see any problem with working 
together, because you know where you come from and where you're going. I 
want us just to be able to work together and get on, and help each other but 
I think it's very important for the Jewish race to keep ourselves separate.’ 
Female medic, 50’s, Jewish Israeli.  
The quote above illustrates the importance and significance of exclusivity 
as a way of keeping the threat at bay and living within a closed community and 
yet under a particular context of work can live with the Other. This is contrasted 
with a left wing medic who asserted that integration was a crucial step for the 
two peoples to explore a more common place of nationhood:  
‘My husband and I right at the beginning wanted the kids to start off 
learning with each other. So we learned that Arabs had their own way. And 
how they had to see the Israeli flag every day. And we found that there is a 
very strong education here without including the other and I didn’t really 
want my kids to follow that. I’m very unusual… most people wouldn’t 
acknowledge this and it’s difficult to get everything out into the open. Like 
on Independence Day we have flags. It’s a flag. It’s a country, and it’s also 
a law to have a flag in some places. It’s just hearing an Arab person saying, 
‘I don’t feel very good about this flag, it’s your flag, it’s not our flag’. Yet 
we are all part of the state. Is it my flag? Do you have to choose?’ Female 
medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli.     
The Other was acknowledged, that of the Palestinian Israeli community, 
by accepting that another dialogue apart from a Zionist positioning, was part of 
an Israeli collective sense of nationhood. The symbolic use of the flag epitomises 
this relationship. These two positions, one of total segregation in one’s personal 
life in the first quote and one of forging integration across many areas of life in 
the second, reflects how ideological knowledge systems of Zionism and 
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liberalism have developed side by side, independently of the professional 
working environment. They were both developed from a base of exclusivity - 
inclusivity. Within the working context, inclusivity was supported by 
institutional medical ethics as discussed by all medics and yet outside of this 
environment, the thema of exclusivity represented a Zionist national positioning 
for some but not all, as exemplified.  
Other discussions reflected a more complex positioning, where there was 
no clear division between the two exemplified positions. To explore this further, 
a dialogical analysis was carried out using the texts from a young Palestinian and 
Jewish Israeli medic about social representations about the land ownership before 
1948 and since. 
 The subject of land rights was brought up frequently by many 
participants, spontaneously standing as a symbol of Israeli nationhood based on 
exclusive rights for one ethnic group over another. The topic of land was often 
described as the symbol of the conflict. The two following quotes represented 
how each group presented a position about the contested land; this does not 
suggest that these are the only perspectives by Israelis, but they represented a 
common trajectory. They are both quoted in full below. Following this, I have 
used sections of them to offer their particular positioning in relation to the Other:    
 ‘We get along at work, we get along in this environment in the secure 
place, in the department where we work together.  But when you go outside 
it’s different. I think the conflict here is based on land. No one wants to give 
up their land, you know. My father has inherited land from my grandfather 
who inherited from his and his and his and it’s been hundreds of years our 
land... and when I go to pick olives I completely feel that it’s my land. And I 
think to myself if someone has come to take my land I don’t know what 
would be possible and what I’d be capable of doing because we are very 
much connected to the land. That’s the only things important in life is the 
land and respect. So no one takes your land and no one takes you(r) respect. 
That’s why you can see that in ‘48 when the state of Israel, that a lot of 
Arab villagers were, what you say, they left or were forced to leave, it 
doesn’t matter how they left it’s the fact that the villages were empty.’ 
Female medic, 20’s, Palestinian Israeli.     
‘I think for years they have been educated that they have been robbed, that 
we took the land, we are horrible and the enemy and you know. I don’t 
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know what (to) tell you because I’m an Israeli and I have been in Israel all 
my life … Since I was born they keep telling you how Jerusalem is 
important, how Israel is important. But if I wasn’t living here I probably 
wouldn’t have heard that and if someone else lived there I would hate it. I’m 
telling you honestly I don’t think Israel thinks they took the land, the land 
was ours ... You see this is where the problems lie. Because if you look, and 
if you go and you look at the Bible and every document, the history, tells it 
that Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So we don’t see it as ... And if you 
look at the history, the Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were moved 
and came back and moved and came back. So we don’t see it as land being 
taken from other people, it was our land. You see and this is exactly the 
problem, you see because it wasn’t neutral, it wasn’t nothing, it wasn’t an 
island that we found and now we’re fighting about it, it’s a land that has 
been here for thousands of years and everybody thinks it belongs to them. 
So we are pretty much … I don’t know, I don’t like to say that we take it. 
There was a war, the UN in ‘48 said to countries for two people. They 
didn’t like that. They wanted to fight. And we won the fight. And they 
wanted to fight again. And we won again. And they wanted to fight again 
and again we won. What can I tell you? I don’t see it as taking the land. 
There was a war and they lost. Sorry. I feel bad for them but…’. Female 
medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli.    
Embedded within the first quote is a positioning that directly appeals to 
the base of the land ownership issue: ‘The only things important in life is the land 
and respect. So no one takes your land and no one takes you respect.’ 
(Palestinian Israeli) and ‘It’s a land that has been here for thousands of years and 
everybody thinks it belongs to them.’ (Jewish Israeli).  The rest of the quotes 
support their arguments: the Palestinian Israeli’s as uncompromising in the 
significance of the land to their collective self and the Jewish Israeli’s setting out 
why the land belongs to the Jewish people. The leads into the discussion about 
the framing of the land, as to how each quote introduced the unprompted issue 
surrounding it. The Palestinian Israeli began by suggesting that at work ‘we get 
along’ (emphasised by saying it twice using the collective ‘we’), in a protected 
work environment compared to the external environment where the conflict 
continues. The Jewish Israeli framed her narrative with a projection of a degree 
of inner confusion and conflict about the issue by suggesting that her collective 
‘we’ are the enemy due to the fact that the Palestinians had been educated that 
‘they have been robbed’ (of the land). She could have used the past tense, rather 
than the perfect i.e. ‘they were robbed’ rather than ‘they have been’ suggesting 
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that the robbing is perceived as continuing until the present day. She further 
suggested that she was not quite sure of her own personal positioning because 
‘they keep telling you how Jerusalem is important’, that is some undefined 
Jewish collective that appears to convey a hegemonic perspective that she accepts 
because she was born there and subject to that. And yet if she were born 
elsewhere, her perspective might oppose that as ‘if someone else lived there I 
would hate it’. Her claim to truth in telling this narrative ‘I’m telling you 
honestly’ is interesting; the use of the pronoun ‘I’ as subject, suggests her own 
personal narrative and not that of the collective. It appears there might be some 
confusion surrounding what she really thinks is the truth as she quickly moves on 
to setting out exactly why the land was ‘ours’. This included, first through the 
Bible and ‘every other document’ setting out grounds for ownership; second, that 
the land was always contested ‘because it wasn’t neutral’ and third, that they 
were forced to fight because ‘they (the enemy) wanted to fight’, not once, but 
three times, with Israel winning each time. The ‘I’ position can be further 
explored within the context of ownership. The quote begins with ‘I think’ as her 
perspective on Palestinian education telling facts that may or may not have 
validity. This is followed by stating her national identity as ‘I’m an Israeli’ and 
how that may have developed her own perspective, finishing the first section of 
the narrative with ‘I don’t think Israel thinks they took the land’. Her own voice 
is replaced by that of the state in its justification of ownership strengthened by 
bringing in a third party ‘you’ inviting a mediator presence to see the evidence 
that backed up her argument: ‘Because if you look … if you go and look in the 
Bible ... if you look at history.’  Her apparent confusion is interrogated further by 
suggesting that she was not quite sure about the justifications by reverting back 
to her ‘I’ position by saying ‘I don’t know, I don’t like to say that we take it.’ And 
she continued with the justification discourse by bringing in a conquest theme 
where two equal parties fight over goods repeatedly and the declared winner is 
entitled to them. It is only then that she gave her own positioning as being in line 
with that of the state by declaring ‘What can I tell you? I don’t see it as taking the 
land. There was a war and they lost. Sorry. I feel bad for them but…’  The 
polyphony of voices - that of her subjective self, the state and a mediator to 
support her case, demonstrated her positioning that acknowledged these different 
knowledge systems.  
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These are not only dialogical ‘I’ positions following Hermans (2002) 
reflecting different subjective perspectives, but they are also dialogical ego / 
Alter positions that she used to clarify her thinking from confusion to more 
certainty. There was a discussion, a co-authorship (Marková, 2003) between 
these perspectives leading to her final more powerful position of an innocent, but 
informed citizen, yet also being apologetic for her stance.  
The Palestinian Israeli narrative also took on the dialogical voice but 
there was no inner debate. Instead, there was confidence about her relationship 
with the land ‘I completely feel that it’s my land’ which connected herself to the 
land through a visible line of ancestry - ‘my father has inherited from my 
grandfather who inherited from his and his and his and it’s been hundreds of 
years our land.’ This justification of ownership was perceived as being evident 
enough without recourse to going outside the self-positioning through references 
to more contested possibilities like the Bible, significant documents or conquests 
as we saw in the Jewish Israeli quote. Her positioning that ‘no-one takes your 
land’ reflects that any conquistador would face strong resistance because ‘I don’t 
know what I’d be capable of doing’ if the land was taken, hinting implicitly at 
conflict. She positioned herself as belonging to the land, rather than through other 
institutions, for example, the state, religious myths, winning conquests etc. This 
ultimately reflected the intractability of this issue as a stalemate position 
persisted.  Any change would require a shift in these positions. 
The Jewish Israeli medic later suggested a possibility of change at some 
point: ‘In my dream there will be no two states, we would be together. If we had 
nothing to be defended, they would be friends.’ A glimpse of an imagined future 
of a dialogue of mutual acknowledgement remained a distant possibility, albeit a 
fleeting one. Yet her previous positioning on protracted warfare possibly 
remained the prominent one, due to the defence of her stated exclusivity to the 
land.  
The example of the Palestinian Israeli narrative concerning the land issue 
acted as a marker for their perceived powerless as a member of the minority, 
demonstrating an asymmetry between the two groups. The themata of non 
recognition – recognition attributed to the Palestinian Israeli group as a 
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consequence of the Israeli hegemonic exclusive – inclusive themata, played out 
in some interesting ways and will be discussed in the next section.  
5.3.4. Themata of non-recognition – recognition: The Palestinian Israeli 
minority 
 As a minority group, the Palestinian Israelis were aware of their lack of 
recognition, both by the State and their fellow citizens as described in the last 
section and identified through organising themes of feeling misunderstood, 
asymmetry and feeling that an impasse across the relationship inhibited further 
reconition.  The following quote demonstrates how the Jewish Israeli’s sense of 
victimhood overrode that of the Palestinian Israeli one, even though a measure of 
sympathy was apparent. This narrative told a story of when a Palestinian Israeli 
medic visited the village where his family had lived pre 1948. The village had 
been demolished, apart from a few remnants, one of which was the remains of a 
church where Christian families would visit to commemorate special events. The 
doctor told me the story as an example of his sense of non-recognition:            
‘I remember one day that me and a paediatrician saw two of our female 
colleagues, standing in the church wondering about this place. And we 
approached them by name. And they were surprised to hear that someone 
was calling them by name. So from time to time they know about us, and 
from time to time some people mention that we are from the village and 
some of them ask ‘What is your story?  Do you still have a desire to go back 
and rebuild your village?’ Some try you know, some don’t say anything. The 
most painful thing for me, is that you start telling a narrative and within a 
second, they turn over to their story, to their story about being a victim and 
having to defend, and saying ‘We were expelled from Europe and we were 
killed and all our properties were taken.’ And your story is not that striking, 
not that prominent any more. It’s ignored. And this is something that 
happens from time to time. And it makes you feel upset’.  Male medic, 40’s, 
Palestinian Israeli. 
The showing of some acknowledgement of the Palestinian positioning by 
Jewish Israelis was perceived as both an acceptance of Palestinian Israeli 
recognition and at the same time, a denial of it through competing victimhood. 
Meeting as colleagues at a significant place for a member of the minority group, 
highlighted the recognition – non recognition themata. Rather than recognise the 
Other’s (Palestinian Israeli) positioning, there was a move toward it, before the 
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Jewish Israeli hegemonic narrative became prominent. No transformation of 
ideas could occur for the hegemonic group as the asymmetry was played out. The 
less powerful is left wanting, needing to be acknowledged at a more personal 
level. The same doctor later discussed the importance of being recognised by his 
Jewish patients as a good doctor, one that was trusted, one that was considered 
‘human’:  
‘And we try to survive. Not in the material sense of things but not to lose 
your mind or lose your spirit. We are committed to treating people 
regardless of their religion, their background, their gender. And from time 
to time the patients reward you. They come and tell you they are given a list 
of specialists in Haifa and Natanya but we choose to come to you. Why? 
The majority of the cases they say ‘Because you are an advantage. We trust 
you more. You are more sensitive. You are more human.  
And the Jewish patients are saying this?  
Yes. Not the Arabs but the Jews. Yes it’s surprising. And it lifts your spirits. 
The fact that a patient can somehow reward you, it goes very highly if they 
are a Jew’. Male medic, 40’s, Palestinian Israeli. 
In the working environment the contact with Jewish Israeli patients and 
colleagues was also one that was considered important and valued, as 
exemplified here:     
‘I have a lot of connections and we work together with close ties. So there 
are senior doctors who are Arabs who guide me and direct me and teach me 
and I learn a lot from them. Some of the doctors here are at the same level 
as me and they are more like friends and of course because we work 
together we do a lot of talking, professional but also some personal. On 
Friday I’m going to a wedding, a guy I work with, he’s a Muslim, and he 
invited me and I’m going there.’ Male medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli. 
 The motivation for recognition wasn’t limited to patients and colleagues but 
also to more personal relationships.  The same doctor recalled his budding 
friendship with a Jewish Israeli medical student as he searched for a common 
theme to cross intergroup boundaries by bypassing victimhood:   
‘It’s defensive if we both talk of being a victim. I tried to tell a Jewish 
colleague (at medical school), that if you want to approach me as an Arab, 
this is not correct. I prefer for us to talk as human beings. And as human 
beings we can open the horizons … And because I used this argument in 
132 
 
order to build rather than destroy, it was interesting for him. And once I 
could approach him and try to open this closed door to tell him that if you 
see me as an Arab, don’t react in the way that I might only have the dreams 
of Syrian tanks coming into Tel Aviv. And he was convinced I was genuine. 
And I was not manipulating him. And that was the whole political talk with 
him. Now my friend from Tel Aviv, we continued with this sort of 
relationship after we graduated.’  Male medic, 40’s, Palestinian Israeli.  
 The significance of being recognised as a human being rather than being 
labelled as a subordinate fellow citizen with possible threatening intentions, 
opened the dialogue between the two individuals to meet on a more equal 
footing. The Palestinian Israeli’s acknowledging of the Other’s social 
representations of threat demonstrated the dialogical relationship unfolding. At 
the personal level and professional level, recognition became a possibility as 
reflected in their organising themes of their working and social relationships and 
an imagined future where they would be recognised across the community. 
Related to this themata was one of inequality – equality that reflected a more 
structural factor within the dialogical relationships across the groups which is 
explored in the following section.     
5.3.5. Themata of inequality - equality: A clash of rights for the Palestinian 
Israelis     
Both Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics conveyed their professional 
relationships in the work environment through an ethos of medical ethics 
prevailing, where equality across all staff, regardless of ethnic or religious 
background, was prevalent:   
‘Our relationship is very good because we are doctors and we are mature. 
Our main activity is to help people so we work together and do the best 
from patients. I think we are equal, and it’s very very good.’ Female medic, 
30’s, Palestinian Israeli.  
‘The hospital is kind of a bubble. It’s very distinct from what’s going 
outside. Everyone is equal. You don’t look at Arab, Muslim or Christian 
Arab or Jewish. It’s not something you look at.’  Female medic, 30’s, 
Jewish Israeli.    
  However, a different social reality emerged when discussing their external 
environments. The themata of equality – inequality was evident across the 
Palestinian Israeli participants’ discussions concerning perceived discrimination 
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across the state machinery where their minority status equated to a confused 
national status. Descriptions of the difficulties of finding suitable accommodation 
based on differences in land rights between the two groups were recurrent. The 
following example from an interview with a Palestinian Israeli medic highlighted 
this issue. The discourse explored the dialogical relationship between the 
participant and the state machinery in terms of the conflict between the perceived 
inequality due to housing segregation, where he faced stigma from Jewish 
neighbours and yet denied access to alternative accommodation to fulfil his 
needs. Ironically, this conversation reflected the conversation I had with the 
Jewish Israeli young man in London, which acted as a catalyst for this empirical 
study.         
The full narrative is printed here for an overview. For the analysis, the 
relevant parts are reproduced where relevant:  
‘I rent a house and after five months I decided I will leave it because all of 
my neighbours are Jews and they never contact me. And I’m a doctor and a 
physician and have children. They ignore me. They just look at me… and I 
think I am one of the successful Arabs in Israel because most of the Arab 
young, the new generation, they don’t have the jobs that they can offer to 
rent a flat. I am very frustrated because I cannot find a place to live here ... 
we cannot find a place. If I want to live in the village (I came from) there is 
no place, I cannot live there I cannot buy land to build my house. If I was a 
Jew, or if I was Russian Jew from Russia, they can buy land and build a 
house with the support of the government next to my village. But I can’t. All 
the people who studied with me, the Jewish doctors, all of them now they 
have the houses, they build their own. All of them have the gardens and a 
big house and lawns and they don’t have to pay back ... They have 
everything they want and it was so easy for them. I would be glad if you 
could come to see some of the villages and you would see an Arab village 
and you can see that there is no place to build any house and on the other 
side you can see that they are all the time advertising (to Jewish Israelis to 
buy land / properties)… The problem is not from between me and the other 
doctors, my friends. The problem is from the government. It’s from the laws 
and there are many laws that are discriminating. I have very good 
relationships with all the people I treat. All the people. All of the religions. 
All of the colours. And I am happy when I’m working here. As I said the 
problem is not the personal problem, I don’t see in my Jewish friends as 
irresponsible people. And that is why we are optimistic. We can live and 
work with each other as humans without problems.’    
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 ‘I think that much of our happiness … we lose it because of that. We could 
be much happier with our lives with our success because, but because of the 
political situation ... Who can ignore it Maybe you can be happy and not 
think about it but most of the people can’t ignore it.’ Male medic, 40’s 
Palestinian Israeli.   
For this dialogical analysis I used pronouns as a means to understand the 
text to exemplify the equality-inequality trajectory around the subject of housing. 
A total of 35 positional pronouns were spoken on this subject, with 12 (34%) 
stating his ‘self’ position as being discriminated against, 12 (34%) bringing in the 
Other as the antagonist, with 4 (11%) directed at a third party judge, a further 7 
(20%) as a reflection of his positions as being valid or not and 2 (5%) that adds 
others, in this case younger Palestinian Israelis who had less chances than him. 
The subjective positioning reflected first, an identity marker as a successful 
consultant physician, which was hoped would carry an increased status for 
neighbourly Jewish relationships and ease of finding accommodation. His 
disappointment in finding this wasn’t the case was keenly felt:   
‘I rent a house and after five months I decided I will leave it because all of 
my neighbours are Jews and they never contact me. And I’m a doctor and a 
physician and have children. They ignore me. They just look at me… and I 
think I am one of the successful Arabs in Israel because most of the Arab 
young, the new generation, they don’t have the jobs that they can offer to 
rent a flat…’ 
The second positioning as a frustrated citizen highlighted the 
impossibility of finding appropriate housing or purchasing of land with the use of 
the word ‘can’t’ or ‘cannot’ frequently to exemplify the frustrations of the 
housing issue, both as being unwanted tenant neighbours in a Jewish area and the 
impossibilities of purchasing land, perceived as rights being denied:   
‘I am very frustrated because I cannot find a place to live here ... we cannot 
find a place. If I want to live in the village there is no place, I cannot live 
there I cannot buy land to build my house.’ 
The Other is defined as one that described opportunities including 
immigrant Jews from Russia who have such rights and Jewish colleagues who 
have the opportunity to purchase housing leading to a victim status that was not 
welcomed:  
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‘If I was a Jew, or if I was Russian Jew from Russia … they can buy land 
and build a house with the support of the government next to my village but 
I can’t. All the people who studied with me, the Jewish doctors, all of them 
now they have the houses, they build their own. All of them have the gardens 
and a big house and lawns and they don’t have to pay back ... they have 
everything they want and it was so easy for them.’ 
And the conversation was set within a plea to be listened to further, by 
inviting me as a ‘third party judge’ to probe further, to judge for myself a reality 
that was being described: 
‘I would be glad if you could come to see some of the villages and you 
would see an Arab village and you can see that there is no place to build 
any house and on the other side you can see that they are all the time 
advertising (to Jewish Israelis to buy land / properties).’  
The same doctor is quick to recall his sense of equality within his 
professional setting, as shown below and his sense of inequality outside as 
described above. This served to highlight how different positions can serve to 
soften or harden imagined boundaries across the groups. This gives us an 
indication as to what lay at the space between them at the structural and personal 
level:         
‘The problem is not from between me and the other doctors, my friends, the 
problem is from the government. It’s from the laws and there are many laws 
that are discriminating. I have very good relationships with all the people I 
treat. All the people. All of the religions. All of the colours. And I am happy 
when I’m working here. As I said the problem is not the personal problem, I 
don’t see in my Jewish friends as irresponsible people. And that is why we 
are optimistic. We can live and work with each other as humans without 
problems.’    
  The positions described above, as respected physician within the community 
versus frustrated citizen with a denial of equal citizenship rights, intersected with 
his own reflections of this dilemma. The reflection that he could be happier if the 
balance of equality and inequality was less polarised, was immediately followed 
by a phrase that questioned his own frustration and victimhood:   
‘I think that much of our happiness … we lose it because of that. We could 
be much happier with our lives with our success because, but because of the 
political situation ... Who can ignore it?  Maybe you can be happy and not 
think about it but most of the people can’t ignore it.’ 
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 The phrase ‘Who can ignore it? Maybe you can be happy and not think 
about it’ is open to interpretation: is this directed at the third party judge or other 
Palestinian Israeli people in general? It was not clear and this ambiguity opened 
up a doubt about his victim status. When the conversation with the Other about 
his perceived discrimination was explored we could understand at what point 
there was a position that reflected the environmental context or immunity to it. 
The following quote tracked a Jewish Israeli positioning re the equality / 
inequality themata:       
‘For example, at my work, I don’t see any discrimination at all, at all, many 
of them are very very successful at work, they are running departments as 
managers and they, they can do whatever they want. No-one is keeping them 
from going forward at work.’ Female medic, 30’s Jewish Israeli.   
 The equality perceived across the relationships within the work environment 
was made clear in the above quote as she talked of her Palestinian Israeli 
colleagues. And there was some acknowledgement of the difficulties with 
housing:   
‘I know that it’s hard for them to find accommodation anyway, because they 
all focus on this area, because the schools are here and all the community is 
here, so everyone wants to be here ... generally the real estate in Israel is 
very expensive because we don’t have much land. It’s generally expensive, 
but for them I think, especially new apartments are even more expensive, 
because you want to be in a certain area. So I think it’s harder for them ... 
it’s harder for them to rent near the university, because most of the 
population is Jewish. Some of them will rent to Arabs and some of them 
won't.’ Female medic, 30’s, Jewish Israeli.  
 However, this understanding was expressed implicitly in terms of 
segregated residential areas. First, that one area favoured by the Palestinian 
Israelis was ‘very expensive’ because of lack of land being available ‘because we 
don’t have much land’ ignoring any historical difficulties for land being not 
being available for sale to Palestinian Israelis as evident in the previous quote 
and acknowledged at the institutional level (Yaftel, 2000). And second, there was 
an implication that some Jews (but not all) preferred segregation as ‘some of 
them will rent to Arabs and some of them won't’ implying further the segregation 
and discrimination. This was underlined by suggesting ‘you want to be in a 
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certain area’ which suggested the subject ‘you’ remained ambiguous which may 
mean people in general or either / both Jewish / Palestinian Israeli.  
  In summary, the positioning of this Jewish Israeli participant supported the 
Palestinian Israeli themata of equality / inequality in terms of equality within the 
professional environment and signs of inequality outside of it. Her positioning 
regarding Palestinian Israeli inequality took two forms: first one of sympathiser 
in partial understanding that agreed there were forms of discrimination which 
included residential segregation and Jewish Israeli resistance to more mixing; 
second, as a neutral position of the status of land availability.  The dialogical 
relationship across the two perspectives illustrated how these positionings 
affected boundary permeability between the professional and private domains of 
equality and inequality. The imagined boundaries between the groups shifted 
when threat entered the field, as a marker of division, as discussed in the 
following section.     
5.3.6. Themata of threat – security: War and its widening legacy for Jewish 
Israelis     
The security–threat themata was highlighted in discussions about the role of the 
Gaza war (Operation Protective Edge) in changing the status quo of the 
professional working relationship across the groups. The conflict was launched in 
July 2014 and lasted six weeks. It was initiated by Israel to stop persistent rocket 
fire from Gaza into southern Israel by Hamas militants, although other factors 
regarding mutual antagonism were also present. Approximately 2,300 Gazans 
were killed and over 10,000 injured, including 3,374 children of whom 1,000 
were left permanently disabled. 66 Israeli IDF soldiers were killed and six 
civilians, including one child. 30% of the Gazan population were displaced 
during the conflict. The discrepancy in the numbers killed i.e. 35:1 ratio of 
Palestinian / Israeli reflected the asymmetry of the conflict as a whole with 
modern and superior Israeli military force, attacking from air, land and sea 
against militants with much inferior military capability.  The resulting social 
representations of the conflict two months later reflected the flaring of 
vulnerabilities that had leaked into the professional working relationship in Israel 
serving as a rupture to ‘normal’ relations. The conflict was recent enough in time 
(two months before the interviews) to recollect those representations before what 
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would be described as ‘normal life returning’ leaving the underlying tensions 
remaining. The social representations that swirled in the interviews from the 
Jewish Israeli positioning centred on the defence of a state against an enemy 
whose perceived intention was to destroy the state of Israel. The Palestinian 
positioning centred on the defence of a population in Gaza who had suffered at 
the hands of an oppressor.   
 Participants talked of the tensions in their working environment felt during 
those six weeks and the attempts by the management of a hospital to put them 
aside in the professional environment, where equality across patients and staff 
was highlighted:  
‘In the hospital we had an order from the management that we can’t engage 
in any political discussion in the hospital, and we have to keep the current 
practice where we treat everyone and we work with everyone equally. But 
you could feel tension. You could feel the tension. But still we worked the 
same way and we treated the Arab patients the same.  We didn’t speak 
about the war.’ Female medic 30’s, Jewish Israeli.  
But the tensions were there nonetheless. This is evident in the above 
comment in the repeated phrase ‘you could feel the tension’ followed by her 
emphasis of the more neutral working relationship (‘treating the Arab patients 
the same’). The following two quotes convey the stark differences and gaps 
between the two groups during this time of armed conflict:   
‘The most difficult thing is when you are in the war and they make this voice 
that you have to stand shoulder to shoulder to support the soldiers. But I 
can’t do this because they kill my people. I don’t want to stand for them. 
You can hear the loud speaker telling you. It’s not real. They make us do 
things that we don’t believe in. And it’s not real for us. And you see all the 
people, all the Jewish, all your friends are standing and you’re looking for a 
place to hide’. Female medic, 40’s, Palestinian Israeli.  
The Palestinian Israeli medic suggested being forced to show loyalty to 
the armed force though ‘they kill my people’, i.e. those of Palestinian descent 
living in Gaza that would have included refugees from present day Israel. By 
being forced to take a stand that is ‘not real for us’ taking oneself out of the 
situation appeared to be the only option.   
139 
 
A second quote from a Jewish Israeli medic demonstrated her 
disappointment with her Arab medic friends who showed disloyalty to the nation 
in Facebook postings reflecting solidarity with the Gazan victims: 
 ‘I have two Arab friends on Facebook that put up a prophet picture, it was 
like a black square that was like a symbol that they identify with the Gaza 
people, with the victims there and I was quite surprised because I thought 
that they are more like pro-Israeli and I was a bit surprised. I didn’t feel 
very comfortable to see this. I didn’t feel very comfortable, like something 
wasn’t real in our friendship, face to face and maybe, when we are not 
together, behind my back they are saying something else or… but when I 
came back to work I talked to them normally as usual and it was like 
nothing happened and we are good friends now.’ Female medic, 30’s, 
Jewish Israeli.  
And yet, these disappointments were put aside post war, reflecting that 
once hostilities had ended relationships could flourish once again even though no 
dialogue had taken place between them about their positionings. Both of these 
participants used the phrase ‘not real’ when explaining their positioning: ‘They 
make us do things that we don’t believe in. And it’s not real for us.’  (Palestinian 
Israeli) and ‘I didn’t feel very comfortable, like something wasn’t real in our 
friendship, face to face and maybe, when we are not together, behind my back 
they are saying something else.’ (Jewish Israeli). 
The significance of ‘it’s not real’ for both is significant. A life that is real 
and yet not real supposes boundaries of realities of authenticity and falsity where 
the former is denied due to the perceived reality of the conflict. The desire for the 
real as a state of meaning of truth reflected the intractability of their positionings 
and yet at the same time was the desire for crossing imagined boundaries of 
connection through their work context.        
The discarding of some tensions following the war epitomised the 
changing reality of resuming normal life. On the surface, the realities and 
tensions it produced in the community appeared to have been quietly put aside. 
However, a dialogical analysis of a Jewish Israeli medic showed the changing 
complexity of her positioning throughout the war. Her narrative centred on the 
reaction to the experiences of her son, an IDF soldier serving and injured in 
Gaza, though physically not seriously. Her role as a mother affected her 
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subjective perceptions that contrasted with her constructs of threat that 
juxtaposed with the relationships with her Palestinian Israeli colleagues and 
friends. The resulting inner conflict of her multi-voiced inner dialogue mirrored 
that of the external conflict. The full text is shown here which will be subject to 
further interpretation and discussion below:   
‘If you were here during the war you would get probably quite different 
views and opinions and even I would talk to you differently. Even me and 
my Arab colleagues over the war it was very hard to communicate, because 
of my kid, you know, because he is in the army and he was fighting, I needed 
to reach out to my Arab colleagues and write a message telling them  I 
wanted to continue to be in contact …  
…  If you were here in this war time, if you are coming here and visiting and 
you go down to the south and you see a big piece of land or whatever with 
civilian populations who are being threatened for years, day after day. We 
call it like rain dropping, you know drops, five, six, ten bombs a day. It’s 
been like this for years and years. No country in the world would ever allow 
this to happen. If it would happen to Britain they would kill 10,000 of 
whoever is across the border. No-one will say anything because someone 
dared to drop bombs on our population. Now Israel is under you know, 
under a magnifying glass all the time because of our history, because of … 
now I’m not saying this just to justify, I’m saying that there is hard evidence 
that Hamas, for example, the terrorists, go into the population … I know 
because my son was just there. It’s not like if there is a war here, then you 
would see that soldiers shooting from this building and this building. No. 
There it is a population area. You don’t draw the fire, you know, you bring 
them where the citizens are, but they do that unfortunately ...  
… Our leaders and their leaders, that’s the problem. Because people can 
connect you know. Mostly they want a quiet life and you know being able to 
provide for their families. That’s what people want. They should have given 
the keys to women and a woman who gave birth and she had kids. If more 
people went through what I went through this summer you should be like 
crazy to think about war being an option. When I heard the stories when my 
son came back I called him and said 'What was the idea of all of this?… 
What was it? Taking a life? For what? I mean it’s ridiculous, it’s ridiculous 
and it’s such a mess... It’s crazy and it’s crazy and it’s crazy. And I sit here 
and I allow, I allow this to happen to my kid.’  Female medic, 40’s, Jewish 
Israeli.      
The Jewish Israeli medic’s final positioning was one of confusion and 
despair. Its significance reflected her earlier careful narrative emphasising the 
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state’s justification of war which, when intersected with her experience as a 
mother, ruptured, leaving her with a sense of imbued responsibility for her son’s 
predicament and the contradictions of war. As the listener, I was invited to listen 
to her experiences as a third party witness as she tracked her different positions 
across her life world landscape. This also acted as a way of her thinking through 
her own perspectives. In the first half of the quote, she positioned herself as an 
Israeli under constant threat: ‘the civilian populations who are being threatened 
for years, day after day. We call it like rain dropping, you know drops, five, six, 
ten bombs a day. It’s been like this for years and years’. The accent on volume of 
threat is clearly defined – for ‘years’, ‘day after day’, ‘5,6,10 drops a day’, ‘for 
years and years’, as a justification to retaliate. It was inferred that other nations 
like the UK would go further and kill many more as ‘no country in the world 
would ever allow this to happen’ offering further justification for what is 
perceived as self-defence. A further justification was the reported action of 
Hamas (militants in Gaza) who, on hard evidence had purposely brought civilians 
into the war zone to act as human shields and so increasing the death toll of 
women and children. Finally it was suggested that Israel was under scrutiny from 
abroad: ‘under a magnifying glass all the time because of our history, because 
of...’ without defining what it was that might have given rise to such scrutiny. 
This voice within her narrating these events can be described as ‘ready-made’ 
discourses of justification, reflecting dominant social representations in the media 
that represented a common national hegemonic position.  
The second part of the text changed to a more personal conciliatory voice, 
that of peacemaker: ‘Our leaders and their leaders. That’s the problem. Because 
people can connect you know. Mostly they want a quiet life and you know being 
able to provide to their families that’s what people want’. Her perspective has 
now shifted to her own reflected positioning, that of her relationship and 
experiences with her Palestinian Israeli colleagues showing that human 
connections were possible. This was of significance for her as she talked of how 
she needed to stay in touch throughout the war: ‘I needed to reach out to my Arab 
colleagues and write a message telling them that I wanted to continue to be in 
contact.’ There was no indication as to why but the relationships were considered 
strong enough not to be severed by the conflict. Her next positioning was one of 
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negotiator, as a woman who had borne a child, and her soldier offspring returns 
from fighting injured leading to her motivation to find a path to stop further 
conflict. However, as her positioning changed again to that of seeker of reality 
where her son was connected with the killing of others, whether justified or not, 
the tension cannot be denied. Her resulting positioning of despair may have 
invalidated her previous positionings and yet they remained within her as 
themata of security and threat pervaded her life world.  
The last quote from this medic returns to the topic of land as discussed in 
the first dialogical analysis surrounding exclusivity – inclusivity, that epitomises 
the conflict as one of intractability where one group has de facto made a decision 
based on their narrative that excludes the Other:    
‘In my view it’s about land conflict. After all when you go to the bottom of 
things you are still divided on the land, so for me to be very pro-Palestinian 
is really going against my people and I don’t know what exactly I am. I am 
left of course. I think. But I know I can tell M and my other Palestinian 
Israeli friends that if it comes to my house or my home or your home, then 
I’m defending mine, you know. It’s a very simple thing, a reality that is 
complicated and simple.’ Female medic, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
            The state of confusion of her personal positioning of being disloyal or 
loyal to the State, transforming to a position of more certainty that finally rejects 
the Other, mirrored the ‘complicated and simple’ reality where polyphasic 
representations scattered the landscape and yet the group with the greater access 
to power held the ability to accommodate their confusion.          
5.4. Summary of dialogical analysis 
The four themata, exclusivity - inclusivity and threat - security representing the 
Jewish Israeli positioning and non-recognition - recognition and inequality - 
equality representing the Palestinian Israeli group, served to act as a foundation 
that reflected their positionings across their landscapes of intergroup conflict. 
The second thema in each pair denoted an approximation to their social reality 
within their professional roles of working together and the first to the one outside 
of it, The medical environment was discussed as a secure institutional base where 
inclusivity, equality and recognition of the Other was paramount. The reality 
outside this environment reflected more polarised positionings across the groups.  
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Perceptions of exclusivity for Jewish Israelis in a Jewish homeland that remained 
dialogically related to the non recognition of Palestinian Israelis leading to 
structural inequalities was discussed against a backdrop of continued threat for 
the majority group, that mirrored their perceived cultural and societal 
vulnerability.              
5.5. Discussion: crossing imagined boundaries   
The field research in Israel demonstrated the significance of context for crossing 
imagined boundaries. The professional medical context, where recognition and 
equality for all medics was both institutionally and socially accepted, contrasted 
to the one outside the hospital gates where social and institutional divisions 
between the majority and minority groups were evident. This dichotomy is 
discussed in terms of theories around contact as a medium for transformation of 
intergroup relationships and the significance of using themata as a conceptual 
approach within this sphere.  
 The contact hypothesis as originally suggested by Allport (1954) and 
taken up by numerous social psychologists, for example, Brown & Hewstone, 
2005, Hewstone and Swart, 2011, Pettigrew and Troop, 2006, was based on the 
idea that reducing prejudice between groups in conflict by bringing them together 
under different guises would lead to improved relations. More pertinent to my 
research is the study by Desivila (1988) where Jewish and Palestinian Israeli 
medics were found to enjoy positive working relationships together in a similar 
manner to my findings. The analysis of data from a semi-structured survey 
examining levels of cooperation, cohesiveness, competence and interpersonal 
communication suggested a high level of co-existence and positive relationships 
across these ‘mixed’ teams. Rather than compare these professional experiences 
with their lives in the external environment, Desivila explored possible ‘cross 
over effects’ between these environments in terms of mutual national perceptions 
of the Other through their national identity formation.  It was found that Jewish 
Israelis described their self-identity as being ‘rooted in their Israeli citizenship,’ 
(p.440) whilst the Palestinian Israelis using a plethora of different identities to 
reflect their positioning, revealing a ‘wider range of definitions, with no single 
category dominant’ (p.440). This finding was interpreted as being a failure of 
contact in their professional context to change these identity positionings. Any 
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transformation in cross group relationships that had occurred in the Desivila 
study, where mutual national perception correlated with overall support for equal 
opportunities for both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis and a motivation for mutual 
reconciliation across the groups, was thought not to be due to their working 
relationship, but to their political positioning as being either ‘dovish’ rather than 
‘hawkish’, an Israeli way of identifying a left-right continuum. There was no 
discussion as to the motivations of those who positioned themselves as such, or 
how their work environment had impacted their perceptions. Overall however, 
Desivila (1998) concluded that the contact hypothesis had been useful in 
illustrating how people from conflicted groups might find boundary crossing a 
possibility within particular contexts, in this case a medical professional working 
environment, yet not continuing outside of it, reflecting my own findings.  
These positionings have been reported in other studies showing how 
different contexts can produce different realities that might appear to be 
contradictory and yet demonstrate the significance of both polyphasic 
representations within them. Minard (1956) found that American coal miners 
worked equally across racial boundaries underground, yet once away from the 
workplace, segregated relationships dominated that matched the external material 
environment. The entrance and exit from the mine literally stood as the physical 
and ethnic boundary; after working together as equals the miners would finish 
their working day in separate showers and transport home: ‘The colour line 
becomes immediately visible as the miners’ eyes accustomed to the inner 
darkness of the mine have accommodated themselves to the light of the outside 
world’ (Minard 1956, p. 30). The segregation – integration theme is similar to my 
findings and demonstrates how a political context of division and difference can 
remain embedded within a culture, whilst at the same time boundaries are 
softened to serve other institutional requirements.  
 Hammack (2011b) followed a group of young Jewish Israeli and 
Palestinians (from the West Bank and Gaza) who spent some weeks at summer 
camps in the USA as part of an encounter group contact exercise. The 
participants were encouraged to think about their own and the Other social 
identities juxtaposed with those of young Americans who acted as third party 
mediators across the groups. By working on what was described as their own and 
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others individual identity structures through group exercises, social events and 
the writing of individual diaries, it was explored whether their group boundaries 
might be softened as new identity structures took hold.  The camp was thought to 
be successful in achieving these aims. By opening up new identity boundaries 
(Doviedo, Gaertner & Saguy 2009) it was hoped that once they returned to their 
respective homes in the conflict zone, they would be transformed by the 
experience and begin a more co-existence path than previously. But a year later, 
the picture was not quite so clear as their previous identity structure had begun to 
take hold. The changing contexts from one of being encouraged to explore new 
identities in the USA to a place still entrenched in political and structural conflict 
was a factor (Hammack, Piliecki and Merrilees (2014). As the teenagers no 
longer had the context of a supporting group promoting more consensus than 
conflict and instead were embedded in their communities where there was a 
pressure to remain loyal to their group, the effects had faded. I had heard similar 
stories in my research when talking to young people in London. This aspect will 
be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6 under the topic of semantic barriers, 
where loyalty and identification with significant members of their group is 
suggested as a factor that can diminish cross group friendships. However, the 
longer term effects of the teenagers’ experiences are yet to be reported. Latent 
effects (Markova 2000) that cannot be directly measured, or in this case, not 
discussed, could play out in interesting ways in the future.     
Encounter group work with young Palestinian and Jewish Israelis has 
been scrupulously followed in Israel to explore what might work to adopt a more 
positive positioning towards the Other. These are groups that are explored who 
follow a programme where transformation of ideas of the Other are actively 
encouraged by bringing members together to explore their experiences in a 
supported environment. The asymmetry in the external environment was found to 
affect progress in the groups with a tendency for the Jewish Israeli narrative to 
dominate (Maoz, 2011). Attempts to focus on equalising the groups (Maoz, 
2001) and trying different strategies of either a co-existence or confrontational 
models (Maoz, 2004) were followed in an attempt to achieve more symmetry 
across the groups.  Co-existent education has also been examined (Bekerman 
Habib and Shhadi, 2011) where Palestinian and Jewish Israeli children have 
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found to be more open to the Other, forming close friendships that reflected the 
positive school environment. This setting was considered to be an excellent 
example of contact implementation with the ‘emphasis on status equality, 
mutuality and cooperative independence might very well be the condition which 
enables and strengthens our findings’ (p.401). It was also thought difficult to 
assess its overall success due to the complexity of the context of future 
developments, for example, the Jewish Israeli children having to later enlist in 
the armed forces acting as closing down of former softening of boundaries, or the 
precarious peace negotiations that might have a knock on effect. Most 
interestingly was the opportunity to open a space where the ‘unsaids of Israeli 
society could be openly stated in a sphere of trust’ (p.402). This alone was felt to 
reflect the success of such an educational initiative.   
These examples demonstrate how programmes to enact social change to 
promote the softening and crossing of intergroup imagined boundaries reflects a 
motivation towards consensus rather than conflict across both groups. My 
findings reflect the complexity of contact research, as described above, where 
different contexts can begin to describe the heterogeneity of segregated societies. 
The clear demarcation of a place of work and a place of living has been 
interesting to demonstrate the differences across this boundary. Dixon et al 
(2008) discussed segregated boundaries of residence, education and employment 
as perpetuating inequality and negative stereotyping of the Other. The 
observation of territorial grouping in public places in post-apartheid South Africa 
(Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux, 2005) that not only created, but signified racial 
separation, exemplifies further the developing dialogical relationships across the 
groups in particular contexts. 
 By identifying themata that resonates with the work-life context, the 
array of underlying tensions between the groups in my study were uncovered 
enough to discuss what was deemed to be significant to each group. The 
structural inequality and non-recognition of Palestinian Israelis within the State 
machinery, where exclusivity for a Jewish only state is promoted, contrasted with 
the structural equality, recognition and inclusivity in the medical field, under a 
different arm of State machinery.  Each of these contexts represented different 
systems that on some level appeared to be quite independent of each other. The 
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external environment is set within the spilling of an ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 
2014) from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the internal relationship between 
Israeli and Palestinian group with their relevant institutions, cultural and social 
trajectories.  The ethos reflects a world view of the justness of each groups’ 
positioning to delegitimise the Other through their own sense of victimhood that 
required high levels of patriotism to defend their positions. At its core is 
intractability leading to human suffering. The internal medical world is 
represented by a set of universal medical ethics where life, all life regardless of 
positioning, is considered precious and so set within an alternative ethos. At its 
core is the universal value of saving lives and promoting health.  
These two contrasting worlds were inhabited by the participants where 
each context represented ‘sharing a world view in the form of collective and 
social representations as a characteristic of groups. It is this epistemological 
means enabling communication’ (Wagner and Hayes, 2005, p.277). The 
dialogical analyses demonstrated the multiplicity of the participants’ life worlds 
across the work / life divide where their heterogeneity of positioning was 
uncovered to reveal a complex web of representational fields. The dialogical 
relationships across and within these fields have shown to reflect how these two 
groups remain related to one another, both as a source of tension and consensus 
as they chart a trajectory to the future based on their culturally embedded past. 
This point will be developed in Chapter 7 when all three studies will be discussed 
further.   
In the next chapter, the last of my empirical chapters, I pursue the 
permeability of imagined boundaries by discussing the role of semantic barriers 
and bridges. Semantic barriers suggest a hardening of boundaries where the lack 
of shared social representations inhibit a positioning that may lead to one based 
more on consensus than conflict, whereas semantic bridges reflect the 
possibilities of the softening and crossing of boundaries through some degree of 
mutual understanding across the groups.     
5.6. Conclusion   
This chapter has explored the permeability of imagined boundaries 
between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel who worked together as medics 
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in Northern Israel. It was suggested that the work environment based on medical 
ethics of life enhancement and care of health, based institutionally on equality 
and inclusiveness of all staff and patients, was effective in providing a safe and 
satisfactory work environment. Professional respect and friendships flourished 
across all groups. This contrasted with their external environment where 
inequality between the groups was evident where structural asymmetry placed 
the minority group in a position of structural inequality and state / social non 
recognition of their Palestinian status. A sense of threat related to many of the 
Jewish Israeli’s narratives dominated their representational field. This was 
highlighted by a recent war in Gaza leading to the rising to the surface intergroup 
tensions that had been a part of Israeli’s lifeworld since 1948. This took the form 
of a justification of the state machinery to deal with conflict juxtaposed with the 
Palestinian Israelis conflicted loyalties. The role of the contact hypothesis was 
discussed to highlight how the discipline has explored these intergroup tensions 
with some interesting observations and some superficial similarity in the 
findings. It was the framework of themata, however, that was integral to mapping 
out a foundation from which both groups’ positioning could be explored. The 
themata of exclusivity – inclusivity, threat – security reflecting the Jewish 
Israeli’s positioning and non-recognition - recognition and inequality – equality 
the Palestinian Israelis’, suggested the deep fissures dialogically developed over 
time as a kernel of social knowledge, where unresolved conflict remains 
embedded in their socio-cultural sphere. At the same time, however, the 
antinomy structure of the themata opens the discussion to embrace environments 
where its opposite can be explored. In this case, the particular professional 
environment can be discussed in terms of these oppositions to reflect a more 
consensual sphere that would have been unthinkable in 1948.   
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6: Semantic barriers and bridges across imagined boundaries  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘They have all this power and they are destroying our lives, women and 
children. You want to stop them but you cannot do anything. You don’t 
accept what they’re doing and you really hate them because, I mean, they’re 
doing so many unacceptable things and that makes you think that we will 
never forget. We will never forgive them. It adds to the history of hatred and 
the conflict with them.’  Female, 20’s, Gaza, Palestinian.    
If you want a true peace, even the most right wing person will tell you 
‘Okay, I’ll sign that paper, and they’re not going to shoot me, they’re not 
going to bomb me, they’re going to leave me alone, that’s fine!’ When will 
we believe they will do that? And they say too, they say they will never stop 
until they have all the land and all the Jews are in the sea. They always say 
that.’  Female, 20’s Jewish Israeli.   
6.1. Introduction   
The above quotes illustrate two perspectives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 
one from a Palestinian and one from a Jewish Israeli symbolising barriers across 
their imagined closed boundaries. Participants across both groups appeared to be 
barred to the knowledge systems of the Other. Yet elsewhere in the data there 
was evidence of bridging barriers that expanded the participants’ representational 
field to acknowledge the Other’s positioning: 
‘What you see on TV, those are the fanatics and they are the small number 
of people. But if you grab any person on the street here and ask them and 
tell him if you sign this piece of paper and peace will happen tomorrow, he 
will say yes. I’m sure. I’m sure people want peace.’         Female, 20’s, 
Jewish Israeli.    
I met Jewish people and listened to them more closely after I came here.  
You take more interest and you listen more carefully. You meet more people. 
So I have changed. And suppose may be, that it does take a long time to 
listen to the other person. And it takes both time, maturity, interest and 
understanding of the person, for whatever reason, to understand and think 
how is this resolvable. And so you take an interest in what the other person 
is saying.’    Female, 40’s, West Bank, Palestinian,   
This chapter focuses on the social representations that underlie barriers 
that serve to inhibit acknowledging the Other and to consider the role of semantic 
bridges that demonstrates a conceptual softening of imagined intergroup 
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boundaries. The chapter is organised as follows: first, a brief recap of the 
previous two empirical chapters is given to place this chapter in context; second, 
the literature that connects socio-psychological barriers to intractable conflict, 
introduced in Chapter 2, is revisited; third, the concept of Moscovici’s 
(1961/2008) semantic barriers is discussed from its original conception and its 
development over the intervening years; fourth, the significance of the 
relationship between themata and semantic barriers is discussed that takes into 
account different inter and intra group positions. The concept of semantic bridges 
is introduced to portray an intrinsic role in the juxtaposition with semantic 
barriers as alternative representations. Examples from the data are explored 
within this theoretical framework.   
6.2. Conflict and consensus across Israeli –Palestinian relationships 
In Chapter 4 I explored how Jewish Israeli and Palestinian participants living in 
London discussed perspectives that were felt to be pertinent to their reflexive 
relationship. By identifying base and organising themes, within and across the 
groups, it was possible to map out and highlight areas for further exploration.  Of 
particular interest was the role of historical representations justifying asymmetric 
group positions in terms of land rights and self-determination and the on-going 
consequences resulting from that. From this knowledge base, my fieldwork in 
Israel gave me the opportunity to explore how Jewish and Palestinian citizens of 
Israel, that is Palestinians and their descendants who had remained in Israel since 
1948, related to one another. By inviting a small cohort of medics from both of 
these populations to discuss their perspectives about the Other, I learned how the 
context of medical ethics created flourishing professional relationships. However, 
a different reality emerged when discussing these same relationships outside of 
this environment where structural, cultural and social differences were found to 
be evident. By identifying themata across and between these two groups, both in 
and out of the working relationship, it was possible to map out areas across 
imagined intergroup boundaries. In this chapter I use a further sample, one made 
up from Jewish Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza and East 
Jerusalem, to explore possible barriers that may serve to harden imagined 
boundaries across the groups, as well as possible bridges that may serve to soften 
them.  
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The sample that forms the basis of this third study is taken from the samples 
from the previous two empirical chapters, as discussed in Chapter 3. To briefly 
recap, the sample was made up of ten Jewish Israelis, some living in London and 
some in Israel (either born in Israel or immigrated through the process of Aliyah 
as when young) to produce a sample that matched ten Palestinians (born in the 
West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem) who were all interviewed in London. The 
participants in this newly formed sample were approximately matched by age, 
gender and left/right wing or more/less moderate positionings. I wanted to 
explore how common sense representations of this sample could possibly 
highlight areas that both fostered and discouraged intergroup conflict. The 
following questions were considered:    
1. What are the types of barriers that serve to inhibit conciliatory relations across 
group boundaries?  
2. Does the notion of intractable conflict imply that intergroup barriers reflect a 
resistance to any softening of imagined boundaries? 
3. If imagined boundaries hold the possibility of more, rather than less permeability, 
what contexts might stimulate or hinder this process?  
6.2.1. The role of themata across dialogical divides 
Before discussing potential barriers it was necessary to consider what lies at the 
base of the dialogical relationship between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians that 
takes into account their positionings of the conflict, both inwards towards their 
own group and outwards to the Other. By identifying relevant themata it would 
then be possible to explore the tensions that can give rise to the formation of 
barriers that inhibit a more consensual relationship.  The exploration of relevant 
themata was found to be useful in Chapter 5, as a foundation from which to 
explore dialogical relationships amongst Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics. 
The process of identifying themata was repeated in this study to address the 
relationship across Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups who are separated geo-
politically by conflict. 
 The resulting asymmetry across the groups was clearly evident from the 
participants’ interviews.   For the Jewish Israeli sample, themata of 
security/insecurity and exclusivity/inclusivity reflected their positionings, whilst 
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non-recognition/recognition and oppression/freedom resonated with the 
Palestinian data, as shown in Figure 4 overleaf.  
Each set of themata framed the core social positioning of each group from 
where social representations could be explored. Within these frameworks, the 
groups’ norms and values, group dynamics and processes of identification had 
developed in response to their lived environment and representational field.  The 
dialogical nature of the relationships within each themata framework can provide an 
insight into how social representations have developed over time and become 
central to the groups’ positionings of the conflict.   
 
 
 
 
 
The following quote demonstrates how the theme of power asymmetry 
was significant to both groups. Not only does the speaker take the position of one 
in a less powerful context, she also acknowledges that the Other is aware of their 
more powerful status and had developed ways of masking it:  
Power asymmetry  
Threat - 
Security 
Exclusivity - 
Inclusivity 
Oppression - 
Freedom 
Non recogntion - 
Recognition 
Jewish  Israeli Palestinian 
Figure 5: Themata across a Jewish Israeli and Palestinian sample   
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‘Fundamentally, there is an imbalance of power. And Israel thinks they can 
get away with it. The party that has the project has more power and that’s 
about it. Israelis I think, by and large understand this, and have developed a 
variety of tools and arguments that alleviate the problems related to that 
understanding. One is ‘the world is a jungle, look at us – we have been 
destroyed and so if we don’t fight for ourselves who will fight for us?  
Tough luck for Palestinians. Nothing can be done about that.’ And another 
one is, ‘Well nobody likes us any way.’  And so it’s kind of ‘Well they don’t 
like us, and they wanted us out, so we’ll kick them out instead.’        Female, 
40’s, West Bank, Palestinian.   
The asymmetry of power relations is acknowledged by the Other as 
illustrated below:  
‘Look, there's the West Bank which is like a big prison. It’s not very nice. Or 
Gaza which is horrible. It’s the truth.  A Palestinian would say - ‘I can't find 
a job. My cousins are stuck in Ramallah or Gaza or whatever and I can’t 
move anywhere.  And I’m looking around and seeing all this prosperity and 
it’s not equal in any way. And yes, I’m being educated constantly as an 
Arab that they came in 1948 and took what was ours in 1967 they took 
more.’  What do you expect? But on their side they do acknowledge that 
Israel is extremely strong and extremely defensive. That's how I see it. 
Having said that, why not try and get along together still?’    Male, 30’s, 
Israeli Jewish. 
The ability to acknowledge the perceived perspective of the Other reflects 
the dialogical nature of the relationship where each can recognise and be 
recognised by the Other, juxtaposed with their own groups’ interests and 
positioning. By questioning ‘what do you expect?’ there is an implicit acceptance 
that forms of resistance to Israeli hegemony is a path that Palestinians, or indeed 
any other group in a similar context, might follow in such a context of 
asymmetry. However, by suggesting that the Palestinians acknowledge the 
strength of Israeli hegemony and resist it, demonstrates the power struggle across 
the groups. And further, by suggesting that some form of co-existence would be 
preferable to resistance, this positioning served to embed the power/powerless 
theme firmly in the context of this asymmetric conflict.  
By identifying further themata relevant to each group stemming from the 
overriding power/powerless foundation opens up a space for further investigation 
into how each groups’ positioning had developed. In Chapter 4, I discussed the 
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significance of historical representations as a positioning tool that served to 
justify this asymmetry, and the response to that, from the less powerful group. By 
exploring further themata applicable to each group, I can begin to examine the 
permeability of the imagined boundary lines between the groups, to understand 
the nature of the barriers that uphold the asymmetry as perceived by those who 
directly experience the conflict.            
6.3. Barriers and bridges across Israeli-Palestinian relations  
‘It is well established that socio-psychological barriers hinder the resolution of 
harsh and lasting conflicts’ (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011, p.637). These different 
categories of barriers have been discussed in the literature (see Chapter 2) to shed 
light on how their prominence in the contextual representational field hinders the 
formation of intergroup relationships steered by consensus rather than conflict. 
These studies have focused on cognitive processes (Ross & Ward, 1995, 
emotional factors (Halperin, 2008; Halperin and Gross, 2011) and societal beliefs 
(Maoz and McCauley, 2005). Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) introduced a process 
model that suggested such barriers can lead to a closed-mindedness that gives 
way to biased processing resulting in denying any new information that might 
support a more non-conflict positioning. A number of barriers were identified 
within my data that appeared to inhibit any softening of boundaries that might 
lead to a more consensus positioning. These barriers reflected similar findings to 
Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) where ‘rigid conflict supporting beliefs, world 
views and emotions’ (p.637) played a dominant role in the communication of 
social representations of conflict. The identified barriers in this study will be 
explored using the concept of semantic barriers as discussed in the next section.  
6.3.1. Semantic barriers: blocking paths across boundaries of difference         
Moscovici (1961/2008) introduced the concept of a semantic barrier to describe 
how social representations, constructed to portray a group’s positioning, remain 
intact within a defined boundary that denies representations held by the Other. 
Representations held by the Other remain barred from the subject’s 
representational field, due in part to a specific propaganda langue structure, held 
in place by semantic barriers. The use of propaganda in the context of 
asymmetrical conflict is central to communication, as its ‘regulatory function 
takes the form of an assertion of the group’s identity and an attempt to re-
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establish its status as a subject that has been freed from contradictions that 
threatened its equilibrium and action’ (p. 311). By externalising these 
contradictions, the group comes to define itself in terms of the enemy leading to 
tighter and more impermeable group boundaries. Moscovici (1961/2008) 
suggested two types of semantic barriers; first, ‘rigid oppositions’ that bar open 
communication of consensus across boundaries as whatever is said by one group 
is immediately negated by the other. Second, the ‘transfer of meaning’ occurs 
when a statement is given, but its meaning is manipulated to signify one that is 
more in line with the positioning of the speaker.  
Gillespie (2008) developed the concept of semantic barriers further by 
defining alternative representations as ‘the ideas and images the group has about 
how other groups represent the given object. Alternative representations are thus 
representations of other people’s representations.’ (p.2). Five further semantic 
barriers were suggested to exemplify the blocking of communication that stands 
to inhibit a fertilisation of mutual and consensual understanding between parties 
held in tension and conflict. These included: 
- stigmatising the Other in order to dismiss their positioning by alluding 
to their lesser status as unworthy of inclusion in any intergroup 
consensus;  
- separating what is acceptable and not acceptable by accepting part of 
the Other’s representation and ignoring an integral aspect of it;  
- prohibiting thoughts through the collective status quo and so any 
alternative representation is denied through pressure to conform;  
- the motive of the Other is undermined and so alternative representations 
can be rejected; and 
- a process of ‘bracketing’ that allows the speaker to judge certain parts 
of an alternative representation as being disassociated from the reality 
and so in effect, polices the boundary of what is considered acceptable 
and rejecting the rest.  
These semantic barriers clearly hinder the developmental of mutual trust 
and respect in intergroup relations. Gillespie, Kadianaki and O’Sullivan-Lago 
(2011) found how these semantic barriers affected relationships between 
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nationals and migrants in both Greece and Ireland where the threat of alterity 
played a role in inhibiting more open relationships with the Other. Semantic 
barriers as suggested by Moscovici (1961/2008) and Gillespie (2008) were 
evident from discussions with both groups. Rather than list the similarities to 
those suggested semantic barriers as described above, I intended to explore 
semantic barriers that reflected how the participants made sense of their 
experiences when discussing a particular context of the conflict. The nature of the 
dialogical relationship across the two groups serves to identify barriers, not only 
between them, but also within the groups.  
6.3.2. Semantic bridges: opening paths across boundaries of difference 
The representational field under investigation was not only dominated by social 
representations of the intractability of the conflict. Representations that 
highlighted empathy, for example, through acknowledging of the Other’s 
powerless positioning, where a motivation to explore possibilities of relationships 
based on consensus rather than conflict, was also present. This quote exemplifies 
a position that strayed from the Israeli hegemonic narrative:    
‘For me, I feel like the Israelis, the Jewish people are missing the point 
when they are insisting on calling the land as their own land and not seeing 
the Palestinian side of how they also have the right to the land. I think the 
Israelis need to recognise that the Palestinian’s predicament, that their 
victimhood is caused by Israel’.  Male, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
And from the Palestinian one: 
I met some Israelis at a special meeting. They came from Tel Aviv, from the 
settlements from the north and we sat there and we discussed stuff.  Most of 
them want peace and they want to live together with us and they don’t want 
to have conflict because we all suffer … and they were happy to be with 
Palestinians and the Palestinians were the same and so we were around 
together.  And at the end it was really quite good to know how they think. 
Some of them would really like to do some more work on this and to be 
more friendly with us.’ Male, 30’s, West Bank, Palestinian.   
 Both these quotes suggest a motivation to acknowledge the Other. The 
Jewish Israeli participant in showing empathy for the Palestinian narrative by 
resisting his own hegemonic group narrative and the Palestinian quote showing a 
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desire to listen to the Other’s perspective that included the desire for more 
contact. 
  Although the groups were bounded by their own life worlds, separated 
from each other by continued conflict where group members tended only to meet, 
if at all, in the context of conflict, the relationship remained a dialogical one. 
Each action of conflict affected the other’s perceptions as the groups remained 
intertwined, separated and yet bound together through conflict.  Even by 
dismissing the Other, the relational act remained a dialogical one, (Linell 2009). 
By juxtaposing semantic barriers with semantic bridges associated with each 
group, we can ask what are the barriers separating and what are the bridges 
bridging?  By keeping the identified themata as the figurative kernel of how the 
groups’ knowledge systems have developed around the conflict, semantic 
barriers and bridges can be explored further.       
6.3.3. Identifying barriers and bridges 
Analysis to identify barriers and bridges was undertaken by compiling the 
transcriptions from the newly formed sample of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians.  
Data that related to either a barrier or a bridge was assembled in separate tables  
that were used as a starting point for the analysis.  
6.3.4. What separates and what binds  
As discussed above, the power asymmetry played a central role across both 
groups in forming and developing social representations around conflict. The 
Israeli Jewish sample reflected this power status through their descriptions of the 
geo-political positioning, state institutions, global allies and military strength. 
The prevailing asymmetry had a knock on effect, both within their themata of 
threat/security and exclusivity/inclusivity pertaining to the barriers that stood to 
prevent acknowledgement of their positioning in relation to their own more 
powerful status. The Palestinian group represented their less powerful positioning 
by describing their representations in relation to the powerful Other, as one of an 
unwanted minority. These representations were evident within the themata of 
non-recognition/recognition and oppression/freedom.  The themata across both 
groups reflected the dialogical nature of the relationship where each position 
affected the Other’s positioning. Any semantic barrier that was identified in one 
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group affected the other group, which in turn, affected the original.  This cyclical 
and reactive nature of this relationship appears to be a significant factor at the 
base of the conflict. Any move towards a position of consensus would require an 
exploration of the barriers identified within these sets of themata across the 
groups. The identified barriers and bridges will be discussed in relation to the 
relevant themata to contextualise their meaning.   
6.3.5. Exclusivity/inclusivity and threat/security related to non-recognition 
/recognition  
Social representations embedded within the themata of exclusivity/inclusivity 
discussed by the Jewish Israeli participants, were also closely related to that of 
threat/security. This was centred on the paramount importance for the safety of 
the Jewish people in forming and developing a secure self-determined nation. 
This was judged by the participants to be a direct consequence of the Holocaust 
in the mid twentieth century and preceding centuries of anti-Semitism. The next 
section (6.3.6.) will discuss themata of threat/security whilst this section explores 
the relationship between exclusivity /inclusivity and how that has impacted on 
the tensions within the Palestinian themata of non-recognition/recognition. 
 Identifying semantic barriers and bridges across these themata has 
provided the opportunity to explore the consequences of this reflexive 
relationship as spoken by those with first-hand experience of the conflict. For the 
Jewish Israeli group this representational field was discussed in terms of the 
flourishing of a collective identity of a particular ethnic group in a developing 
nation state based on an ideology that had encompassed a history of suffering and 
loss. The need for solidarity and belonging was keenly felt:   
‘One wants to be one common entity. It means that I am part of this network 
of people and I feel that I naturally feel a bond with people when they 
associate me with being Jewish and I associate them with being Jewish. It’s 
a cultural evenness.  It’s just a desire to be part of something that is bigger 
than you and the feeling that you’re not alone.’     Female, 20’s, Jewish 
Israeli. 
‘It is very attractive. I feel special.  I thought I'd hide it here in the UK but I 
don't. I'm very open about it, I'm talking about a special culture.’   Male, 
30’s. Jewish Israeli. 
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The desire to segregate with others of the same ethnic background had 
acted as a semantic bridge to develop solidarity within a framework of the 
ideology of Zionism, creating a nation state for the protection and proliferation of 
the Jewish people. However, the tension between exclusivity and inclusivity held 
the seeds of a semantic barrier of exclusion, for the Palestinian group:         
‘We want the Jewish race to carry on. I want our children to be Jewish and 
our grandchildren to be Jewish.  If we start intermarrying with Arabs then 
that's not going to be’.       Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.  
The threads of threat and safety remain firmly embedded in the 
development of the national collective identity, resulting in a particular narrative 
that played a significant role in the embryonic dialogical relationship with the 
Palestinian inhabitants of the land they conquered:  
‘Collective identities are structured around opposition to the other …  In 
Europe the Jews have no choice to be Jews because everyone else will call 
them Jews whether they want to be or not but in the new country we have to 
define ourselves by enemies and everyone else who doesn't think so are 
weak’.   Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.   
The Palestinian group discussed their narrative in terms of semantic 
barriers of injustice and loss of dignity, as the creation of the Israeli state 
occurred at the expense of their status as the indigenous people. These barriers 
were echoed in Chapter 4 when discussing historical representations. Barriers 
were further discussed in terms of the Palestinian perspective of a denial of the 
Israeli people to acknowledge this positioning:           
‘The Israelis always try and claim things. Like this is our land. This is our 
army.  And people are convinced by it. It all comes from the same ideology, 
that they were the chosen people, and they have to protect it, the land … I 
feel the Israelis have these false ideas, because they feel insecure.  I think 
what happened to the Jews in the Holocaust was tragic, and I don’t know 
why, but they are doing just the same thing to us. They built a wall around 
us just like there was in Germany and they are promoting really racist 
ideology, that they want everyone to recognise Israel as a Jewish only 
state.’    Male, 20’s, West Bank. Palestinian.   
This quote demonstrated a barrier of perceived injustice that prevented the 
speaker from acknowledging the Other’s need for a nation state exclusively for 
the Jewish people. By positioning himself as a victim due to claims of the Other, 
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he cannot bridge this represented perspective. But a bridge is nevertheless created 
by formally and informally recognising Israel as a sovereign state: 
‘I’m one of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians refugees who left 
throughout our history.  We lived in the land what is now called Israel. 
That’s Israel as a state that was established in 1948 as a result of a war, the 
Israeli Arab war. I can’t deny their right to live in this piece of land. All 
Palestinians recognise the state of Israel.  No-one talks about destroying 
Israel. The only problem we have is the Israeli state politicians who 
represent the brutal policies of controlling the Palestinians, not only the 
land, but to the right to live in peace, the right to have a state.’    Female, 
40’s, Gaza, Palestinian.  
But the desire to be acknowledged as a people for their suffering of their 
loss, to be socially recognised as a people, stood as a barrier representing stigma 
for not being heard:     
‘They don’t understand the resentment and the suffering that the 
Palestinians have been going through. They didn’t know about Palestinian 
house demolitions, particularly in the punitive sentence as a punishment for 
terrorist activities. And they would question me and they would think that 
I’m lying, that I am deluded.  I remember there was one Jewish guy from 
America I met at University and was now living in Israel. I was so trying to 
convince him what was really going on. I took him around the West Bank. 
And after one of many discussions he said to me. ‘Finally, you know what? 
Maybe you’re right. Maybe some of what is going on is unethical. But if that 
is what has to happen for Israel to exist, so be it.’   Female, 20’s, East 
Jerusalem, Palestinian.  
This more powerless positioning, as inferred above, was never far from 
the Palestinian narrative. The suggestion by an American Jewish visitor finally 
agreeing that maybe the Palestinian people had suffered and continue to suffer 
was met with the acceptance of this for the continued existence of Israel, as 
quoted above. This exemplified the semantic barriers that drew a veil over 
injustice and in the following quote accentuated the Palestinians’ positioning of 
powerlessness:  
‘I try to see them as people, and many Palestinians do the same.  But to be 
honest with you, the conflict makes you feel terrible. You just want someone 
to make them feel what we feel.’    Male, 20’s, West Bank, Palestinian.    
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One of the overriding consequences of the conflict frequently referred to 
was continued access to the land by Jewry from any part of the world with no 
immediate ancestral link with the land, whilst Palestinians with these connections 
were denied entry. Moreover, the continued settlement building in the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem, for Jewish only citizens, stood for the continued taking of 
contested land. The Palestinian narrative had stressed that the international 
community had continued to discuss the illegality of these settlements built on 
occupied land through the UN and EU legislation. It was along this route that 
some Palestinian participants followed, symbolising a bridge that steered a 
course away from conflict to a narrative where their positioning might be 
recognised:  
‘We do have a right to the land, and the Jewish people claim they have a 
right to be there too. I’ve always chosen to stick with the international law, 
and perspective. That just defines the conflict within the UN resolutions, 
conventions and treaties.’        Male, 20’s, West Bank, Palestinian.   
However, the sense of injustice standing as a barrier between conflict and 
consensus and set within the themata of non-recognition/recognition and 
exclusivity/inclusivity, remained dominant:  
‘There should be a reason that justifies Israel to continue the settlement 
expansion, to continue with the enclosure of Gaza, to continue with all its 
policies against Palestinians. What is the reason? What are the facts for 
them that justify them to go on with their colonial policies?’  Male, 20’s, 
Gaza, Palestinian.   
And the asymmetry continued to be relevant, as any sense of reciprocity 
further barred any relationship based on mutual understanding of each other’s 
positioning:      
 ‘I told him (the Israeli guy) ‘You know, it comes down to me recognising 
you as an Israeli, but I see that you are not even seeing me’.  I don’t 
understand why they would insist on having the whole land for themselves 
and not even seeing any claims and rights for the other side.’  Male, 20’s 
Gaza, Palestinian.  
Israeli Jewish themata of exclusivity/inclusivity related to threat/security 
has been discussed in relation to the less powerful Palestinian thema of non-
recognition/recognition through the dialogical relationships across the groups. At 
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the intersection of the intergroup imagined boundaries, semantic barriers are seen 
to close down acknowledgement of the Other’s positioning, and yet semantic 
bridges have played a role in increasing intragroup solidarity and belonging and 
some hint of intergroup bridging. The following section explores further these 
concepts through different sets of themata.   
6.3.6. Threat/security related to oppression/freedom  
I began this third study interested in how themata from each group was related to 
the Other in terms of semantic barriers that inhibited acknowledging intergroup 
positionings.  Once a positioning had been acknowledged, the representations 
formed can be described as a bridge to opening a dialogue across group 
boundaries. The tension across each thema stood as an integral and ontological 
aspect of the representations of conflict for the particular group. For the Jewish 
Israeli group, threat/security hovered above all representations of Israeli 
nationhood. The tragic Jewish collective experience of ethnic genocide during 
the Holocaust was symbolised, amongst many things, as an endowment of 
vulnerability that had affected many aspects of Israeli life.  The national 
homeland of Israel, built upon the ideology of Zionism, placed at its centre, the 
exclusive right to self-determination for the Jewish people, residing in a place of 
security, free from the threat of the Other. Within the thema of threat/security, 
semantic barriers around the concept of threat, through fear of the Other, 
demonstrated this continued potency through all levels of society:    
‘I am very open minded and left wing, but if you challenge me and start 
pushing you know, yeah my God I have to defend, or I will lose my security 
very easily.’  
To the institutional level:  
‘A friend is a veteran of an intelligence organisation and he is convinced 
that the Palestinians are not trustworthy and the bottom line is that they 
want to destroy us.’ 
To the societal level:  
‘When we have the fear inside us then you are looking to validate it in all 
kinds of examples .. so it only takes one terrorist who goes on a tractor and 
runs some people over for people to  say ‘You see?’ They don’t really want 
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us to be here. They are dangerous and we have to protect ourselves.’     
Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.                
Responsibility for the continued semantic barrier of threat is handed to 
the Other for the continuation of the conflict through terrorist activities that 
Jewish Israelis believed to include plans, in the unforeseen future, to annihilate 
Israel and all its people: 
‘It stems from the fact that the Muslims want to wipe out Israel. And don't 
forget that Israel was founded because of what had been going on in Europe 
at the time.  The people then felt nobody wants us, everybody's thrown us 
out and killed us and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on our own.  
We've got to show the world that we'll do whatever we want, whatever you 
say.’   Female, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.  
Over sixty years of conflict had not appeared to lessen the sense of threat 
that originally brought many Jewish people to what was believed and hoped to be 
a safe and secure homeland.  The semantic barrier of threat had resulted in a 
stalemate positioning where the relationship between threat and security was 
continually being played out.  Threat of the Other, not only Palestinians, but also 
for other perceived groups that represented threat was reflected within the 
threat/security thema foundation. The tension across the antinomies had led to the 
urgent need for a sense of security to offset any perceived threat. Security 
remains a central tenet of Israeli nationhood.  The role of the military is a 
significant factor in dealing with the threat of the Other to provide a strong 
security force to safeguard its people. Israel is home to one of the strongest 
military machines globally in terms of equipment and trained manpower. 
Military service remains an enforced duty for all young Jewish Israelis, apart 
from some groups of orthodox religious Jews. In addition to this, annual reserve 
duty is required of active men until approximately the age of retirement.  The 
experience of serving in the military can stand as a mark of national pride, where 
future careers and life-long friendships are formed:  
‘For me being an Israeli is about the army. If you haven’t done the army 
you’re not really an Israeli … I made my best friends in the army and it’s an 
experience that I think makes us mature really fast. And also it makes you 
bond for life.’  Female, 20’s, Jewish Israeli.  
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The consequences of the Jewish Israeli themata of threat/security on the 
Palestinian group related to representations embedded within that of 
oppression/freedom. As discussed in Chapter 4, historical representations across 
both groups reflected different interpretations of the events surrounding the birth 
of the state of Israel in 1948. The more powerful group celebrated their victory at 
the expense of the other group, who remain in mourning for the ‘Nakba’ 
(tragedy) over sixty years later. The continuing conflict demonstrated the 
temporal tensions around the themata of threat/security and oppression/freedom. 
For the Palestinian group, their face to face relationships with Jewish Israelis 
tended to be based on contact with soldiers at checkpoints, patrols, house raids, 
or, for the Gazans, as soldiers in combat at war with their people. The exception 
was the Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem who share a city with the 
Jewish Israeli population, although separated physically by highly segregated 
areas including military checkpoints and culturally, by the consequences of the 
division of ethnic groups by continued intergroup conflict.      
The experience of meeting Israeli Jewish soldiers within the confines of 
the conflict emphasised the power/powerless positioning:   
‘When I went to school I had to go through the checkpoints and sometimes 
the Israelis would beat us really badly. They wouldn’t sexually harass you 
but I remember a soldier, he would say ‘Now go across the checkpoint 
naked,’ even though I was 13 years old. The journey should take no more 
than fifteen minutes by car but we had to go a long way around just to avoid 
the checkpoint, otherwise you might be stuck at it for two hours probably. 
There were some horrible stories especially during a second intifada. I was 
very young then. That was when everything was really bad.’         Male, 
20’s, West Bank, Palestinian.  
The themata of oppression/freedom framed the ontology of social 
representations that reflected these realities. The loss of one’s dignity, both 
personally and within the group, at the hand of a powerful Other, stood as a 
semantic barrier to contemplating consensus. The following quote reflected the 
representations around humiliation, fear and anger that formed a foundation from 
which a subjective barrier of oppression was built, that inhibited an 
acknowledgement of the Other’s positioning within the themata of 
threat/security: 
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‘They used to come into our house at three in the morning … they were 
knocking at the door with their guns looking for my cousin.  And they told us 
to leave the house because they had to search for him.  My father said to 
them in Hebrew ‘My children are really young, and they have to go to 
school tomorrow’. But they were just saying ‘Shut up and go outside’. And I 
think that they knew he wasn’t there but they still had to do it.  I was about 
14 or so then but it started when I was about nine. . it was really scary.  It 
was terrifying. I had a younger brother and he used to get really really 
scared that something was going to happen to him.’  Male, 20’s, East 
Jerusalem, Palestinian.      
The lived experiences of a powerless positioning as exemplified above, 
was juxtaposed with the barriers of the Other, where threat had played a role as 
discussed earlier. The resulting representational field shows one dogged by 
intractability where both groups remain imprisoned by their positionings of threat 
and oppression.  Despite this, bridges that represented a shift that held the 
possibility of transformative change to acknowledge the predicament of the Other 
and identify with part of their experience, was also present in this 
representational field. The quote below illustrates how an Israeli Jewish soldier 
reacted to a scenario, not dissimilar to the one described above that described the 
reality of military service that carried a burden of its own. In this particular case, 
it led to the seeds of resistance to Israeli hegemony that acted as a bridge to 
acknowledging the Other. Even though the two participants had never met and 
were unaware of each other’s personal existence, they remained in a dialogical 
symbolic relationship with each other:    
‘I met the Palestinians as kind of, as an enemy. I only knew them as a 
soldier, as a combat soldier. I was a combat soldier.  When we got into 
houses into their homes we had to take people out from their parents. And 
seeing the children crying I just didn’t know what to do. I was told to do 
that. I thought that I was keeping my country safe, but when I grew up and 
then went on to meet Arab people as normal citizen in my work, I was 
shocked. When I see that they are just like you and me. They have their 
rights and they should have their rights, as you have them.  In Israel we 
can’t really be so backward …. it’s very difficult for me to see a child 
crying. So I think it’s a deep psychological issue that is quite personal, to 
see the suffering of the other.           Male, 40’s, Jewish Israeli. 
The participant discussed a personal reaction to an act of perceived unjust 
aggression that began a chain of events that transformed his thinking of the 
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Other.  The bridge of empathy led to the building of a barrier against Israeli 
hegemony, representing further tension within the themata of threat/security and 
the positioning within it:          
‘We’re talking about a different world in the IDF … being a soldier is like a 
way of putting your violence somewhere. And it makes you feel strong, 
capable, as you are when you’re a teenager. It’s very sad also, because they 
can become violent when in a group of soldiers. But it’s very difficult 
because your friends go to the army, your parents went to the army, your 
family, everybody went to the army. It’s like a national mission or 
something like that. It’s very difficult. It’s very difficult to come to terms 
with.’    Male, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.  
For the Palestinian young man from East Jerusalem, discussed earlier, he 
was aware of the way in which young Israeli Jewish people changed during 
active military service to accept Israeli hegemony that appeared to close any 
possible bridge from forming across the groups:   
‘I wouldn’t say they are brainwashed but the fact that they have to serve in 
the military. To be honest I met some really nice Israelis before they had to 
serve in the army. They become radical, they become more like patriotic, 
nationalistic, more proud of being Israeli and also less acceptable towards 
Arabs. I don’t know what they teach them in the military.’   Male, 20’s, East 
Jerusalem, Palestinian.      
And yet he never felt that violent retaliation was a solution, given the 
asymmetry in military capability within the power/powerless domain which 
would differ from the Israeli Jewish positioning that Palestinians were violent 
and seeking their destruction:        
‘I think to be honest I never believed that violence is the solution with the 
conflict. Even if you try and stop an Israeli it makes no difference because 
they will demolish a house or hurt you in some way and you get nothing out 
of it. You’re just going to cause more harm to yourself and your parents. 
And if you hurt someone they will come back to hurt your family and you 
will spend the rest of your life in jail. So I don’t think that violence is the 
solution. Even at a certain age I thought we could coexist, which is why I 
took the human rights path.’ Male, 20’s, East Jerusalem, Palestinian.      
The bridge to a human rights path away from a path of violent retaliation 
held the possibility of a future based less on conflict through the possible 
inclusion and assistance of Israeli pro peace agencies and international agencies, 
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such as the United Nations to mediate on their behalf.  This action did not 
however act as a bridge that acknowledged the positioning of the Other. The loss 
of personal and collective dignity, felt to be due to the oppressive nature of the 
threat/security tension of the Israeli hegemonic dynamic, appeared to be too 
much of a bridge to contemplate. The loss of dignity and collective history that 
denied a nationality appeared to have led them to a positioning of helplessness 
and despair reflecting the closing of boundaries and intractability. The following 
two quotes summarise these positions:  
‘There is anger …  anger, vulnerability, all these things, I feel it because I 
had this experience myself. And I remember. The anger feels like a furnace. 
I remember maybe thirty to forty times I was humiliated at checkpoints.  
They want to humiliate us forever … some people accept being humiliated 
to secure their physical survival, but not the spirit and their soul and their 
self-respect.’     Female, 40’s, Palestinian, Gaza. 
‘It is so important not to lose your sense of nationality when Israel declared 
itself a state. To keep and protect it. The conflict makes it more important 
for us to keep our roots, to keep our dignity as Palestinians.’  Male, 30’s, 
West Bank, Palestinian.   
 It was the more powerful party who was in the position to access the 
power asymmetry dynamic that might hold the possibility of bridging the divide 
to acknowledge the Other’s more powerless positioning:   
‘We need to understand that they (Palestinians) have a right to define 
themselves. They don’t have a land, an identity, or a nation.’    Female, 
20’s, Jewish Israel.      
The focus on a ‘need to understand’ demonstrates the acknowledgement 
of the positioning of the Palestinian and so forming a bridge to opening a 
transformative dialogue that includes the significance of adopting universal 
values of human rights. The following quote goes further in acknowledging the 
violence perpetrated by the Palestinian people in the past that could stand as a 
barrier within the threat/security thema.  Yet it is dissolved into a bridge by 
stressing the significance of her own nation’s approach to the conflict in concert 
to her own polarised positioning:  
‘The Arabs have had their struggles and they were always violent against 
Israel, right? They have always been. But we are a state, we are 
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democratic. We have our values of democracy, of rights, of free speech. 
There is, like, a few kilometres from us we have a regime. We are 
controlling it, another nation, and we don’t give them their rights, no 
freedom of speech. Our husbands and sons are serving there and oppressing 
these people. But it comes back to us. You cannot have a democracy here 
and a dictatorship there. It doesn’t work you know. It just leaks inside. And 
slowly, slowly, each year it becomes worse.’  Female, 40’s Jewish Israeli.    
Her positioning, where the values of democracy were questioned, lies at 
the centre of her argument, demonstrated the intractability of such a system in 
this geo-political context. She acknowledged the dialogical relationship across 
the groups through the reflection of the ‘leak inside’ of the effects of conflict and 
its role in the trajectory of the conflict.  The pivoting of saying ‘our husbands 
and sons’ as both protectors of her group and oppressors of another group, is 
significant. By referring to the collective rather than a personal relationship with 
her family as oppressors, she was accepting a position that reflected an ability to 
move away from the hegemonic national identification with the military and all 
that represent as discussed earlier, in terms of a national ethos. However, her 
alternative positioning opens up a dilemma of being identified as disloyal to the 
state, as discussed in the following section.         
6.3.7. Group loyalty:  You’re either with us or against us   
Semantic barriers were not only identified across the groups but also within 
them. Straying from the group positioning was considered taboo, giving rise to 
threat, stigma and isolation. Non conformists were made to feel as traitors to their 
national, cultural, religious or ethnic background. For Jewish Israelis, the 
democratic ideal within the state had led to an openness of positions, whether in 
the cultural or religious domain. However, when connected to a supportive role 
to the Palestinian question, the pressure to conform was strong:   
‘For us, it is becoming frightening to be here, because we would be 
considered a traitor. Not everyone considers you like that but, the media is 
always present.  I can’t hear the news.  I can’t bear it. The few times I did, it 
was horrible. It’s completely unbalanced. Whoever is saying it, the way they 
talk. They don’t say a traitor but the way they talk, the music of their words, 
they imply you are a traitor. You are not patriotic.’  Female, 40’s Jewish 
Israeli.  
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The role of the media in presenting material about the conflict highlighted 
the importance and power of the national and political narrative to be heard and 
understood. The essentialising of group positions into two opposing groups, 
where no compromise was considered and all complexities were ignored to 
present a simplified version of events, gave rise to a communication based on 
propaganda. Any alternative knowledge was subdued to the point of extinction. 
The quote above reflected this positioning. Another participant described the 
challenges in finding alternative information that opposed the national narrative 
of the conflict:   
‘If you want to find alternative information you can, but you need to look for 
it, as it’s not obvious. You need to read a certain newspaper, a certain 
journalist, so people don’t and if you do, they say they source is probably 
Palestinian. So it’s easier for them to tell me that I am not telling the truth, 
than to face the psychological consequences of admitting it might be true, 
because they want to be patriotic and humanist at the same time.’  Female, 
30’s, Jewish Israeli.     
Loyalty was as significant for the Palestinian group. The group 
boundaries within Palestine appeared to be clearly defined across two knowledge 
systems representing different narratives surrounding the conflict, one of a more 
religious positioning and one of more a secular one. Although there were no 
Islamists within the Palestinian sample, there was an awareness of their 
contribution to the national narrative. The ensuing barrier to acknowledging the 
Other, by resisting the resistance to Israeli hegemony was referred to by a young 
Palestinian man:    
‘Back home, I wouldn’t speak about my opinions because I know how my 
people think. And that will fire back at me. The problem with extremists is 
they play with the religion to suit what they want. Back home in Palestine 
whatever I said about others, [about Israelis] no-one would believe me, but 
if I said ‘God said that’ and I would use a few words from the Koran, they 
all go emotional and therefore accept it.’       Male, 20’s, West Bank, 
Palestinian. 
The acknowledgement of different positionings within Palestinian society 
demonstrated how group solidarity can be splintered into different sub groups, 
some of which were felt to be extreme and unacceptable:  
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‘There are some problems with Hamas, with Islamic Jihad, where they want 
to fight, to react when Israelis do something. Others live by that. But this is 
not the norm.  I want to talk about normal people like me, who go to work, 
work in a bank, work in social media. These people who if they have more 
chance, that trust will be a little bit higher and more normal.’    Male, 30’s, 
West Bank, Palestinian.   
The bridge to acknowledging the Other through contact was made more 
complex by a more generalised aversion to mix with Jewish Israelis on a personal 
basis. This was the reverse context as the Jewish participant quoted above. Both 
would be considered traitors to their national cause with an assumption of siding 
with the Other’s positioning, which would be judged unacceptable.  
For the Palestinian group there was the added complication of 
collaboration with the Israelis.  This sensitive topic was one that wasn’t generally 
discussed, but was touched upon lightly by a minority of Palestinian participants. 
They suggested that collaboration was possibly wide spread at a low level. Some 
people may not have applied the term of collaboration to the act of passing on 
information to an Israeli accomplice. Within the Occupied Territories and Gaza, 
collaboration is punishable by death. These quotes exemplified the anxiety 
surrounding collaboration demonstrating the extent to which group conformity 
remained strong:          
‘When I go back home there is this incredible paranoia about how I might 
be an Israeli collaborator.  Because I might be meeting Israelis and I 
studied Hebrew and they have some sort of paranoia about that’.    Male, 
20’s, Gaza, Palestinian.    
‘It’s not easy to have an Israeli as a friend because the situation makes it 
difficult. You have a situation that will be risky for both of us, because 
others might think that you are a collaborator’.   Male, 30’s, West Bank, 
Palestinian.  
Group loyalty was a significant factor in forming barriers to the Other 
both within and across groups through processes of identification with the 
group’s collective value system. Those who bridged the hegemonic boundaries 
had sometimes sought solidarity with others to develop an alternative base from 
which to develop a strategy. Those in Israel who followed such a course would, 
for example, become part of an Israeli peace movement or an organisation that 
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had acknowledged the Other in some way. One example was to discuss forming 
some sort of joint Israeli –Palestinian project, for example, a Jewish-Arab school 
where children would be educated with each other. Those in Palestine followed a 
different trajectory due their more powerless status as the weaker party within the 
asymmetrical dialogical partnership. Any form of resistance to Israeli hegemony, 
for example, becoming a member of a non-violent resistance group, was met with 
a strong rebuff from Israeli authorities and so more of a challenge to develop and 
maintain.  
6.4. Discussion 
The identification of semantic barriers and bridges deriving from a framework of 
themata has been a productive exercise in exploring how two groups in conflict 
framed their experiences through the generation and maintenance of social 
representations. Barriers to resolution played a distinctive role in determining the 
course of the conflict as each group attempted to maximise their position in 
relation to the Other. In this chapter I have identified a range of semantic barriers 
and bridges and discussed their relevance to the conflict through the voices of the 
participants. This exploration of the context of the conflict through their eyes has 
enabled me to access the space between their imagined boundaries to explore 
what may lie between them to gain further knowledge about the dynamics of the 
conflict. 
 Semantic barriers as introduced by Moscovici (1961/2008) and developed 
by Gillespie (2008, 2012) and Gillespie, Kadianaki and O’Sullivan-Lago (2011) 
proposed an ontological explanation as to how a group’s positioning  can deny 
the communication of social representations held by the Other. More recent work 
has reflected how semantic barriers remain significant to group differentiation 
where opposition played a major role (Sammut and Sartawi, 2012, Sammut, 
Clark and Kissaun, 2013). The semantic barriers that were thought to be 
significant in this study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflected positionings 
through a range of themata that was judged to be connected to the imagined roots 
of the conflict. The asymmetric nature of the conflict reflected different sets of 
themata across the groups, resulting in differences in the surfacing of semantic 
barriers.  
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The context of the dialogical relationship gave the opportunity to probe 
into the subjective positioning of semantic barriers within and across the groups. 
Were they self projected or as a response to the Other’s positioning? The 
intersubjective base of a dialogical relationship (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) 
reflected the mutual group awareness of the conflict as each group competed with 
each other through a domain of power relations and states of tension 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007).  This co-dependency of one to the Other for reifying their 
own group positions in relation to the Other can be reflected in the construction 
of semantic barriers to strengthen groups boundaries, not only with the Other but 
within the groups to protect group conformity and loyalty.  The concept of 
semantic bridges is an idea to explore how these boundaries could be weakened, 
or even crossed under certain contexts. Gillespie (2008) suggested the concept of 
semantic promoters to denote the absence of semantic barriers which would 
reflect a softening of imagined boundaries where barriers would cease to be 
active by losing its semantic power. I introduced the term of semantic bridges to 
reflect how each group held the possibility to build a meaningful conceptual 
bridge to counteract the effects of the semantic barriers.    
Socio-psychological barriers for Jewish Israelis that inhibit a path to 
peace by resisting alternative information (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011 and Porat, 
Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2015) have been recognised to include factors such as 
societal beliefs and world views. Societal beliefs were described as ideological 
conflict-supporting beliefs that included themes of security, victimhood, 
patriotism, justness of own goals, and delegitimising the opponent by glorifying 
their own group. These beliefs ‘and sentiments provide a prism through which 
individuals perceive and interpret the reality of conflict’ (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 
2011, p. 639).  These themes were similar to my findings. However, the results 
also differed to my findings, quite possibly due to the difference in methodology 
used. In the Halperin & Bar-Tal’s study, data was collected through a survey 
based on measures designed to emit a positive/negative scaled response.  It was 
concluded that such barriers led to cognitive closure and a tunnel vision that 
would preclude any consideration of alternative approaches. It was suggested that 
‘if we take the consideration the fact that same type of socio-psychological 
barriers work on both sides, it is possible to understand why conflicts are not 
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resolved easily’ (p.647).  This approach parallels with one that determines 
intergroup conflict through essentialising the Other by objectifying them as 
homogenous entities. Each group would be perceived as stable and mutually 
exclusive, set within a particular ideological foundation that reflected a single 
sided conception of history and a belief in the group’s infallibility (Raudsepp & 
Wagner, 2012).  Although there were aspects of this approach that resonated with 
my own research, my findings explored an alternative story by presenting the 
positionings of both groups and how their relationship reflexively affected the 
Other.  By exploring semantic barriers that denoted meaningful themes and 
structures to individuals from their own interpretation of the conflict and how 
each group relates to the Other, we can learn more about what lies at their 
imagined boundaries. 
 The presence of semantic bridges with those directly experiencing 
conflict confirms the presence of heterogeneity across the groups. It is the 
perceived relationship between the two groups that remains significant. They will 
each differ through their own positionings about their perceived past and present 
status which would dictate how they imagined their joint futures. It is through the 
interplay between semantic barriers and bridges that a perceived reality of the 
conflict can be described that can shed light on the possibilities of transformation 
within the dialogical relationship where bridges hold the possibility of 
transcending barriers.   
The concept of themata has been fruitful in this study as it has given the 
opportunity to explore the foundational kernels from which to begin an analysis 
and discussion of the dynamics of the conflict. Themata can capture the origins 
and structure of social representations within a given context without having to 
attach them to a structure of elements, as suggested by the core-peripheral 
approach (Abric, 2001). Each context will differ according to its social reality.  
The relationship between the core and the periphery cannot easily be drawn as 
distinctive elements (Liu, 2006) that ignore any underlying atomistic 
assumptions. A multifaceted approach to social psychology embedded in a 
cultural and social reality with its own discrete histories is one that holds the 
opportunity to reflect a particular rather than a universal reality (Billig, 1985).  
By not taking an element atomistic approach to the explorations of a social 
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reality, themata can search for the deep structures that are socio-historically 
constructed embedded within a society. It is the social interaction between the 
groups rather than their similarity or dissimilarity between them that reflects a 
dynamic whole that remain interdependent The relational categories discussed in 
this chapter, as themata, has enabled an exploration suggested by Marková 
(2007) to 
‘identify such relational categories of the basic nature that activate more 
complex forms of socially shared knowledge, this would in turn enable us to 
explore the dynamic structures of social representations, as well as to 
understand reasons for the prevalence of specific opinions, beliefs, collective 
actions and so on.’ (p. 170).  
 By identifying themata congruent to each group’s positioning, the 
juxtaposition of semantic barriers and bridges associated with each group, has 
given the opportunity to reflect on the intrinsic nature of the contextual thematic 
content.  By establishing the proposed themata of each group (threat/security and 
exclusivity/inclusivity for the Jewish Israeli group and oppression/freedom and 
non-recognition/recognition for the Palestinian group), interpreted from the 
participants own experience of the conflict, I was able to explore how semantic 
barriers and bridges had opened up an opportunity to go beyond an essentialising 
approach in conflict research. 
The semantic barriers that were identified in this chapter were clustered 
around three modes of operation. First, as a protector of a group’s positioning 
that reflected a justification for taking such a position and in doing so, would 
result in the dismissal of the Other’s alternative representations. This was 
exemplified by the semantic barrier of fear and threat with a Jewish Israeli 
positioning as a victim to Palestinian terrorism and so barring any alternative 
representations towards a more consensual relationship. In the same way, 
semantic barriers of injustice, oppression and loss with the Palestinian group 
protecting their positioning as a victim to Israeli hegemony.  
Second, by exploring these protected semantic barriers in the 
representational field solely in terms of victimhood, it may result in a stalemate 
positioning across the groups. For example, the semantic barrier of fear through 
threat (Jewish Israeli) has resulted in a stalemate position where no amount of 
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protection and security has been found to ease their collective positioning. And 
for the Palestinian group, their status as oppressed and stigmatised living in an 
unjust reality will remain in a stalemate position, unless there is an internal or 
external shift of thinking and strategy. This stalemate positioning relates to that 
of intractability where conflicts become resistant to a peaceful resolution because 
neither side is willing to compromise (Bar-Tal, 2013). The living reality of the 
conflict becomes normalised and institutionalised and become part of a society’s 
political and cultural reality. Through justifying (Jost & Banaji 1994) their 
positionings, meaningful structures can become legitimised and protected as 
semantic barriers become reified.  
Third, the role of intergroup loyalty has demonstrated that semantic 
barriers played a role in reinforcing group boundaries, both at the social and 
institutional level. Stepping outside and resisting the Israeli hegemonic group 
boundary was challenging and uncomfortable, but occurred when a significant 
part of oneself refused to be influenced by an event that was incompatible with 
one’s value or belief system (Duveen, 2001). Transformation that dismissed the 
semantic barriers by dialoguing with alternative representations cannot occur in 
isolation but mediated through others (Gillespie, 2008). These three modes of 
operation of semantic barriers as discussed, served to tighten imagined 
boundaries. But as the empirical research has shown, semantic barriers did not 
totally dominate the representational field of the participants. Semantic bridges 
were evident in the talk of many participants. These held the possibility of 
shifting the landscape enough to allow the dialogical relationship to be discussed 
from an alternative vantage point.  
Semantic bridges were affected by the asymmetry of power between the 
groups and affected both within and across groups.  For the Palestinian group, 
semantic bridges centred on recognising Israel as a sovereign state to counteract 
the semantic barrier of threat as positioned by the Israeli Jewish group. The 
motivation for the Palestinian group to follow a non-violent path by appealing to 
international agencies such as the United Nations as an impartial judge in being 
recognised, acted as a semantic bridge for left wing Jewish Israelis but not right 
wing group members; for this latter group such a move was perceived as a 
semantic barrier of threat to Israeli hegemony. The need to understand the 
176 
 
Palestinian positioning, and in so doing resisting Israeli hegemony, would require 
a measure of identification with the Palestinian group in the form of empathising 
with their position of suffering. Empathy arose from a human rights ethos, 
embedded from a Jewish sense of responsibility.  
The Israeli group represented a more heterogeneous positioning than the 
Palestinian group.  The difference in their positions reflected different systems 
approximately along a right / left wing continuum with a centre ground where 
representations crossed these lines.  The Palestinian group’s more homogenous 
positioning reflected some difference of degree but not difference in content 
towards the Other. They were united in their contestation of Israeli hegemony by 
reflecting on social representations of resistance to their perceived oppression 
and non-recognition. The tone of the semantic bridges across the groups showed 
it was the Israeli Jewish group who held the possibility of transformation to 
identify with the Palestinian group through empathy.  The two groups do not 
communicate on equal terms. By exploring these public spheres there is a ‘power 
differential at the level of production, distribution and reception of 
representations’ (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p.24). The recognition of the Other 
remains central to consensus.  This is especially significant as the marginalised 
group can perceive their positionings as ‘being unjustly neglected, excluded and 
discriminated against and demand recognition of their basic rights’ (Maoz & 
Powell, 2014, p.117).  
The asymmetry between the groups is often not recognised in conflict 
research in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Rouhana, 2004).  The reality of the 
dominant/dominated context is often ignored and it is within this reality that the 
determining effects of the conflict can be explored. This would require 
recognition ‘to identify different meanings for parties who have unequal power, 
because they emanate from drastically different collective experiences’ (p.42) 
This, I hope to have achieved by exploring meaning structures across the groups 
as to what may lie at their imaginary boundaries between them. In the next 
chapter I will discuss how these boundaries have come to represent inter and 
intra group positionings and how social representations operate within this 
dialogue.   
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6.5. Conclusion  
I hoped to convey in this chapter the foundational base of the imagined 
boundaries that sit between Israeli-Palestinian relationships. Their perceptions 
demonstrated the asymmetrical nature of the conflict leading to their present 
stalemate positioning in relation to each other. By exploring themata from each 
group it was possible to examine their dialogical relationship as how one group’s 
positioning affected the other in a continual cyclical movement. The presence of 
semantic barriers served to protect their positionings, both within the groups and 
across them. For the Jewish Israeli group, the themata of threat/security and 
exclusivity/ inclusivity remained significant in erecting semantic barriers to 
protect their power base in their continued hegemonic status in relation to the 
Palestinian group. The themata of non- recognition/recognition and 
oppression/freedom represented the Palestinian group’s positioning, where 
semantic barriers protected their sense of their weakened status in relation to the 
Other. To counteract these barriers, semantic bridges were explored to 
acknowledge that consensus to the Other was also located in the representational 
field. By empathising and identifying with Palestinian oppression and non-
recognition, Israeli Jewish participants exemplified the softening of imagined 
boundaries by bridging semantic barriers to change the dialogical nature of the 
relationship to one of recognition. The Palestinian group in turn recognised the 
Israeli’s need for a safe homeland in Israel yet, in their resistance to Israeli 
hegemony, remained barred from a more transformative relationship of equality 
due to the continued asymmetrical context. The concluding chapter will explore 
how all three empirical studies have developed to discuss ways in which 
intractability can be understood in this particular conflict, by addressing the 
asymmetrical dialogical relationship that stands between them.     
  
178 
 
 7: Conclusions: Dialogical relationships across intractable 
conflict 
7.1. Introduction  
My research journey of this thesis began with an exploration in answer to the 
question, what does the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mean to the people entrenched 
within it? On a global level the conflict has dominated Middle East politics for 
nearly seventy years. A plethora of internationally brokered peace negotiations 
has risen hopes for a lasting peace between the two peoples, only for them to be 
undone as a complex weave of differences have blocked a way forward. 
Collective hopes have been raised and dashed leading to a state of intractability 
(Bar-Tal, 2013) where possibilities of workable political solution remain elusive 
and out of sight. Yet not out of mind. Both the Israeli and Palestinian 
participants, who discussed their representations of the conflict, suggested they 
held on to the idea that peace may come one day. The findings suggest two rival 
communities divided by nationalist strivings embedded in an ethos of conflict, 
where group differences amidst a context of Israeli hegemonic power asymmetry 
has led to the difficulty in alleviating intractability. Paradoxically, this stronger 
group is simultaneously the weaker group due to its vulnerability to a perceived 
threat from the Other, not only from those of Palestinian descent, but a 
generalised Other. This group master narrative of intractability was evident in 
interviews with Jewish Israelis. The less powerful group, competing with their 
own victimhood of perceived injustice, non-recognition and oppression, have 
become more desperate in wanting a nation of their own on some of the land of 
their forefathers. This Palestinian master narrative also involves intractability. 
The continually internationally brokered geographical boundaries that divide the 
two groups remain imagined.                   
This final chapter concludes the thesis with a discussion of how each 
empirical study has complemented one other to both describe the processes of 
experiences of the conflict from three different vantage points and to offer some 
theoretical insight to the studies to enable a social psychological study of 
imagined boundaries across groups in conflict to be interpreted and discussed. 
The chapter is set out as follows. First, the research direction, to position the 
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research within the discipline, is discussed before turning to the three empirical 
studies. Second, the role of intractability of the conflict is discussed using the 
findings from all three studies to assess the complexity of power relationships 
across the groups through their dialogical relationships with each other. Third, 
the empirical and theoretical development that links the three studies is 
considered before suggesting how a process based social psychology of conflict 
might be envisaged. Fifth, the possibilities of applying the research findings and 
future research directions are discussed before discussing  the limitations of the 
thesis. Finally, my modest contributions to social psychology, both in the 
empirical and theoretical domain, are considered.  
7.2. Thematic foundations of the conflict  
The first empirical study as discussed in Chapter 4, gathered qualitative data 
from those who had a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet at 
the time of the interview were living in London. Their narratives that 
encapsulated their understanding of the conflict were crucial for my 
understanding of it. Organising and base themes from the data taken from the 
transcripts of the interviews provided both a helpful descriptive overview of the 
conflict as well as the opportunity to think about further interpretation of the 
thematic content. The reference to historical events was notable for the frequency 
of their inclusion when there had been no questions about the relevance of the 
past conflict. 
 The described base themes set out to give an overview of the two group’s 
positions, both those towards consensus and those towards conflict.  Organised  
under themes of security and ideology, collective agency and collective 
positioning, I was interested as to how these were mirrored across the groups.  In 
a symmetrical conflict some mirroring would be inevitable.  There was a mirror 
effect in terms of rejection of the Other and nationalistic overtones in themes of 
conflict across both groups. However, the remaining themes related to power and 
asymmetry where no mirroring was observed. For the Jewish Israeli group, this 
was set within themes relating to threat of terrorist attacks, existential fear 
relating to a generalised Other, victimhood and distrust of the Other. For the 
Palestinian group, the effects of their more powerless positioning was reflected in 
themes of dehumanisation, unrecognised, loss of dignity, fear of aggression by 
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the Israeli military, oppression, hatred of the Other, lack of agency and a deep 
sense of injustice. The lack of mirroring, points to the conflict as described by 
those embedded within in it, as asymmetric where one side is all powerful and 
the other side as having a lack of agency to contribute to future conciliation.     
 The themes that represented consensus were more symmetrical than those of 
conflict as they demonstrated more intergroup mirroring.  For both groups, 
themes that related to acknowledgement of the Other, the significance of 
universal justice through human rights legislation, the significance of a shared 
past as a base for a shared co-existent future in a possible bi-national state was 
discussed across both group.  Some differences were highlighted that reflected 
the asymmetry discussed above, such as Jewish responsibility to show empathy 
for the less powerful group, the importance of recognising the Israeli occupation 
in the Occupied Territories and an aim to be open to change.  For the Palestinian 
group there was a tendency to discuss the need to involve outside agencies such 
as the UN and support groups to voice their more powerless positioning.  The 
tendency to present the two groups as roughly equal partners in conflict has 
generally taken precedence in the research literature, and particularly in western 
media. The asymmetrical relationship that was evident in the data, is generally 
not reflected in the research literature and only recently discussed (Rouhana, 
2004, Adwan and Bar-On, 2004) to be of significance.  
The framing of past events to justify claims and positions was further 
explored. For Jewish Israelis this tended to claim rights of state and land 
ownership due to the promises set down in religious documents of thousands of 
years ago and the legal purchase of land from Palestinians during the early part of 
the 20
th
 century. The Palestinians, in their defence, gave narratives of their 
ancestors being forced to leave their homes through Israeli military force in 1948 
and subsequently given to Jewish immigrants or demolished, leaving them 
stranded as refugees in other nations or remaining in their land under Israeli 
occupation, or as a disadvantaged minority in the modern State of Israel. Their 
cultural traditions of their lost nationhood were perceived as crucial to their 
positioning as being Palestinian. The rupture to this national positioning 
remained foundational to their sense of victimhood, juxtaposed with the triumph 
of the Jewish Israelis finding a safe haven post Holocaust.  However, the safe 
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haven as envisaged remained in part illusory, as the dialogical relationships 
across the imaginary borders led to increased conflict with the indigenous and 
mostly exiled population.  
These frozen historical stories (Lázló, 1997) and templates (Wertsch, 
2002) that had become an ‘essential truth’ (Novik 1999) to charter a path based 
on collective remembering (Lui & Lázló, 2007), continued to be developed by 
reconstructing the past to understanding present meaning (Tileaga, 2014). The 
future can be discussed as being mapped by representations of the past (Liu & 
Hilton, 2005) which is close to Bartlett’s thinking (1932) where these 
representations and memories of the past are actively worked into the present to 
create new version embedded in the cultural life of the community. Through the 
objectification and anchoring of these crucial events surrounding events in 1948, 
as suggested by the narratives of the participants, the dialogical relationship 
across the groups continued to invade their own nationalist aspirations that 
continue to develop along their conflicting parameters. The conflict of memories 
‘between different social groups reminds us that there is no neutral way of 
representing the past; remembering is always done from a social position and 
with cultural tool, such as languages, images and narratives’ (Wagoner, 2015, 
p.161). This has particular resonance in conflicts described as intractable as these 
constructions of the past feed into societal belief systems (Bar-Tal, 2013). These 
belief systems can be reformulated as tools of communication in propaganda 
material (Shlaim, 2009) based on particular historical interpretations that fit a 
desired political positioning. At the same time, these constructions appeared to be 
foundational to the participant’s narratives about the conflict, as kernels of social 
knowledge, from where present social representations would have some degree 
of connection to, that links both the short and the long past to the present 
(Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000).   
  The thematic content from this first study in London set out a foundation 
from which to pursue the social psychological construct of the contact hypothesis 
(Allport 1954).  I chose to explore the accounts of Jewish and Palestinian Israeli 
professional medics who work together under a mutual code of medical ethics, to 
explore their work and social relationships with the Other. I was interested as to 
how any kernels of social knowledge that were evident in the first study in the 
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context of historical representations might be prevalent under different guises in 
this particular representational field.     
7.3. Contact in context      
The lived experience of the medics crossing intergroup imagined boundaries in 
the context of their professional and home environments was discussed in 
Chapter 5. The significance of context was found to be paramount, as though two 
distinct different life worlds operated in the same social space, sometimes 
connected, sometimes apart.  If the two groups can co-habit in one context and 
not in another then it is the context that requires examination as well as the social 
representations of those who inhabit them.  The two contexts can be said to 
represent two systems, that of an ethos of cooperation and medical ethics in one 
environment and an ethos of conflict outside of it. Bar-Tal (2013) suggested that 
an ethos of conflict remains embedded within Israeli society through 
socialisation, education and public debate. It was further suggested that it was 
established as a driving force that served as an engine that fuels conflict, and at 
the same time, as an empowerment to help alleviate the psychological suffering 
of it. This is contrasted with an ethos of medical ethics that stipulates the 
prolonging of life for all individuals under a physicians care. A code of medical 
ethics in Israel through the Israeli Medical Association (IMA) is based  on the 
Hippocrates Oath where the preservation of life remains central to the code 
as shown in:  
   (www.ima.org.il/ENG/ViewCategory.aspx?CategoryId=4138)  
Valsiner (2008) suggested that the dynamics of peace and war can be 
culturally regulated through social representations and polemic dialogue to 
preserve stability, or the opposite, through essentialising the necessary 
components required for its efficacy. In this case, the ethos of conflict is 
preserved within Israeli whilst in the medical institution, an alternative set of 
values dominated the representational field.   
It could be argued that the role of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 2000) 
can explain these separated worlds where individuals operate in different social 
environments where their social knowledge systems and actions intertwine with a 
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particular context (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Duveen and de Rosa (1992) suggested 
that it is the adoption of multiple social identities that can connect to different 
contexts with specific goals and tasks that gives rise to polyphasia to denote how 
a variety of social representations can develop, depending on the communicative 
contexts arising from them. The medics in this second study appeared to cross 
these two contradistinctive representational fields with apparent ease. I wanted to 
explore a theoretical path that would enable me to go beyond a thematic 
description, as I did in the first study, which would relate the data to a 
foundational base and stretch across different contexts. An analysis based on the 
identification of themata in the data would allow an uncovering of cultural 
assumptions (Marková, 2007), both across the groups and between the two 
contexts. The identified themata, developed through objectification and 
anchoring would allow common themes across representations that are 
established over time (Maloney & Walker, 2007). The kernel of social 
knowledge (Moscovici and Vignaux, 2000) that underpins representations, 
remain preserved within the community is set within relevant themata. By 
identifying themata in this population it was possible to discuss their different 
work / non work contexts as they dialogically related to one another. Each 
context referred to an alternative bank of social representations connected to each 
social knowledge systems where each represented polyphasic positionings. The 
dialectical unity of exploring antinomies within these social representations 
implicated social knowledge as a dynamic process inbuilt within history and 
culture, that is both maintained and transformed through communication 
(Moscovici and Marková, 1998). The identified themata of exclusivity/inclusivity 
and threat-security representing the Jewish Israeli participants and non-
recognition/recognition and inequality/equality, the Palestinian Israelis group, 
reflected their relationships with the Other in both their professional working life 
and that outside it. Through a dialogical analysis of each pair of thema it was 
possible to map how each affected their positioning in relation to the Other, to 
demonstrate the polyphasic nature of these complex contexts.    
7.4. Crossing imagined boundaries 
The exploration of semantic barriers and bridges across Jewish Israeli and 
Palestinian participants as discussed in Chapter 6 reflected their dialogical 
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relationship that had resulted in a state of stalemate over the preceding seventy 
years. Themata, interpreted from the narratives of those with direct experience of 
the conflict was a necessary component to explore the hardening and softening of 
imagined boundaries between embedded conflict and any possibilities of 
consensus. Not only did the themata reflect the powerful-powerless reality of the 
two groups, but they opened the opportunity to explore further the relationship 
between their concrete experiences and the social representations that had 
developed over time. By directly exploring related thema pairs across the groups, 
identified semantic barriers could be discussed to demonstrate how positionings 
had become structurally and culturally embedded. I discussed how semantic 
barriers were clustered around three processes of operation. First, as a protector 
of a group’s particular positioning through justification and so dismissing any 
alternative positioning. Second, as a stalemated positioning leading to no possible 
alternative outcome and third, as a closed system where loyalty to the group’s 
positioning was considered vital and any deviation from that to seek an 
alternative understanding was met with strong institutional and social resistance. 
  However, alternative representations not only entered the representational 
field of the Other, but also enabled transformation through semantic bridges, 
leading to the softening of imagined boundaries. I have defined semantic bridges  
as a conceptual process that holds the possibility of counteracting the effects of 
semantic barriers within their dialogical relationships, both within and across the 
groups. Because the data highlighted the dialogical relationships across the 
groups, based within  themata of power-powerless, semantic bridges were thus 
connected to this and so differed across the groups. For example, semantic 
bridges may require a shift in the loyalty to one’s group to explore and (partially) 
accept a positioning of the Other. This will be discussed further in relation to 
transformation and cultural change below.   
7.5. Empirical and theoretical development across the thesis   
As Marková (2003) suggested, one of the prime aims of social 
psychology is to identify, describe and analyse the contents of common sense to 
extract meaning of social knowledge systems in real life situations. The 
opportunity to explore three vantage points of the representational fields of those 
with a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was rewarded by the 
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freedom to follow an empirical and theoretical journey through a grounded 
theory and ideographic approach. By exploring social representations in the first 
empirical study, a foundation was set to plan subsequent stages, both in terms of 
choosing relevant samples and a theoretical stance that would remain exploratory 
in nature, yet open a discussion about intractable conflict. This trajectory opened 
up interesting possibilities to follow that would add to each study from the 
previous knowledge base and so building up a framework from which to 
understand the social psychology of imagined boundaries that may lie between 
groups locked in conflict. 
The thematic analysis provided a thorough and useful mapping of the 
groups’ positionings from which to develop in subsequent studies. It was within 
these themes that an array of positionings was found that reflected both their 
differences and their commonalities to each other. Some of these themes can be 
described as forms of proto themata reflecting cultural assumptions that had been 
communicated and developed over time (Markova et al, 2007) to be replaced by 
themata that contain within them, the problematised issues that related to the 
perceived kernel of the conflict. The subsequent identification of themata in the 
study of professional contact in Israel and those between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians representing groups in intractable conflict, served to link together the 
three empirical chapters with a theoretical connection, each developing one to 
another.    
7.6. Towards a process based social psychology of conflict 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has its own characteristics that may differ from 
other conflicts around the world. We can ask what is the role of social 
psychology in these areas of intractable conflict?  Are there processes that are 
common to the context of conflict per se and by identifying them this knowledge 
would be useful as a humanitarian exercise in social change? Wagoner (2014) 
suggested the significance of processes over entities when exploring a 
sociocultural approach to peace and conflict. This interest lies in ‘dynamic and 
transformative processes, rather than abstract, universal and de-contextualised 
entities that are often presumed to exist in individual minds and explain their 
behaviour (p.187). The importance of the past as a cultural tool to imagine the 
future through change and stability becomes a necessary trajectory to reflect on 
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group positioning that guides possible action. The documentation of relevant 
themata can assist this approach by demonstrating the array of positionings 
within dialogical relationships both within and across groups, not only in the 
present, but as a conduit for the future. A structural approach, where an 
unshakable and stable core and a more malleable periphery relating to contextual 
entities (Abric, 1993) would suggest the difficulty of significant social change. 
Yet transformation can occur when core elements such as a persistent belief are 
contradicted over time and at some point overthrown through tension, 
fragmentation, negotiation and debate (Maloney & Walker, 2000). Rather than 
discussing elements of a representation, as in a structural approach, it is the 
process of the dynamic and dialogical nature of social representations through 
communication (Liu, 2006) that is significant. The dialectical unity of exploring 
opposites within social representations implicate social knowledge as a dynamic 
process inbuilt within history and culture, that is both maintained and 
transformed through communication (Moscovici and Marková, 1998).   
7.6.1. How intractable is intractable conflict?   
Intractable conflict has been described by Bar-Tal (2013) as having several 
contextual characteristics that has a determinative influence on those who are 
trapped within it. This includes the observation that neither side is willing to 
compromise as to do so, would mean giving up something essential to the 
groups’ survival as an entity. And so the conflict continues as it remain 
knowingly unsolvable, leaving violence to call the shots, requiring huge 
economic resources to run it, immense suffering for both groups and a bleak 
future as each generation is filled with a desire for power, or to resist a power or 
to call for revenge for group loss and suffering. As a conflict continues these 
characteristics become more hardened, more reified and more difficult to break 
out of the cycle of violence as the ethos of conflict becomes culturally entrenched 
in daily life.   
 My question at the beginning of the thesis was an exploratory one, to 
explore the intractability of a conflict where imagined intergroup boundaries 
were closed allowing no or little meaningful relationship to develop as each 
group followed its own and separate trajectory. The structural and political 
entities in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem do not have total 
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agency over their future as the conflict is situated within a global arena. The 
national interests of other states, seeped in their own historical foundations, 
remain influential partners in the conflict. The shaping of the modern Middle 
East (Barr 2011) was largely a project by the UK and France as a response to 
German threat during World War 1 (1914-1918) and their then imperialist aims, 
with the USA playing a defining role with the UK in Palestine following World 
War 2 (1939-1945). The USA-Israeli relationship now appears to dominate 
Israeli foreign policy with the EU as an interested, but less powerful broker, as 
other players have joined the global arena following the end of the Cold War 
between USA and NATO allies and the former USSR (1947-1991).  The 
resulting web of complexity playing out in the present day Middle East 
demonstrates the dialogical relationships across global players since the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. Thus, at this international level, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict remains intractable as global players have been drawn into its 
internal complexities.  Neither did I explore the national contexts as described by 
Bar-Tal (2013) above, not having the expertise to reflect on this local observation 
in Israel. Instead, I explored the social representations of those who had a lived 
experience of the conflict. A challenge was to bring together these different 
levels of examination, from global, to national, to personal without losing the 
essence of the notion of intractable conflict. 
Doise (1982) as reported in Chapter 2, suggested four levels of social 
psychological explanation ranging from the individual at level 1, the inter 
personal and situated context at level II, the positioning of  different category 
membership at level III,  and the ideological, at level IV. Doise (1982) did not 
assume that reality is structured around these four levels, but through analysis of 
them we can assess them, particularly in the case of conflict where the reality of 
the perceived social relationships about the Other combines all levels of 
processes. Stephenson (1981) notes that in any negotiations across groups in 
conflict it is the discussion of each level of positioning that is significant and 
needs to be established to interpret opposing points of view and to integrate these 
when negotiating between them. Doise (1982) suggested that any interactions in 
negotiations would require the discussion of analysis at levels II (inter personal 
and situated) and level and III (group membership). Any mediator would need to 
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take into account the ideological aspects of the conflict, so the analysis of these 
levels II and III should be added at level IV (ideological) for a complete study of 
intergroup negotiations and relationships. This observation is relevant in the 
discussion on intractability and how different levels discuss the phenomenon, 
each having its own trajectory.     
My findings suggest that for the people entrenched within the conflict, 
those from levels 1 (individual) and II (inter personal and situated), it is not 
intractable. The imagined boundaries can harden and soften, depending on the 
situated context juxtaposed with the groups’ deep cultural processes that relate to 
semantic barriers that can close down authentic consensus, or relate to semantic 
bridges that serve to open them. I will discuss this across five key areas: the 
dialogical relationship across imagined boundaries that can be discussed in terms 
of identified themata that acts as a framework for the continuation of the conflict; 
the semantic barriers that can form from these themata and the bridges that 
counteract them; the significance of the situated context and contact and finally, 
the ability individuals and groups to transform over time.      
7.6.2. Dialogical relationship across imagined boundaries 
There are assumptions that the boundaries between the groups are separate and 
individualised according to social identities and become closed as the categories 
that describe them become reified entities (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001; Brewer, 201; 
Reicher, 2004).  Following this avenue, groups are often researched and 
discussed as separate entities as to how they may relate to others based on their 
own trajectories, identities, and ideologies. There is also an assumption that the 
contents of social representations are structural (Marková 2003) and the 'aim of 
the theory is to identify, describe and analyse these structured contents and 
meanings' (p.177). The idea that social representations are dialogical processes 
was a later development of the theory of social representations, developed 
particularly by Marková (2003) based on the premise that 
‘Dialogicality, it is hypothesised, is the sine qua non of the human mind. 
Dialogicality is the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and 
communicate about social realities in terms of the ‘Alter.’  (Marková, 2003, 
p.xiii) 
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Moscovici elaborated his theory in the early 1990’s to account for the 
significance of themata as 'they are dialogical concepts that significantly 
contribute to the theoretical development of the theory of social representations 
as a theory of social knowledge’ (Marková, 2003, p.181). The focus on 
antinomies transformed the way in which social knowledge might be observed; 
the basic unit of ‘ego / alter’ stands at the base of all relationships, both in the 
Meadian sense as a ‘self / other’ pairing with the Other and as a way of relating 
with other ‘self / other’  processes. The dialogical self (Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2012) acknowledges the variety of a multitude of selves within the 
individual, both  conceptually serving different processes, for example, self-
esteem and through self/other ontological experiences that make up the 
individual’s sense of self. The dialogical nature of social representations through 
the concept of themata not only takes account of the Other, but can develop 
further Mead’s ‘self / other’ integration to accommodate intergroup dialogical 
relations. The work of Bakhtin (1895-1975), a Russian critic and theorist, 
formulated the idea of dialogicality as being fundamental to all human activity. 
The following quote expresses his interpretation of the dialogical nature of 
cultural processes, as follows: 
In the realm of culture, outsideness is the most powerful factor in 
understanding. It is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign culture 
reveals itself fully and profoundly … Meaning only reveals its steps once it 
has encountered and come into contact with another, foreign meaning: they 
engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one 
sidedness of these particular meanings, these cultures. We raise new 
questions for a foreign culture, one that it did not raise itself; we seek answers 
to our own questions in it; and the foreign culture response to us by really 
revealing to us new aspects and new semantic depths.  Such a dialogic 
encounter of two cultures does not result in managing or mixing, each retains 
its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched. (Bakhtin, 
1986, p. 332/4)  
What was evident in my research was first, the identifying of themata that 
acted as meaningful processes to give an explanatory focus to people’s 
perceptions of their particular positioning in relation to the Other and second, to 
illustrate how each group was continually effected by the Other. The co-
authoring of their relationship was based on a power based   asymmetrical 
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majority/ minority ethos and remained dialogical even though it was based on 
conflict.  However, there appears to be different understandings of the concept of 
dialogicality within the discipline where the co-authoring of a relationship is 
dependent on perspectives about the Other but not necessarily in direct 
communication. Or it can be understood as an exchange where the Other is 
acknowledged in some meaningful way and when such an exchange is not 
thought to be present, the relationship is termed as non dialogical where 
‘dialogical involving co-existence and inclusion … and non-dialogical, involving 
displacement and exclusion with potential for segregation and even destruction’ 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007, p.143). This contradiction needed clarifying for the 
interpretation of my data when discussing the intractability across groups.  
The closeness of the terms dialogic and dialogue was one that affected my 
understanding of how these terms might be interpreted. In encounter groups in 
Israel, contact with the Other was often said to be based on positive dialogue, 
with the interpretation of dialogue as being a force for good, where through 
talking and engaging in dialogue, differences of perspectives could be bridged.  
However, the term dialogue can have different meanings for different contexts. 
Linell (2009) described three different meanings of the term. The first as an 
interactive encounter between two or more mutually co-present individuals; 
second as a ‘benevolent communication between equals’ (p.5) characterised by 
symmetry and co-operation as a form of ideal way of communicating (Habermas, 
1999). And third, through a dialogical reading, dialogue would be more of an 
abstract process that would refer to ‘any kind of human sense-making, semiotic 
practice, action, interaction, thinking or communication, as long as the 
phenomena are “dialogically” understood’ (Linell, 2000. p.5/6). It is this latter 
approach that best fits my positioning. My aim, to explore the space between two 
groups in conflict, as to what may sit at the imagined boundaries between them 
can best be described within a dialogical framework where each narrative had 
been developed through the relationship with the Other, regardless of whether  
there was direct dialogue or not. Their positionings had been developed over 
many years of their lived experience and immersion in their cultural 
representational field where the Other had also lived in their imagination. This 
relates to one of Bakhtin interpretation suggesting that we are always in dialogue 
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with other people and everything in the world because everything addresses us in 
a certain sense (Robinson, 2011).  
The dialogical analysis in Chapter 5 was particularly revealing to reflect the 
power positioning between both groups. This appears to coincide with the 
majority group having the advantage of heterogeneity for the variety of 
positionings held, compared with less powerful group, either as Palestinian 
Israelis as the minority group in a majority Jewish state or as a stateless entity in 
the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The identified themata that reflected 
the groups’ interpreted positions dialogically related to the Other reflected a 
suggested framework of their perceived sense of understanding and reality 
towards the Other.  From this positioning, the imagined boundaries fluctuated as 
semantic barriers and bridges hedged the representational landscape.    
7.6.3. Intractability: Semantic barriers and bridges developing from 
themata  
The semantic barriers that were identified in Chapter 6 and discussed briefly 
earlier in the chapter, were grouped around three processes, each fulfilling a 
different role that affected the intractability across the groups. First, they 
protected the groups positioning to inhibit any shift from the group’s social 
knowledge system. This was exemplified by the Jewish Israeli semantic barrier 
of fear and threat and so positioning themselves as victims of Palestinian 
terrorism to prevent an alternative dialogue that could change the course of the 
conflict. The themata surrounding oppression/freedom reflected in the Palestinian 
positioning against Israeli hegemony, can become reified and so entrenched in 
resistance movements within society and so can also be described as semantic 
barriers that can enable intractability to continue indefinitely. Second, 
victimhood for both partners in the conflict can lead to an ethos of intractability 
itself that can become a semantic barrier as group positions become deeply 
embedded within the cultural sphere, where each side blames the other for their 
lack of willingness to pursue consensus rather than conflict. Finally, loyalty to 
the group’s aims was also suggested as a semantic barrier that has the effect of 
hardening group boundaries, to close, rather than open possibilities of being 
aware of alternative representations.  
192 
 
The need for a process to counteract these barriers can be discussed at the 
institutional and the individual level. At the institutional level, intractability can 
be replaced by a context that promotes consensus, as was shown by the medical 
sector in Israel where Jewish and Palestinian Israelis work together to promote 
good health across both groups. The underlying themata between Jewish and 
Palestinian Israeli medics illustrated their dialogical relationship that shifted from 
the work context to the one outside of it. The social reality of a shared context 
had shown how boundaries had been crossed where a positive work environment 
was appreciated across the groups. The long term effects of meeting in such a 
context cannot be predicted but deepening relationships across the groups may 
result in transformation and social change as alternative social representations 
enter the field. Some of the younger participants had recalled how they had never 
considered the Palestinian context until they reached medical school when they 
met and worked with Palestinian Israelis and over time boundaries began to shift 
towards recognising the Other.  The recognition of the Other across both groups 
acted as a semantic bridge across their imagined boundaries, as was demonstrated 
by the flourishing medic relationships within the medical context. The latent 
effects (Marková 2000) remain a factor within the representational field, not only 
as a positive force as in the case of close contact under conditions of less tension 
and more negative when the context can change. For example, during the war in 
Gaza, the once close professional relationship changed into one of more tension, 
as the Jewish Israeli themata of threat/security became more active and then 
subsided into less tension related to the ending of hostilities. In the future, these 
relationships may change yet again as other contexts that cannot be foretold 
become more salient.  
7.6.4. Acknowledging the Other: Transformation and change 
At the social individual level, recognition of the Other for both groups was found 
to be central to boundary formation.  The Israeli soldier who recognised the 
suffering of the Other when experiencing a young Palestinian child crying 
through terror, juxtaposed with the young Palestinian man who recalled his own 
suffering as a child in similar circumstances, is one example.  This dialogical 
relationship between them had transformed the Israeli soldier to reconsider his 
positioning resulting in adopting a more left-wing or ‘doveish’ one that 
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represented a semantic bridge to cross the imagined boundary to acknowledge 
the Others’ suffering. Whilst for the Palestinian young man the experience had 
the opposite effect by closing any imagined boundary between them.   
Encounter groups to bring young Israeli and Palestinian people together 
were discussed in Chapter 5 with mixed results, dependent on the context and 
power asymmetry (Hammack, Piliecki and Merrilees, 2014; Maoz, 2001, 2004, 
2011). To acknowledge the Other, by laying quiet previous social representations 
and activating with alternative representations to transform a positioning within 
relevant themata, needs an approach that touches a social knowledge system 
enough to have an effect. The Robber’s Cave experiments set up by Sherif (1967) 
remain as interesting now as they did nearly fifty years ago, demonstrating how 
competitive and cooperative games and activities led to different outcomes of 
behaviour that can give rise to hostility, solidarity or cooperativeness through 
different contexts. A more recent example in Israel involved Jewish and 
Palestinian Israeli university students meeting weekly over the course of a year to 
take on the role of activists to promote co-existence across the group (Hager, 
Saba and Shay, 2011). By jointly examining power structures between the 
groups, the students attempted to reduce the structural inequality that was felt to 
be a reality. By motivating students to transform their own existing social 
knowledge systems they formed united groups to effect social-political change 
with greater equality and opportunities for meaningful dialogue across the 
groups. 
Peace organisations in Israel and Palestine have developed since the 
1960’s in an attempt to go beyond social knowledge systems of conflict to those 
towards consensus. Some one hundred and fifty groups are active (Hermann, 
2009) in Israel to promote acknowledgment of the Other to resist Israeli 
hegemony and to promote a more hopeful future. For example, Breaking the 
Silence (2012) is one such organisation where Israeli soldiers have documented 
their experiences that have affected them in some meaningful way, be it through 
seeing the suffering of others or ordered to carry out a procedure that was felt to 
go against their own personal social knowledge system. The Parents Circle, 
established in 1995 is a joint Palestinian and Israeli organisation consisting of 
600 families who have all suffered from the loss of a close family member as a 
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result of the conflict. It was begun when several bereaved Israeli families 
contacted Palestinian families to acknowledge their joint suffering. It developed 
into an organisation where members identified with the call to prevent further 
loss of life through tolerance, dialogue, peace and reconciliation, 
(www.theparentscircle.com). These and many other groups  exemplify how 
groups in conflict can also transform to groups in consensus by reacting to 
experiences that have allowed a semantic bridge to be opened where recognition 
of the Other remains paramount on some meaningful cultural level. However, 
asymmetric power struggles and diverse social knowledge systems that mirror 
those within Israel and across the geopolitical borders in the West Bank. Gaza 
and East Jerusalem have, over time, become less politically successful then was 
first envisaged (Hermann, 2009).       
7.6.5. Applications and future research   
All the participants talked of their future hopes for consensus rather than conflict, 
and yet aware of the difficulties of achieving that in their lifetime. Social 
representations of both consensus and conflict were narrated through the medium 
of particular themata that reflected the kernels related to its development. Any 
future programme that explores the ways in which these conflicting groups, 
whether Jewish with Palestinian Israeli or Jewish Israeli with Palestinian might 
acknowledge the Other, should find a process approach useful. By taking note of 
significant themata for each group, dialogically related to the other, yet set within 
the power asymmetry that was evident, research programmes could be designed 
to include these insights. The role of the past was established in this thesis 
pointing to particular events that had become meaningful as reified constructs 
within the representational field that remained active in the present. It would be 
advantageous if a top down reconciliation programme based on fairness and 
legitimacy included the significance of the past when planning the future in the 
form of relevant themata. This approach would take into account the symbolic 
value of such a process as well as the role of including the voices of those 
integral to the conflict being heard (Obradovic and Howarth, 2015). The 
inclusion of semantic barriers and bridges would also be of benefit in any bottom 
up reconciliation process to allow people to politically engage in both the 
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construction and the shaping of representations that reflect their present and 
future reality (Howarth, Andreouli and Kessi, 2014).  
For further research programmes, it would be interesting to first, compare 
these   findings with other global conflicts, to explore the differences across local 
socio-cultural contexts. Second, it would be useful to widen the sample base to 
explore how other groups within the same conflict perceive group relationships, 
for example, orthodox and religious groups across both groups. Opinion polls in 
Israel show that Jewish Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process (1994) 
waned between 1994 and 2008 from a high of 60% in 1994 to a low of 35% in 
2008. However the graph changed when a secular background was compared 
with a religious one, resulting in a secular result of 68% in 1995 to 48% in 2008; 
orthodox results as 38% in 1994 to 12% in 2008 and an ultra-orthodox result of 
8% to 1% (Hermann 2009, p.276). Themata from these groups might show a 
different foundation to their perceptions of the conflict which would be 
interesting to examine when discussing the ontology of conflict relationships. 
Finally, it would be interesting to explore post conflict groups along a similar 
trajectory, for example, samples from Northern Ireland, and the Baltics to 
examine contextual themata to demonstrate the effects of transformation over 
time.          
7.7. Limitations of the research  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the samples chosen for my empirical studies, were 
from a small and select population with experience of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Although the findings can be described as being robust as a reflection of 
this particular population, they cannot be used as an example of an overall insight 
into the conflict. However, it is within these population groups that the next 
generation will come of age and contribute to their relevant  societies. Further 
research would be needed to clarify other positionings from a wider population. 
My positioning as a researcher is also significant. My subjective experience as 
well as belonging to different social knowledge systems can be perceived as 
being both an advantage and disadvantage. I may have been perceived as a 
member of the international community and therefore one that is open to diverse 
set of views, but on the other hand there is the possibility the participants told me 
what they thought I wanted to hear and what they would like the international 
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community to know, rather than a reality that more closely matches their own 
subjectivity.    
The theory of social representations has been my theoretical partner 
throughout this thesis. However, a crucial component of social representations 
theory is the way in which social representations are communicated throughout 
society. I have not included these processes even though it would have greatly 
added to my findings. Although I have argued that intergroup relationships 
remain dialogical, I have not discussed how communication can be monological 
in some particular contexts, for example in the dissemination of information 
through propaganda. The role of communication, particularly through the media 
is a significant component of conflict.  
Finally, I am also aware of the political sensitivity of the conflict and how 
I might be judged as taking or developing a biased positioning from those who 
might follow an overt political trajectory. I have used the voices of the 
participants to inform my knowledge base and it is their voices and their 
perspectives that tell the story that I have narrated on their behalf. 
7.8. Contributions to social psychology    
My modest empirical contribution includes the capturing and discussion of the 
social representations that lie at the imagined boundaries of two groups in 
conflict, rather than looking at two groups in isolation, operating as separate 
processes. By exploring their joint experiences it was possible to deduce the 
kernels of social knowledge that may lie at the base of their dialogical 
perceptions of each other. By repeating this strategy in two environments, one 
between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians living in London and one between 
Jewish and Palestinian Israelis in Israel, it was possible to compare how each 
perceived the Other across these contextualised relationships. The third sample 
using both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians gave the opportunity to further discuss 
the two groups in conflict that replicated the reality of the conflict. Finally, the 
inclusion of the past through historical narratives that formed the framework for 
the objectification and anchoring of social representations of the present was an 
empirical finding that will add to the literature on intractable conflict.       
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 My theoretical contribution focuses on the development of the concept of 
themata between the groups as described above and how that has been useful in 
exploring the perceived kernels of the conflict for these populations. Further, by 
using themata as a base for the medics in Israel it was possible to compare their 
dialogical relationships both in and out of the working environment to highlight 
group differences along these trajectories. By doing so, it was possible to chart 
these differences and discuss this in terms of key social psychological theory, 
such as the contact hypothesis. Further, the development of the concept of 
semantic barriers within a framework of relevant themata was a novel and 
revealing way to explore how imagined boundaries between conflicted groups 
can be hardened under particular contexts. The introduction of the concept of 
semantic bridges to counter the effects of semantic barriers opens the opportunity 
to examine how groups hold the possibility of transformation and change even 
when embedded in conflict.  Both the concepts of semantic barriers and bridges 
require further development and I hope their inclusion here can be part of that 
empirical and theoretical journey.  
7.9. Conclusion    
This concluding chapter summarised the three empirical studies, demonstrating 
how one study influenced the preparation of the following one both empirically 
and theoretically. The overall motivation for the thesis remained an exploratory 
one using a grounded theory approach to build a framework based on the 
meaningful perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from those entrenched 
within it. The first study provided a descriptive overview and a thematic baseline 
from which to draw preparatory conclusions. The antinomy of conflict and 
consensus exemplified both the polarity and the presence of polyphasic 
positionings across the representational field. Collective memory played a crucial 
part in the perceptions of those with experience of the conflict demonstrating 
how events had been objectified and anchored within the development of social 
representations surrounding perceptions of the conflict. The second study 
developed a theoretical argument around the plausibility of themata as an 
instrument in exploring two different contexts where conflicting groups work 
together on an equal basis yet live apart in an unequal alternative reality. The 
processes uncovered by using themata were particularly useful in exploring these 
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alternative realities that allowed an opportunity to explore their intergroup 
dialogical relationships. The third study developed this further by the 
identification of semantic barriers and bridges that stood at the imagined 
boundaries of the groups, demonstrating how they could be hardened, softened or 
even crossed under particular sociocultural contexts.  
 The three studies were linked by these theoretical developments that 
demonstrated both the intractability of the conflict and the areas in which 
transformation away from conflict and towards consensus remains a possibility. 
By following a process approach rather than one that remains at the level of 
examining entities, it is suggested that by taking note of relevant themata across 
and between groups, we can develop a social psychology of conflict based on the 
dialogical nature of its foundations.  
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Study one overview (Chapter 4) 
Included in this first part of the Appendix is the discussion guides for the first study in 
London followed by a copy of the consent form that each participant read and signed.  
The NVivo categories are given as tables for both samples Jewish Israeli and 
Palestinian living in London at the time of the interview. A table showing the base 
and organising themes from Chapter 4 is reproduced which gives an overview of the 
relevant themes, followed by quoted examples.  
9.1.1. Discussion guides  
 
A) Discussion guide for Jewish Israeli living in London  
Introduction to the project  (guidelines for introductory chat)  
Thanks for coming.  
 PhD thesis on exploring commonalities between Jewish and Palestinian 
citizens in Israel and Palestinians in OCT; 
 I have no political ties with Israel or within the UK. My background is 
academic;   
 I take no particular perspective apart from the interest within social 
psychology of enduring conflict; 
 I am interested in how those who live within a conflict zone can begin to 
understand the perspective of ‘the other’ in order to think about their own 
perspective. 
 
Recording and confidentiality 
 The session is recorded for my own analysis and recordings will not be passed 
on to any third party. 
 I may use a quote from the session in my reporting but no-one can be 
identified as no names will ever be given.    
 LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed. 
 Consent form to be completed, and leave my contact details.   
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 Any questions?     
 
Interview as a guide not as a Q and A session.  
 
 
1. How might you define and talk about Jewish Israeli people generally?   
 Explore this in terms of prominence to:  State / nationality / Aliyah /  
Jewishness / fear  / etc.   
 
2. Can we talk about what you think might lie at the base of the conflict?   
 Explore how these definitions are discussed and explore further under the 
topics addressed above.   
 What understanding / misunderstanding stands between them? 
 What form does this take?  
 What does it personally feel like to be part of this reality? 
 
3. How might you define and talk about the Palestinian people ?   
 Explore in terms of their experiences and contact / in Israel and in the OCT.  
 
4. What do you think the Palestinian people think of the Jewish Israeli people? 
 
 Explore in terms of how they might distinguish between Palestinian 
individuals that you might know and the society they represent?   Explore 
this divide from the general to the personal . 
 
5. How do you think your views have been formed and sustained?  
 Explore the roles of ethnic background  / ideology / significant relationships 
/ education / institutions (inc military of mentioned)/  media (TV and 
Newspaper).        
 
6. Can you envisage a time in the future when the Jewish and Palestinian people, 
regardless of race, may consider living together in one state?    
 Probe how this society might feel like 
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 What might the commonalities be /  Explore any barriers that may inhibit 
this process.  
 
7. Conclusion   
Pick up on the main themes that have become apparent.  
  
B) Discussion guide for Palestinians living in London  
Introduction to the project  (guidelines for introductory chat)  
Thanks for coming.  
 PhD thesis on exploring commonalities between Jewish and Palestinian 
citizens in Israel and Palestinians in OCT.  
 I have no political ties with Israel or within the UK. My background is 
academic.   
 I take no particular perspective apart from the interest within social 
psychology of enduring conflict  
 I am interested in how those who live within a conflict zone can begin to 
understand the perspective of ‘the other’ in order to think about their own 
perspective 
 
Recording and confidentiality 
 The session is recorded for my own analysis and recordings will not be passed 
on to any third party. 
 I may use a quote from the session in my reporting but no-one can be 
identified as no names will ever be given.    
 LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed. 
 Consent form to be completed, and leave my contact details.   
 Any questions?     
 
Interview as a guide not as a Q and A session.  
1. How might you define and talk about Palestinian people generally?   
 Explore this in terms of prominence to:  State / nationality / conflict / 
tradition / etc.  
 
2. Can we talk about what you think might lie at the base of the conflict?   
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 Explore how these definitions are discussed and explore further under the 
topics addressed above.   
 What understanding / misunderstanding stands between them? 
 What form does this take?  
 What does it personally feel like to be part of this reality? 
 
3. How might you define and talk about Jewish people in Israel ?  
 Explore in terms of their experiences and contact.  
 
4. What do you think the Jewish Israeli people think about the Palestinian 
people? 
 
 Explore in terms of how they might distinguish between Palestinian 
individuals that you might know and the society they represent?   Explore 
this divide from the general to the personal . 
 
5. How do you think your views have been formed and sustained?  
 Explore the role of ethnic background / ideology / significant relationships / 
education / institutions  / the occupation / media (TV and Newspaper).        
 
6. Can you envisage a time in the future when the Palestinian and Jewish people, 
regardless of race, may consider living together in one state?    
 
 Probe how this society might feel like, What might the commonalities be /  
Explore any barriers that may inhibit this process.  
 
7. Conclusion:   Pick up on the main themes that have become apparent.  
Close and thanks 
 
 
9.1.2. Informed consent 
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The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 Institute of Social Psychology 
St. Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
       Tel:  020 7955 7712 
 
     Date ….. 
Informed Consent 
Project: Representations of conflict and co-existence between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of 
Israel / Occupied territories.   
 
Researcher: Cathy Nicholson, PhD Candidate, Institute of Social Psychology, London School of 
Economics. c.g.nicholson@lse.ac.uk 
  
Supervisor: Dr Caroline Howarth, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Social Psychology, London School 
of Economics, c.s.howarth@lse.ac.uk  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
To be completed by the Research Participant 
Please answer each of the following questions: 
Do you feel you have been given sufficient information about the research to 
enable you to decide whether or not to participate in the research? 
Yes No 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the research? 
Yes No 
Do you understand that your participation is voluntary, and that you are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason, and without penalty? 
Yes No 
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Are you are willing to take part in the research? 
Yes No 
Will you allow the research team to use anonymized quotes in presentations and 
publications 
Yes No 
 
Participants Name:_______________________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature: ___________________________     Date:__________ 
 
 
To be completed by Researcher (NB/for mostly Palestinian participants who had shown 
hesitation in being interviewed because of confidentiality). 
 
I agree to keep any identifying information given to me as confidential between me and the 
participant.  The tapes will be personally transcribed by me with no name attached to either.  
Small sections of quotes maybe given in academic journals or power point presentations, but 
never with any form of identification. I am a member British Psychological Society whose  ethical 
guidelines I agree  to follow.    
   
Signed __________________________________________________    Date  ____________________ 
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9.1.3. Nvivo categories  
Table 11: NVivo summary Jewish Israelis in London (Study 1)     
Name   Nodes References 
JD 17    37 139 
JD 01   34 125 
JD 10   32 97 
JD 11   29 70 
JD 12   35 101 
JD13   22 55 
JD14   25 73 
JD 15   30 85 
JD 16   43 135 
JD 02   37 89 
JD 03   46 199 
JD 04   41 131 
JD 05   32 92 
JD 06   38 172 
JD 07   37 116 
JD 08   23 82 
JD 09   24 86 
Table 12: NVivo categories Jewish Israelis in London    
Name Sources References 
Anti-semitism 10 16 
Arab Jews 8 9 
Asymmetry 3 4 
Barriers 13 48 
Belonging 12 23 
Biblical myths 9 12 
Boundaries 4 5 
Co-existence 17 62 
Cognitive polyphasia 8 18 
Contact 6 20 
Critical of Israel 8 16 
Denial 4 12 
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Differences 9 17 
Distrust 8 12 
Empathy 8 18 
Fear 15 35 
Food and music 6 10 
Holocaust related 12 22 
Humanity 4 7 
Identity national and personal 15 68 
IDENTITY neutral 10 29 
Ideology constructs 6 11 
Injustice 7 12 
International opinion 5 7 
Intractable 17 61 
Islamic fundamentalism 9 21 
Israeli Palestinian and Palestinian 17 171 
Jewish Responsibility 6 18 
Jewishness 14 33 
Loyalty 15 26 
Medics 2 2 
Meta perspective 10 87 
Military 13 26 
Nationalism 9 17 
Open to possibilities 7 18 
P Modernism 1 1 
Paradox 10 23 
Peace hopes 9 20 
Politics 13 42 
Post Modernism 7 20 
Promised land 7 13 
Racism 8 19 
Realism 2 2 
Rejection of other 6 17 
Relating IPs to Pals in WB 9 19 
Religion 9 28 
Resistent to change 5 6 
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Righteousness 12 60 
Security 3 3 
Segregation 10 38 
Semantic barriers new 11 37 
Semantic resisters 10 128 
Shared Future 9 19 
Socialisation and education 6 19 
Special people 1 1 
Stigmatisation 12 29 
Taboo 2 5 
Terrorism and S bombers 8 13 
Threat 17 54 
Transformation 12 38 
Universal Rights 9 29 
Victimhood 4 5 
Zionism 14 68 
 
Table 13: NVivo summary Palestinians in London (Study 1)     
Name   Nodes References 
PD015   24 39 
PD01   63 148 
PD 09   35 104 
PD 08   33 69 
PD 07   37 78 
PD 06   30 58 
PD 05   36 79 
PD 04   28 80 
PD 03   37 92 
PD 02   34 77 
PD 014   17 35 
PD 013   29 67 
PD 012   24 44 
PD 011   20 33 
PD 010   36 74 
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Table 14: NVivo categories Palestinians in London    
Arabs and Pals in Israel 4 7 
Asymmetry 7 16 
Barriers 14 53 
Belonging 3 4 
Biblical myths 2 2 
Boundaries 0 0 
Checkpoints and crossings 6 9 
Co-existence 12 23 
Cognitive Polyphasia 3 4 
Collaboration 4 12 
Conflict 7 15 
Contact 10 33 
Critical of Israel 2 3 
Denial 2 5 
Despair 7 13 
Diaspora 2 2 
Differences 7 10 
Distrust 4 9 
Emotions 10 22 
Empathy 2 2 
Fear 7 11 
Feelings for Israel 0 0 
Food  Music  Temperament 0 0 
Future 14 40 
Gaza WB distinction 3 6 
History 10 30 
Holocaust 12 20 
Humanity 1 2 
Identity national 10 38 
Ideological constructs 7 13 
Injustice 12 26 
International opinion 8 23 
Intersubjectivity 11 36 
Intifada 1 3 
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Intractability 5 9 
Irony 3 4 
Jewish 4 10 
Land 7 14 
Language 2 3 
Loyalty 3 3 
Media 3 8 
Medics 1 1 
Memory collective 2 2 
Metaperspectives 11 62 
Militancy 2 4 
Military and IDF 6 8 
Myths 1 1 
Normalisation 4 4 
Occupation 10 22 
Opportunities 4 6 
Paradox 2 2 
Peace 9 16 
Personal consequence 5 10 
Perspective from afar 3 5 
Politics 10 48 
Positioning 5 6 
Post Modernism 0 0 
Racism 7 17 
Realism and Pragmatism 2 4 
Refugees 7 13 
Rejection of other 0 0 
Religion 6 21 
Resistance to change 2 3 
Righteousness 1 1 
Security 3 3 
Segregation 3 4 
Semantic barriers 6 23 
Settlers 5 7 
Socialisation 3 15 
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Suffering 4 10 
Taboo 0 0 
Terrorism 1 1 
Universal Rights 4 6 
Victimhood 6 11 
Zionsim 8 15 
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Ideology 
 
Palestinian 
nationalism 
Injustice 
Resistance 
Religion 
Security  
 
Harmful 
experiences  
Fear of aggression 
Hatred  
Collective positioning 
 
Unrecognised /vic 
Lack of dignity 
Dehumanised 
Oppressed  
 
 
Collective 
agency  
 
Lack of agency 
Stateless 
Occupied 
 
  
 
Ideology 
 
Jewish responsibility 
Recognition of the 
Occupation 
Universal justice 
Human rights law 
Collective  positioning 
 
Cultural artefacts  
Co-existence  
Bi-national state   
Collective agency    
 
Acknowledgement of the 
Other   
Empathy   
Open to change 
 
Ideology 
 
Universal justice 
Human rights law 
Defining Palestinian 
national conscious 
Collective positioning 
 
Shared past to future 
Co-existence 
Bi-national state  
Collective agency  
 
Acknowledgement of the 
Other  
Universal injustice  
through international 
agencies   
Pragmatism   
 
 
9.1.4. Organising and base themes framework  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideology  
 
Zionism 
Nationalism 
Historical  myths 
Religion 
Security 
 
Existential fear 
Terrorrist attacks  
Holocaust memory 
Distrust   
Collective positioning  
 
Jewishness in a 
Jewish State 
Militray service 
Safe haven 
Victim 
 
Collective 
agency   
 
All powerful 
Rejection of Other 
Segregation 
Racism 
C 
O 
N 
F 
I 
C 
T 
C 
O 
N 
S 
E 
N 
S 
U 
S 
 Jewish participants with lived experience in Israel  Palestinian participants born in W Bank, Gaza,  
E.Jerusalem & Israel 
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9.1.5. Organising and base themes coding book  
A) Jewish (Israelis) living in London base and organising themes (Conflict)  
 
Organising themes Base themes Example 
Collective agency All powerful And it’s not only in terms of territory its in terms 
of the economy, in terms of one group of people 
always dominating another in terms of power 
and exploitation. And that picture is never going 
to change.  
 
 Rejection of other  There's an Arab section in Israel where all of 
them live there. I don’t really go there obviously. 
I just find it difficult to accept that there are 
Arab people there. 
 
 Segregation  It means that I am part of this network of people 
and I feel, I feel it’s funny that I naturally feel a 
bond with people when they associate me with 
being Jewish. For some it’s religious, some say 
its mysticism. It’s just a desire to be part of 
something that is bigger than you. 
 Racism  The way they behave I don’t think of them as 
people, because people don't behave like that. 
And I know they see us as probably the same 
thing, like I said I wish everyone would let 
others live and leave them alone. I of course, I 
don’t have to like them but I'd much rather hate 
them and have them out of our lives you know/ 
 
Collective positioning Jewishness in a 
Jewish  state 
There aren’t a lot of Jewish people in the world. 
So I think that there is this desire that we want 
to keep ourselves to ourselves.  
 Military service  The Army is a sort of melting pot where they all 
become Israelified in the positive sense. 
 
 Save haven  I don't agree with the settlements but you need 
them there. You need them there. It’s not a 
question of should we do it, shouldn't we, you 
need them there.  It’s a security buffer.   The 
only reason.  
 
 Victim I think we see ourselves as the victims and 
always portraying ourselves as the victims. And 
even in Israel where they are the majority and 
the law is geared around them and they are the 
nation’s citizens they still see themselves as the 
victims. 
Security  Existential fear You only need to lose once in Israel. if you lose 
the war in in Israel you’ve had it. You can't 
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afford to lose one war because then that's the 
end of Israel.  
 Terrorist attacks But when Arab Israelis from Haifa, from the 
villagers from wherever are driving, driving a 
suicide bomber into the centre of town to 
explode on a bus of children, this is mistrust that 
you would be very very difficult to overcome. 
 Holocaust memory I have family that lost everything in the 
Holocaust and they go back to Poland and they 
see the building where the kids were running 
around. 
 Distrust  They are not trusted. I don’t want it to sound.. 
ok it's not a blame game. We have our fair share 
but the fact that it’s about what is the point of all 
of this?  How are we ever going to get along 
together? The fact is they are not integrated.  
Ideology Zionism You can’t not be influenced by Zionism. From a 
very young age in every school in every 
kindergarten. 
 Nationalism I do feel that if Israel as a state didn't exist I 
wouldn't feel so secure .. when L. talks of a two 
state solution he means a Jewish state without 
non Jews and some kind of Palestinian entity 
that the Palestinian citizens of Israel would be, 
they wouldn't shifted there physically but the 
border would be altered.  
 Historical myths It's the history behind it all .. if you want to go 
back to that we were there two to three thousand 
years before anyone else. It’s a moot point. We 
were there first. 
 Religion And now its started in a way as religious, Jewish 
Zionism with the complication of the ‘67 war for 
all these stages that allows the settlers sort of 
closer to fulfilling their vision. I don’t know 
exactly how to explain it. Now that the messianic 
energies on the one hand are so strong. 
 
 
B) Jewish (Israelis) living in London base and organising themes  (Consensus)   
 
Organising themes Base themes  Example 
Collective agency Acknowledgement of 
the Other  
For me, I have actually Arab friends, they are 
perfectly fine. They are perfectly normal and 
exactly the same as me. And the fact that there 
Arabs is no difference.  
 Empathy   Their feeling is that we were robbed of our 
country, we were robbed of our freedom. We are 
living in shanty towns and refugee camps and so 
232 
 
on and so forth. No wonder they are as they are 
and there is hatred which is fanned by the Imans 
and everything. 
 Open to change  I had a kind of sense that people were being 
punished for being occupied. And it grew from 
there. You start reading and start looking more 
carefully at what happens in the news.  It was 
very painful. It was awful. It was horrible. I have 
been earnest in the past. But I had to start 
questioning the whole basis of Israel and what 
Israel was doing, it was very difficult.  
 Cultural artefacts  We are very similar … everything I said about 
Israelis can be applied to them as well.  And the 
culture. We adopted many things from their 
culture. Words, language, slang.. The 
pronunciation, the accent of the Hebrew 
language is now a mixture of German and 
Arabic. A range of aspirations, passions, food.  
 Co-existence I was always very open, if you want to call it the 
left wing, you know that’s how you are more or 
less classify the Israelis who were more open, 
but when I came here I met a lot of Palestinians 
that I couldn’t meet when I was in Israel. It 
changed my perspective of the situation. 
 Bi-national state My dream would be that it would be one country 
for Israelis and Palestinians, And the West 
Bank. It would all be one and that's my dream. 
And those who live outside would have to apply 
to come, It wouldn't have to be automatic right 
of return.  
Ideology Jewish responsibility For me Israeli means responsibility, means 
having privileges at the expense of non Jewish 
people. Israel and Palestinians in the OCT it 
means that if I don't that if I am passive then I 
am part of the ongoing problem that will not 
have its own solution until people are active and 
so for me it’s a responsibility.  
 Recognition of the 
occupation  
That the occupation is awful, its terrible it 
should have ended a long time ago. What it has 
done has hatched a completely different country 
from the liberals involved in Israel’s founding 
vision. Israeli critics might say that its built into 
Zionism that it is evolving into a neo fascist 
ethnocracy 
 Universal justice  It should be one person one vote. People should 
be the same in their opportunities. Like have 
equal opportunities. There’s no intrinsic 
difference between Jews and Arabs. Its no more 
intrinsic between the difference between a Jew 
from the UK and a Jew from Yemen. If that can 
be - its not completely bridged, it is different but 
if that can be embraced.  
 Human rights law It all came down to human rights, individual 
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human rights which we can go and fight in the 
court of law. So I think that we are in a world 
which has become all rights and no 
responsibilities but of course not everyone has 
right. 
 
 
C) Palestinians in London base and organising themes (Conflict)  
Organising themes Base themes  Example 
Collective agency Lack of agency It’s a lack of freedom, a lack of self autonomy. 
Most of the people I’ve met abroad don’t know 
anything about it. They know it’s about conflict 
that but they don’t know why. 
 Stateless  But I say to people can you imagine what it’s 
like living in a place where you don’t have your 
army where you don’t have the freedom to go 
where you want. 
 Occupied  I feel that they are occupiers, they are 
oppressors and also they are outsiders, they are 
all from different countries and now they have 
more rights than me. I feel that they don’t 
belong to the country. That’s the general idea 
they are occupiers.  
Collective positioning Unrecognised / 
victim  
Well, I can’t say that I’m not a victim. But I have 
managed to keep away from the stigma of being 
a victim. Because, we were poor and I cannot 
travel of my own. If I wanted to go to university 
in Ramallah and  I applied for that and I got an 
acceptance. And I knew that I couldn’t go there. 
Because you need a permit. 
 Lack of dignity  But it is so important not to lose your nationality 
when Israel declared itself a state. To keep and 
protect yourself as a  Palestinian. Of course as I 
said again the conflict makes it more important 
for us to keep our roots, to keep our dignity as 
Palestinians. 
 Dehumanised   When I went to school at go through checkpoint 
and sometimes the Israelis like would beat us 
really badly. They wouldn’t sexually harass you 
but like like I remember a soldier they would say 
now go across the checkpoint naked even though 
I was 13 years old.  
 Oppressed One thing I realised …  was that a lot of Israeli 
Jewish people didn’t know about Palestinian 
house demolitions, particularly in the punitive 
sentence as a punishment for terrorist activities. 
And when I would actually tell them the story of 
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how they demolish them, and the number that 
went on in the thousands, it was the first time 
that they would hear it. And they would question 
me and they would think that I’m lying. They 
would think that at worst, I’m lying on at best, I 
am deluded. 
Security  Harmful experiences When I was back at some point there was a 
bombardment at a place about 3 km away from 
our house and the sound of the missiles hitting 
the place and exploding. I almost had like a 
nervous breakdown because it was so loud, my 
eardrums were going to explode. 
 
 Fear of aggression  It was terrifying. Especially when you are so 
young would also like I had a younger brother 
and he used to get really really scared that 
something is going to happen to them and erm 
when they had arrested my cousin they even like 
beat up in front of everyone. Even in front of his 
mother. And the Israeli soldiers said this is 
what’s going to happen to you, and they 
arrested him and took away.  
 Hatred  It’s not that we hate them, it’s like we are born 
with that. And we actually suffered because of 
that.  
Ideology Palestinian 
nationalism   
I think that Palestinians have been, in a small 
country that has huge significance in history, the 
holy land. And that significance has created a 
lot of bridges with the outside world. So I think 
Palestine enjoys a strange blend of openness 
with the outside world and a kind of knack as to 
how to deal with the world, exposure and also a 
lot of kind of, you know, occupiers.  The 
Palestinians always have to fight yet another 
occupier, but also have exposure to the world.  
 Injustice  And we are still being colonised by Israel. And 
this is depriving us of our rights, of having an 
army, living in security, having the freedom to 
go back home, going out of your city, getting 
into your city. When you are there are not sure 
about your safety, the Israeli army might come 
to your property. That is a very hard thing.  
 Resistance   So the resistance is very important for the 
Palestinian people, an important way of living 
and a source of hope. 
 
 Religion  I think even in my country, suddenly everybody 
became religious and especially in the first 
intifada if you look at the images you would 
hardly see any women wearing hijab or 
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anything but suddenly everyone became 
religious. I don’t know why, maybe they felt it 
was really hopeless.  
 
D) Palestinians in London organising and base themes (Consensus)   
Organising themes Base themes  Example 
Collective agency Acknowledgement of 
the Other  
I recognise you as an Israeli and there is no 
doubt that this is the case in terms of political 
representation, recognition as well, that we have 
recognised Israel. Israel accepted the terms of 
the PLO agreement.  
 Universal injustice  To control the injustice is important. Justice is a 
basic right. It will take many years 
reconciliation process whatever you want 
called. It will be a very long healing process. It’s 
not an easy reconciliation process but if we start 
it now it will be quicker than starting it later. 
 
 Pragmatism I want to talk about normal people who’ll for 
example like me who go to work, work in a bank 
work in social media. We want to dance and see 
our friends, we want a normal life.  
Collective positioning Shared past to future I heard that my grand father, my grandmother 
speak about what happened in the past and how 
they used to live and how it was their life. They 
all lived together, and   how it suddenly 
changed.  
 Co-existence You can’t be hypocritical. It’s developing, the 
understanding, about the other side. And that’s 
what will make the difference convergence. I 
always felt like I believe we could coexist.  
 Bi-national state I believe if we have a justice and everybody gets 
his rights we will be able to live together since 
we don’t have like a divided country by 
geographic or mountains or something to isolate 
us that would be Israel or Palestine.  
Ideology Universal justice  And talking about the right to be free the right of 
dignity, the right of claiming and reclaiming the 
land, the right for a prosperous economy the 
right to have your own natural resources for 
political sovereignty. And talking about very 
basic human rights. And the right to live a 
normal life. 
 
 Human rights law Conflict will carry on if they just talk about the 
competition of land.  Yet we need to talk about 
the human rights law and then there is a way 
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through.   
 
 Defining Palestinian 
consciousness   
In the end you know we are always in flux, 
forming new entities and so keep saying you are 
a nation, it you’re not a nation you are a nation. 
Well I mean of a nation is formed and emerges 
and says we are a nation then there is a reason 
that they want to feel one, an entity that claims 
nationhood.  
 
9.2. Study two overview (Chapter 5) 
Included in this second part of the Appendix is the discussion guide for the second study 
in Israel. The consent form used was the same on used in the first study.   The NVivo 
categories are given as tables for both samples, Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. Examples 
of quotes used in the development of relevant themata are given, followed by the full 
quotes from the four examples used in the dialogical analysis.   
9.2.1. Discussion guides 
Introduction to the project   
Thanks for coming.  
 PhD thesis on exploring commonalities between Jewish and Palestinian citizens 
in Israel.     
 I have no political ties with Israel or within the UK. My background is academic.   
 I take no particular perspective apart from the interest within social psychology 
about the process of dialogue in places where conflict is present.   
 
Recording and confidentiality 
 The session is recorded for my own analysis and recordings will not be passed on 
to any third party. 
 I may use a quote from the session in my reporting but no person will be 
identifiable.     
 LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed (sign forms).  
    
1. Introduction  
Would you like to tell me about your journey in becoming a doctor (medic) here?  
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 Explore motivation to be a medic / location and timing of training in terms of IDF 
(or non IDF) / ease of employment / work satisfaction/  
 
2.  This part of Israel is considered to be the most co-existent part Israel, as 
perceived in Europe, where both Palestinian and Jewish population live side by side 
peacefully. How far would you agree with that?      
 Explore in general terms about the local population in terms of segregation / 
perceived prejudice and perceptions before discussing this in more personal 
terms, such as their own social mixing, probing both positive and negative 
contexts.   
 Explore why this area might be more open to multiculturalism than other places /  
historical roots of the area etc.  
 Discuss any organisations that may or stimulate or hinder this process.  
 
3. In terms of your experience and observations, in general, how do you find your 
working relationship with your Jewish (Arab Israeli) colleagues?   
 Explore what any commonalities or differences might be salient / personal vs 
professional / pragmatism vs political.  
 Probe how that has happened and changed over time and consequences of that.  
 
4. Does this also extend to patient relationships?  
 Explore this in terms of cultural familiarity / contextual affinity / professional 
experience.  
 
5.  How do you think your values and beliefs have been formed and sustained?  
 Explore in terms of societal beliefs / significant relationships/ education / 
institutions (inc military of mentioned) /  media /etc.   
 Link back to their professional context.  
6. Can you envisage a time in the future when the Jewish and Palestinian people, 
regardless of race, will form one state?    
 Explore how this society might feel like / look like.  
 What might the commonalities be? What might the enduring differences be? 
 Would it be based on multiculturalism as it is represented in the West. 
 Explore perceived hardened barriers between different communities.    
 
7 Conclusion    
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 Pick up on the main themes that have become apparent and probe for those topics 
that highlight a point of interest, particularly the positive, softening and hardening 
of boundaries.    
 
Close and thanks 
9.2.2. Nvivo categories 
Table 15: NVivo summary Palestinian Israelis in Israel (Study2) 
Name   Nodes References 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 10   30 96 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 09   22 66 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 08   20 51 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 07   24 47 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 05   26 72 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 03 and 04   32 71 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 02   19 47 
LSE Haifa 14 PD 01   34 89 
LSE Haifa 14  PD 06   21 40 
     
Table 16: NVivo categories Palestinian Israelis in Israel   
Borders   7 20 
Co-existence   4 11 
Cognitive polyphasia   9 35 
Commonality   4 5 
Conflict   3 5 
Culture in Israel   3 4 
Dialogical analysis   8 18 
Education   3 5 
Ethnic purity   3 3 
Friendship   2 2 
Future imagined   8 35 
Gaza war   8 17 
Hate  hating   2 3 
Holocaust   2 3 
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Identity constructs   8 18 
IDF   5 6 
Israeli discrimination   7 18 
Jewish hegemony   2 2 
Lancet   3 5 
Land   8 18 
Language   3 3 
Media   4 4 
Metaperspectives   8 58 
Narratives   8 36 
Occupation   0 0 
Peace people not politicians   4 5 
Politics   5 7 
Prologue my thoughts   1 1 
Racism   1 2 
Relationship J with A   10 74 
Religion   1 1 
Russian community   1 3 
Segregation   0 0 
Semantic barriers   9 76 
Semantic bridges   9 40 
Socialisation   1 1 
Terrorist attacks   0 0 
Threat   3 3 
 
Table 17: Nvivo summary Jewish Israelis in Israel (Study 2)   
Name   Nodes References 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 10   26 73 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 09   23 75 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 08 (2)   25 46 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 07   27 63 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 06   17 32 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 05   15 28 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 04   29 39 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 03   18 48 
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LSE Haifa 14 JD 02   26 67 
LSE Haifa 14 JD 01   27 58 
Table 18: NVivo categories Jewish Israelis in Israel    
Name   Sources References 
Activism   1 2 
Biograph career   9 22 
Borders   4 13 
Co-existence   5 12 
Cognitive polyphasia   6 8 
Commonality   3 6 
Conflict   2 3 
Culture in Israel   5 14 
Dialogical analysis   2 4 
Education   3 8 
Ethnic purity   4 1 
Friendship   1 1 
Future imagined   7 23 
Gaza war   7 17 
Hate  hating   3 3 
Holocaust   5 6 
Identity constructs   5 20 
IDF   4 15 
Israeli discrimination   5 8 
Jewish hegemony   1 1 
Lancet   1 2 
Land   1 5 
Language   2 2 
Media   7 10 
Metaperspectives   8 56 
Narratives   5 15 
Occupation   1 1 
One state or two states   1 1 
Peace people not politicians   5 10 
Politics   2 4 
Prologue my thoughts   4 4 
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Racism   3 6 
Relationship J with A   10 95 
Russian community   2 3 
Semantic barriers    2 12 
Semantic bridges    1 6 
Socialisation   5 9 
Terrorist attacks   4 5 
Threat   6 15 
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Themata of exclusivity-inclusivity and quoted examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mm 
hemata of threat-security  
 
 
 
 
 
Security to combat threat   
Terror  Collective 
Memory  
Culture  
Fear  
Discrimination Living / city  
space  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exclusivity 
Inclusivity 
Segregation  
Ideology 
Future 
imagined 
Threat  
Exclusion  
Work 
Equality  
Social 
mixing  
National 
equality  
PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL HOMELAND   
Land rights  
Perceived 
differences  
Collective  
history  
Workplace 
protected 
Medical 
ethics Positive 
relationships 
relationships
PERCEPTIONS OF DIVERSITY  
Experiencing 
the other  
Rights for 
all  
Christian,
Muslim,  
Druze 
,Druze  
Opportunities  
Socialisation 
Education/ 
language  
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Thema:  EXCLUSIVITY  
 
PERCEPTIONS OF A NATIONAL HOMELAND  
 
Base theme  Quote example 
 
Organising 
theme 
Socialisation  My kids go to school and you have to deal with that 
when you send them to school you have to put them 
through the system that educates them differently. And it 
is also difficult because you know that they will be 
soldiers fighting for things that you don’t believe in and 
you know it’s very hard to control it because however 
you educate them and I know that when most of the boys 
go into the army it’s hard. J8 
CULTURE   
Perceived 
differences  
There are a lot of cultural differences and there is no 
way around it. A lot of Israelis have come from Europe. 
And there are some from North Africa and so it’s a very 
different culture from the Arabs.     The European 
culture is open to change. I don’t think its brain power, 
its more ideas and thoughts, like the women don’t work 
and people don’t aspire to work.  The women have fixed 
marriages and the woman belongs to the man and she 
stays at home and takes care of the children.  
 
They are collective yes, a collective culture. As far as the 
Israeli society it is more of an individual society, a 
society for individuals. 32.58. The family or the 
community is less than it is in the Arab culture you know 
to the extreme were they can kill you know, a girl were 
destroying the name of the family. The honour ..  I can 
take you to a forest minutes from here. My mother’s 
housekeeper, she was burned in her car because she had 
put disgrace on her family. It happens all the time. It 
really does.. That happened two years ago, it happens, 
they do. 
CULTURE 
Christian / 
Muslim / Druze 
I have to tell you that, first of all I have to tell you that 
there is a difference between the Christians the Muslims. 
There is a big difference. The Christians I think 
sometimes, I was born in Haifa and raised here so, so I 
know,  the rumour is that I mean I know that the 
Christian Arabs hate the Muslim Arabs. I mean they like 
us better than the Muslims. Yeah. And they really see 
themselves above them, for example I can’t believe that a 
Christian girl would marry a Muslim boy. It would be a 
no-no. Especially in Haifa the  Christian Arabs they are 
very aristocratic here and very like I society. So I don’t 
really know about, I have a good friend, she is Christian 
and she has talked to me.  
 
Some Druze groups are the worst. They have this respect 
which is about morals, which is very good but they are 
CULTURE 
244 
 
very loyal but mainly they are …it is the most closed 
community in Israel. And they are actually loyal to the 
country, they serve in the army. They are in a very 
difficult situation. They go to the army but they are 
Arabs actually, but they are not really Arabs they don’t 
look on themselves as being pure Arabs but they are. 
Living / city 
space  
I know that it’s hard for them (Arabs) to find 
accommodation anyway, because they all focus on this 
area, because the schools are here and all the 
community is here, so everyone wants to be here. 
And the prices for apartments are very high. 
SEGREGATION  
Discrimination  I do have a worry of a certain thing that the hospital will 
become over populated with Arab staff.  I would still like 
to see the Jewish staff be the majority. 
 
What are you going to do with them? Are they going to 
say what about us, this is not country, this is our land. 
And you know they are right, because the villagers are 
not like our cities, there being discriminated. I don’t like 
to say it but it’s true. They are being discriminated, they 
are not been treated the same. They don’t have the same 
opportunities .. .around the Technion and the university, 
I think  it’s harder for them to rent, because most of the 
population is Jewish.  Some of them will rent to Arab 
students and some of them won't. 
SEGREGATION  
Training space  Then here you enter a classroom there is a big hole and 
on the right side or the Arabs the sitting and on the left 
the Jews were sitting and I was stunned by that. It was 
terrible. I was crying because it was so terrible. And 
then it’s not as bad as it looks because we are friends, I 
have been to weddings and some of our friends are 
Arabs, but it’s easier to sit next to someone who is more 
of your culture. I think it’s very, em how do you say? It’s 
very natural to look for the people who are your kind. 
That’s what I think. But at first I was shocked. But then I 
came to understand it and it wasn’t as hard as I thought.  
SEGREGATION  
Collective 
history 
 
 
 
 
 
And also in Israel it was built as a Jewish home after the 
Holocaust and my grandparents family all died in the 
Holocaust. I come from that. I can’t see, I can’t see it 
being anything but a Jewish country.  
Then the (1948) war erupted and they (Arabs) were 
excluded.  Or thrown away or never mind … Out of their 
houses. And they became refugees in refugee camps and 
stuff and they multiplied.  There were a few here, you 
know, few Jews, but historically what happened was the 
Jews what happened in Europe and they needed a land. 
Of course they went back to the Bible.  
IDEOLOGY 
Land Rights I don’t think Israel thinks they took the land, the land 
was ours.. You see this is where the problems lie. 
Because if you look, and if you go and you look at the 
Bible and every document, the history, tells it that Israel 
belongs to the Jewish people. So we don’t see it as.. And 
if you look at the history, the Jewish people did live in 
Israel, and they were moved and  came back and moved 
IDEOLOGY 
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and came back. So we don’t see it as land being taken 
from other people, it was our land. You see and this is 
exactly the problem. 
 
But now the situation is very much more complicated. 
Because you give the Palestinians a country and what to 
do with all the Arabs in Israel? You know we are 1.5 
million Israeli Arabs. What are you going to do with 
them? Are they going to say what about us, this is not 
country, this is our land?   
Exclusion  As I said I have to totally segregate my private life from 
my professional life. I can say perfectly and truly that at 
work I don't feel like I have any conflict, on a day to day 
basis with them no.  But as I say I completely divide 
between my private life and my professional life.  
IDEOLOGY 
Threat  Fear, that goes way back to the fears, the deep fears that 
someone can come and just push me away just because I 
don’t belong. Because I don’t have my mark. And here? 
My grandparents they built it you know. So you feel 
connected. Not because of the Bible because it’s 
something, somehow I belong to the town where  I live, it 
was built so you feel connected.  
IDEOLOGY 
 Thema: INCLUSIVITY  
 
PERCEPTIONS OF DIVERSITY    
 
 
Base theme  Quote example 
 
Organising theme  
Medical ethics  The ethics, the way you approach a patient, as another 
human being, the care for another human being so it 
feels a bit more normal. We come with a lot of 
prejudice but when you work with people to be exactly 
the same to everyone, whether they are nice, you have 
to treat them exactly the same. It has nothing to do 
with what I think or believe, it has nothing to do with 
that.. You do the best you can to try and help. 
WORKPLACE 
PROTECTED    
Work equality  For example, at my work, I don’t see any 
discrimination at all, at all, many of succeeding at 
work, they running departments as managers and they 
can do whatever they want, no-one keeping them  from 
going forward at work because they are Arab. 
 
The hospital is kind of a bubble.  It’s very distinct from 
what’s going outside.  Everyone is equal.  You don’t 
look at Arab, Muslim or Christian Arab or Jewish.  It’s 
not something you look at.  You look at it when I 
[accent 12:41] a resident that’s in charge of the work 
schedule.  I put [accent 12:50] certain shift, so I have 
to know all the holidays, the Jewish, the Christian and 
the Muslim, and we’re trying to keep everyone at home 
in his holiday and not to schedule doctors for the 
holidays.  
WORKPLACE 
PROTECTED    
Positive  We work shoulder to shoulder. It’s very nice, it’s very WORKPLACE 
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relationships   pleasant. It shows that two groups can coexist because 
the nurses there are a lot of Arabs and there is lot of 
respect between us and we work as a team. There is 
never a feeling of ‘oh he’s an Arab I don’t want to 
work with him,’. Never. They are colleagues first of all. 
 
I feel more comfortable when there is a mixed, Jewish 
and Arab doctors. So we have mixed opinions and 
ways of seeing things and ways of living.  
PROTECTED    
Social mixing  I consider A to be a very good friend of mine. For me 
he is a very good friend, a close friend. I feel confident 
and comfortable in sharing with him my private life, 
we really are connected. We’re  friends.  
OPPORTUNITIES  
Experiencing 
the other  
I think my work helped me a lot, because it did 
broaden my horizons, because it made me not to think 
about Arabs as they are not as they are in the papers.  
But my colleague, don’t think the patient, they are 
people exactly like me, and they are better than me 
because they have much all medical knowledge. The 
head of ER is an Arab and is amazing he’s smart and 
clever and good and I never for a second think he 
treats me differently because I’m Jewish, or any of 
that. Never never, not even for second. So it has 
changed me a little bit.  
 
I got to know them because I was new in the group, as 
I’d stayed back a year. I heard a lot of stories about 
their families from 48 who had been deported and 
some of them had stayed at lived under the regime. 
And they’re struggling. So for me it was an interesting 
time in that sense, but it only made me feel more 
empathic. I was always empathic, but I understood 
more, like deep, a deeper understanding of the conflict 
inside Israel not in the territories. 
OPPORTUNITIES  
Education / 
Language  
 It just makes sense to grow up together because the 
language can separate us, and especially with 
children. I think it’s the education, to teach children 
right at the beginning that the other person is exactly 
like you, but just speaks another language. They can 
coexist. I hope that my children will be different in the 
sense they will have Muhammad in the class and it will 
be completely normal.  
FUTURE 
IMAGINED 
Rights for all  They don’t have a land, they don’t have borders they 
don’t have identity, nationality, the problem, the 
biggest problem I know, and I think this needs to be, 
this is the place where it needs to start. They need to, 
we need to understand they have a right to define 
themselves as a nation. 
FUTURE 
IMAGINED 
National 
equality  
In my dream there will be no two states, we would be 
together. If we had nothing to be defended, they would 
be friends. 
FUTURE 
IMAGINED  
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Themata of threat-security and quoted examples   
 
Thema:  THREAT  
 
Based on premise that the other as enemy is intent on destroying Israel  2 
 
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising 
theme  
No partner for 
peace  
 I have one friend  .. He is 65, very intelligent person but 
he worked in the FBI … He is a veteran of this 
organisation and he can’t see, he’s just you know, he is 
convinced that they are not trustworthy the Arabs, Arab 
Palestinians and the bottom line is that they want to 
MISTRUST OF 
THE OTHER   
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destroy us. How can you even argue with someone who 
has these arguments?  
 
It stems from the fact that the Muslims want to wipe out 
Israel. Well you hear their leaders declaring it very often, 
that's what they really want.  
Lack of belief  There is a problem, we don’t really think that the peace 
will hold and that’s a problem. If you want a true peace, 
even the most right wing to person will tell you okay I’ll 
sign that paper, but they’re not going to shoot me, they’re 
not going to bomb me, they going to leave me alone, 
that’s fine. When will we believe they do that? We feel 
that we can't trust them, that their leaders are not doing 
what they should.   
MISTRUST OF 
THE OTHER   
Collective 
memory   
And don't forget that Israel was founded because of what 
had been going on in Europe at the time.  The people then 
felt nobody wants us, everybody's thrown us out and 
killed us and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on 
our own.  We've got to show the world that we'll do 
whatever we want, whatever you say. 
 
The Israeli population, most of them have come from 
difficult places, from terror places and the Holocaust, and 
there was something like eight wars we’ve had. And 
people, they hold on to like family suffering. It will never 
end. 
FEAR 
Terror  Peace  would never come because, when you have the 
fear inside of you then you are looking to validate it in all 
kinds of examples or situations in the outside. So it takes 
only one terrorist who goes on a tractor, runs and goes 
over the pavement and runs some people off, for someone 
like my friend to say ‘You see? They don’t really want to 
be here you see. They are dangerous, we have to protect 
ourselves. That’s what happens  
FEAR 
 I find it very hard to look them in the face.  Certainly the 
Palestinian, not so much the Israeli Arabs, because I 
don't know where they stand.  I don't know, I've never 
spoken to them, I'd rather not know.  But when there's a 
terrorist attack, it's very hard.  
 
Identity  
Construction  
Fear. It’s genetic. It’s a Jewish thing. 
 
When we were in Florida I remember once driving the 
car and just stopped and there was car next to us and 
there was a saying on the dashboard with a big flag with 
a cross, with the Nazi cross. I was looking at my husband 
and I said oh my god I hope they don’t recognise us as 
Jewish you know. Do we look Jewish? We were scared. It 
is rather as a law against it you know. But in America 
there is the KKK there are places there that have that and 
you don’t feel secure. Or maybe it’s all an illusion, of 
being secure or insecure…. because here people are 
exploding bombs.   
FEAR  
Gaza War  Now I’m not saying this just to justify, I’m saying that 
there is hard evidence that Hamas, for example of 
CONFLICT  
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terrorists, go into the population … I know because my 
two sons were just there. It’s inside, it’s not like if there is 
a war here then you would see that soldiers shooting from 
this building and this building. No. This is a population 
area/ No, you don’t draw the fire, you know, you bring 
them where the citizens are, but they do that 
unfortunately.  
 
You go down to the south and you see a big piece of land 
or whatever with civilian populations who are being 
threatened for years, day after day, we call it like rain 
dropping, you know drops, five, six, ten  bombs a day. It’s 
been like this for years and years. No country in the world 
would ever allow this to happen. If it would happen to 
Britain they would kill 10,000 of whoever is across the 
border, no one will say anything because someone dared 
to drop bombs on our population. 
Ethos of conflict  We live on our sword There is a saying in Israel . ‘For 
ever you live on your sword. It’s from the Bible. I don’t 
know who gave this kind of, God gave this punishment to 
who? to Adam. For ever you live on your sword.  
CONFLICT 
Imagined future I’m not talking about outside Israel but inside Israel, by 
the Palestinian Authority and the way they insist on not 
understanding that we still have to be here in 50 years, 
this way or another. 
 
And they say too, they say that they will never stop until 
they have all the land in the Jews in the sea. They always 
say that. 
 
I think by the next war we will build machines that can 
detect tunnels. That’s what they will do.  It’s amazing 
what people are putting their  money and brains to, just 
making the war more sophisticated, instead of putting 
your mind into resolving this problem. 
CONFLICT 
Land  rights  So the threat, the immediate threat Israelis feel about 
going into peace talks is that they want not just the ‘67 
borders and the land with it,  but they also want 
everything that was, years ago.    
CONFLICT 
Thema:  SECURITY   
 
Security to combat threat    
 
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising 
theme  
Jewish majority  It should be mainly Jewish. It’s not a political point of 
view it’s an emotional point of view.  
EXCLUSIVITY 
Loyalty  After all when you go to the bottom of things you are still 
divided on the land, so for me to be very pro Palestinian 
it’s really going against my people and I don’t know what 
exactly I am. I am left of course, I think. But I know I can 
tell A and I can tell my other friends that if it comes to my 
house or my home or your home, then I’m defending 
mine, you know . It’s a very simple thing, a reality that is 
EXCLUSIVITY 
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complicated and simple 
Safety For me, Israel is to me a safe place for my family and for 
my feelings not a political view. The feeling is that you 
can be safe only if there is a Jewish majority. 
DEFENCE 
IDF But for most of them it’s very difficult because your 
friends go to the army, your parents went to the army, 
your family, everybody went to the army, it’s like a 
national mission or something like that. It’s very difficult.  
DEFENCE 
Legitimate 
violence  
It’s easier to be violent and partake in that. It’s easier. 
You feel strong, you feel in control.  
 
Violence become something that is legitimate, it’s 
legitimate. The violence that’s against Palestinians 
DEFENCE 
Medical ethics  In the hospital we had an order from the management 
that we can’t engage in any political discussion in the 
hospital, and we have to keep the current practice where 
we treat everyone and we work with everyone equally.  
But you could feel tension.  You could feel the tension. 
 
But still we worked the same way and we treated the Arab 
patients the same.  We didn’t speak about the war.   
WORKPLACE 
PROTECTED 
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Themata of recognition – non recognition and quoted examples 
 
 
 
Thema:  RECOGNITION  
TO BE  RECOGNISED AS A VALUED MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY  
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Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising 
theme  
Rise above 
differences  
Somehow you hide behind the profession. Somehow you 
invent ways of not getting involved by committing to the 
profession, to the professional standards. I am a public 
health person and I’m interested in keeping everybody 
healthy, Arabs and Jews. Life has a sacred value to me 
above a level of understanding. There are tricks of the 
trade to sort of convince yourself.P4 
  WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP 
Compassion  I remember once three soldiers, a bomb had blown up 
and when we saw them, I think I gave him treatment. It’s 
not easy for me. He must take every day and injection 
for his pain and another injection and he refused all the 
nurses to give him his injection. He wanted just me. And 
I said you know I am Arabic, and he had been shot at by 
Arabs, attacked by them.  And he just wanted an Arabic 
nurse to treat him, and when he saw me, he was in a lot 
of pain, in a very bad way.  And was taken on to recover 
and rehabilitation and survived.  And he saw me and 
was waiting for me to come from my shift to give him the 
injection. Because he said, and his mother said to me, 
that when you give him the injection he doesn’t feel 
pain.  But all the others did.  He smiled when he saw me 
I never forget that smile.  And he would say ‘you’ve 
arrived’ and smile. He was just 19.  You have this 
dilemma.  He is also a human being.  He was in 
Lebanon on and he killed there he killed my people.  On 
the other hand you give him treatment, and the smile 
was just for me.  It’s not easy.  And how did you feel? 
Happy. I made him happy. I love my job. I have been a 
nurse for 19 years.  I still have the same energy for it.  
D7 
WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP 
We are needed  Look I’m a nurse. I am in a place that they come and 
they need me. They come to me and they need me so they 
will not attack me, even if I am Arab because they need 
me 
WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP 
Medical ethics  And, is it that values that we are educated on as 
physicians no matter where we studied, whether in 
Israel or outside, to see the human aspect of the subject, 
so we have to treat every patient, no matter what the 
gender, nation, religion. Or is it the character of the 
person? He went to study medicine because he was like 
that? He has this kind of motivation. Anyhow, inside the 
hospitals you can see a very nice interaction and 
relationships p9 
WORKING 
RELATIONSHIP 
Social time And we were together and we go to drink beer together, 
we have a social life together. And I think it was sincere 
when a visitor said, and some of the Jewish colleagues 
also agreed totally with him. And me as an Arab, the 
chief of the Department I like the atmosphere here. P9 
SOCIAL 
REATIONSHIPS  
Building 
through work 
Up until my fourth year, we were grouped with  eight or 
nine students and we started having our practice and I 
SOCIAL 
REATIONSHIPS 
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was in a group where there were only Jews. So that was 
a switch when I started having real Jewish friends, not 
only people where you say hi, but having friends and 
going out with friends. And I think that happened only 
because we were everyday together. And that’s carried 
on..P10 
Explore 
commonality 
We do have some Jewish friends and we have met 
together, sometimes we meet and go to a restaurant and 
eat something else and I like that. I don’t hate them. You 
eat with them. You live with them. You talk with them. 
You have a lot of common things together. And I believe 
and I still believe we can live together. I can live with 
part of them more than without them. I find common 
things with part of them, I believe that we have to find 
common things to live together 
FUTURE 
IMAGINED 
Co-existence But you know if I take the Arab Palestinian community 
inside Israel which is composed of Muslims, Christians, 
Jews I think mostly I can say the vast majority is 
tolerant, is accepting the other, is calling for 
coexistence, coexistence between Arabs and Jews with 
mutual respect inside. And I’m coming from a town 
called S 40,000 people, which is mixed, Muslims, 
Christian and Jews, and they live in harmony, yes, they 
live very well in harmony with mutual respect visiting 
each other, and participating in the joy and sadness of 
each other, on the personal level and within the 
community. And until almost 100 years ago we used to 
have a Jewish community in my town which actually left 
in 1918 when the British mandate came over and some 
of them you know, of the people, the farmers, didn’t 
matter whether it were Christians Muslims or Jews, they 
left for Haifa during the British mandate so it was a 
natural outgrowth of the mandate at that time. So 
actually until then we had a nice Jewish community. 
Now, now it’s sad we are three communities. We still 
have the synagogue that is maintained. No Jews living 
there are now. P9 
FUTURE 
IMAGINED 
Thema:  NON RECOGNITION  
NOT TO FEEL RECOGNISED AS A VALUED MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY  
 
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising theme  
Perceived as the 
enemy 
And Giddi,( Jewish Israeli friend) was very calm, 
very silent. He didn’t shed any political talk. Because 
we were neighbours in Tel Aviv. And once I could 
approach him and try to open this closed door to tell 
him ‘Giddi if you see me as an Arab do not react in 
the way that I might only have the dreams of Syrian 
tanks coming into Tel Aviv’. And he was convinced I 
was genuine. And I was not manipulating him.. P5 
  
MISUNDERSTOOD  
Fear of the 
other 
maintained  
I think it is a fear that is artificially maintained 
intentionally by the state, by the official line of 
Hasbro, by the official line of government policy. And 
MISUNDERSTOOD 
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if you lose that then you don’t have a case and 
demanding greater Israel. So that. Erm. ..  no you 
consecrate this holy cow for defence because we 
(they) are going to kill us because we are afraid for 
our lives and safety and so on. It is maintained by the 
state intentionally to keep the level of animosity and 
the level of of … otherwise why would kids enlist in 
the Armed Forces?  
Media portrayal   Sometimes you need to explain that it’s not true what 
you are talking about and then it’s finished. And 
some of them say we don’t know that, because they 
hear the Israeli media. For example, one of the 
radiographers said that the difference between us 
and them is we have ’zihab’ (the iron dome) and still 
they (Hamas) put their children there as ‘protectors’. 
There is a lot in the Israeli media. They are always 
saying that Palestinians protect Hamas buildings or 
something by putting their children there at the front. 
Saying that the Palestinians use human shields that 
they like to kill their children. 
ASYMMETRY 
Fear of state 
disloyalty  
 With my work or something like that I have to be 
careful. My opinion is that peace is the best thing for 
all the people for all of us. I know a friend of mine 
who is also a doctor and she had her registration, 
they did an interview, because when she went on a 
(peace) demonstration she put down that she was a 
Dr. And she was told that she would be in trouble if 
she participated in another demonstration that she 
might be fired. You can’t continue working in the 
hospital. So I don’t tell my opinion. I have but I don’t 
participate in demonstrations. I don’t tell my opinion 
at all. I think that my opinion will not change 
anything and Palestinians and the Jews 
ASYMMETRY 
Victimhood  And sometimes they want to talk about coexistence, I 
start to define what is the meaning of coexistence. So 
my existence is totally different from theirs, it is a 
totally different existence to my Jewish colleagues. 
He has the hope, he has the promise. I am living on 
the shoulders. I do not have enough economic power 
to become independent. I am all of the time in 
relation of the horse in the nights. This horse, from 
time to time, somebody must be able to break 
through. It does not represent the whole picture. It is 
the interest of the system to have them, as the 
director deputy of the ….  And some professor who 
invented the electronic nose and other things and it is 
in the interests of the system to have our minds 
advanced. But it all serves to fortify the Israeli 
economy, the state. Which is something I’m not 
complaining of, especially if the alternative is to go 
and live in Ramallah.  
ASYMMETRY 
Divided 
loyalties  
f course I’m worried about my job. I have children 
and of course I’m worried. I studied a lot to keep my 
job. But at 11 o’clock (during Gaza war when staff 
IMPASSE 
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were asked to stand in silence to support the IDF) I 
will not stand with them. And sometimes I forget and 
I’m in the middle of a treatment and have to think 
what I can do. You can hear the loud speaker telling 
you. It’s not real. They make us two things that we 
don’t believe in. And it’s not real for us. And you see 
all the people all the Jewish all your friends are 
standing and you’re looking for a place to hide ** P7 
Seeker of truth You can’t be silent and not crying and if somebody is 
crying the other will look at him. When the war was 
on in Gaza I was in Jerusalem at a conference for a 
DIR system, how to treat autism. And I met my 
friends who I meet every year. I was the only Arab in 
my group. And we are working very nice together 
and very professional and humanity but it started 
there, I was there when it started. And it was a very 
bad feeling to meet people and I think I look around 
and I think ‘where is her son? Is he killing the Gaza 
children now? And I feel pity for her and her child 
and for my child. So I feel pity for all the people and I 
feel angry at the same time, why they don’t seek for 
the real truth, and they listen to the Israel news. So 
why I blame people is because they don’t seek the 
truth. P5 
IMPASSE 
Collective 
memory  
When you go shopping for instance in the 
supermarket or in the big city, like Carmel you see 
everybody shopping and actually the Palestinians 
from the villages are the  the greater number 
shopping in these places. They do more shopping and 
there are even figures to show that they buy more. 
And you see a lot of Palestinian kids working in the 
shops and selling. And so you seem to find 
coexistence in a very high plane you know. But that’s 
only in the marketplace. Once you leave everyone 
goes to their separate communities, there is no 
interaction. They don’t realise this abroad. …. when 
I came back I remember so many times our 
neighbours would be having friends to parties, 
Jewish friends coming and coming to weddings and 
other social events.  But not any more. I can’t 
remember the last time it happened. P4#, I feel much 
more bitterness because, how come that you 
memories the spirits of these innocent people on my 
land. And exactly on my land of our village where 
people used to grow that their figs. And the fig tree is 
a symbol for life. The fruit. It is free for everybody 
who passes by. If you are hungry you can come in 
and eat. The bulldozers they destroyed these trees in 
the 1950s. The forest there that stands there today to 
memorise the spirits of the children is of pine  … 
which is a symbol of death.    
IMPASSE 
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Themata of equality – inequality and quoted examples 
 
 
mm 
hemata of threat-security  
 
 
 
 
 
Security to combat threat   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work/life 
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Nurturing 
rel’ships 
Equality 
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Work 
Opportunities  
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Lack of 
opportunity 
Politics 
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Land 
rights 
Ethnicity  
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Positive 
experience 
Structural  
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Segregation 
TO FEEL LESS THAN AN EQUAL MEMBER 
Racial bias  
Discrimination 
Recognition  
(see themata) 
Aliyah  
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Thema:  EQUALITY   
TO EXPERIENCE EQUAL STATUS  
 
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising theme  
Positive experiences  I can confirm now because I worked for 
a hospital with Jewish doctors and it 
was very nice. It was very good 
WORK OPPORTUNITIES  
Politics ignored   And I’m working in a department 
where there are Arab doctors. It’s more 
difficult for me to get started (with 
Jewish doctors) and I need to have 
relationships and it will take more time. 
We don’t talk about the political 
situation because I think all the 
academics not just doctors, all of us the 
Jews and the Arabs understand the 
situation so there is no need to talk 
about it. I know why they do their thing 
and they know why I do mine. And so 
we’re not talking because everyone 
knows what the other is thinking. 
Maybe this is a mistake but now it’s 
accept it and that’s what everyone is 
doing. 
NEUTRAL SPACE  
Nurturing relationships  And, is it that values that we are 
educated on as physicians no matter 
where we studied, whether in Israel or 
outside, to see the human aspect of the 
subject, so we have to treat every 
patient, no matter what the gender, 
nation, religion. Or is it the character 
of the person?. Anyhow, inside the 
hospitals you can see a very nice 
interaction and relationships  
NEUTRAL SPACE 
Work/life separation  I keep calm with the years, with the 
experiences, for me, I learn that it is not 
easy to express myself or many times I 
have just to deal with myself by saying 
‘his is the reality, you have to deal with 
this.  This is the reality, I can’t change 
it.’  I can’t change in the small area, in 
a small circle, my thoughts from the 
past that I want to change the world, 
it’s not real, its not rationale.  I can 
influence my family and  my friends and 
from here we have the staff, our staff is 
Jewish and Arabs.  My friend, she is 
Jewish and after the holidays she came 
here and we sat to talk about the family, 
about her parents, about what 
happened in Gaza. I never opened the 
RECOGNITION  
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subject about the political situation 
with her.  I don’t know, I don’t want to 
know what is her opinion really 
because I want to find the common that 
we are together.  Really there is a lot of 
things that we are the same. So we keep 
it separate.  
Thema: INEQUALITY  
WE ARE NOT EQUAL CITIZENS  
 
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising theme  
Housing opportunities  Now we are struggling about the city 
plan for the future that they did not 
consider the Arabs and their plans. So 
there is a high population in the city in 
the Arab neighbourhoods and if you 
travel in the city you will see them. 
And the Arabs can’t find places to live, 
for us to have our schools and places 
where we can live and when we go far, 
when we want to go to the 
neighbourhood that is much more 
improved and better place to live it’s 
not easy. P1 
STRUCTURAL 
Segregation  I am leaving (my home) but I can’t 
find another place. I am very 
frustrated because I cannot place to 
live and this is a problem for the Arab 
young, we cannot find a place.  
STRUCTURAL 
Land rights  I am not originally from Haifa, I came 
from the Galilee, a small village and 
the village is also a problem because if 
I want to live in the village there is no 
place, I cannot live there. There is no 
land to build a house because it is full, 
the capacity is over crowded. And they 
don’t let us buy land and so I cannot 
buy land to build my house. If I am a 
Jew, or if I was Russian from Russia 
and not even Jewish. It’s a formal 
statistics something like 50% are 
Jewish  but they can buy land and 
build a house with the support of the 
government next to my village but I 
can’t. 
STRUCTURAL 
Consequences of Aliyah  I don’t know how much my generation 
how long will be, you know, it’s like 
boiling inside, everyone is talking 
about that that it’s not possible that 
that I was born here and my parents 
STRUCTURAL  
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and grandfathers were here and this is 
the land that we have and I cannot live 
on my land and someone who came 
from I don’t know from another place 
will take the land and build a large 
house. And have a large space and 
garden. And I can see how they are. 
Ethnicity  We feel that they don’t accept us. They 
are thinking about taking all the 
villages near the West Bank from 
Israel. So this is what I say, we don’t 
feel the country accepts the minority 
the Arab minority and all the time they 
are talking about the demographic 
danger. All the time planning on how 
the Arabs don't have more and more 
children. 
DISCRIMINATION 
Racial bias  The two cultures are changing all the 
time. Our culture has been changing 
in the last years because of 
globalisation, and because of it, it’s 
now harder to live and to an enough 
salaries and to work hard. So people 
are not sharing so much as they did 
before. We live now everyone alone 
and there are lonely people now. The 
Jewish culture is more, there are many 
cultures. That’s the Arab Jews who 
came from Morocco and Iraq and they 
are like the same as the Arabs with the 
same culture. And those who came 
from Europe from Eastern and 
Western Europe they have a different 
culture. And also between the Jewish 
communities that are differences and 
they don’t accept each other. There is 
a discrimination between the 
communities from the West and the 
East. 
DISCRIMINATION 
Dependent on geopolitics   They choose the Arab doctors that are 
the best. But sometimes they choose 
the Jewish doctors, like the Russians 
that aren’t very clever. They try to 
keep the numbers equal. (But there is 
discrimination as to who might be 
picked - they have two Arabs example 
and they need four, so they would 
choose one Jewish and the fourth one 
they will also choose Jewish even 
though they may not be the best 
qualified compared to another Arab). 
They don’t say it in public, but I feel 
that it does happen. Misraqi Jews tend 
not to be doctors - they don’t study 
LACK OF OPPORTUNITY 
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like others. It’s not as though they are 
less clever it’s that they are not 
interested. It’s my opinion that I see 
that, but they don’t say that in public. 
9.2.3. Dialogical analysis full quotes  
A) Exclusivity / inclusivity  
“We get along at work, we get along in this environment in the secure place, in the department 
where we work together.  But when you go outside  .. it’s different. . I think the conflict here is 
based on land. No one wants to give up their land, you know. My father has inherited land from 
my grandfather who inherited from his and his and his and it’s been hundreds of years our land  
. . and when I go to pick olives I completely feel that it’s my land. And I think to myself if 
someone has come to take my land I don’t know what would be possible and what I’d be capable 
of doing because we are very much connected to the land. That’s the only things important in life 
is the land and respect. So no one takes your land and no one takes you(r) respect. That’s why 
you can see that in 48 when the state of Israel, that a lot of Arab villagers were, what you say, 
they left or were forced to leave, it doesn’t matter how they left it’s the fact that the villages were 
empty.”      Female medic, 20’s, Palestinian Israeli  
    
“I think for years they have been educated that they have been robbed, that we took the land we 
are horrible and the enemy and you know. I don’t know what tell you because I’m an Israeli and 
I have been in Israel all my life … . Since I was born they keep telling you how Jerusalem is 
important, how Israel is important. But if I wasn’t living here I probably wouldn’t have heard 
that and if someone else lived there I would hate it. I’m telling you honestly I don’t think Israel 
thinks they took the land, the land was ours.. You see this is where the problems lie. Because if 
you look, and if you go and you look at the Bible and every document, the history, tells it that 
Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So we don’t see it as.. And if you look at the history, the 
Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were moved and came back and moved and came back. 
So we don’t see it as land being taken from other people, it was our land. You see and this is 
exactly the problem, you see because it wasn’t neutral, it wasn’t nothing, it wasn’t an island that 
we found and now we’re fighting about it, it’s a land that has been here for thousands of years 
and everybody thinks it belongs to them. So we are pretty much.. I don’t know, I don’t like to say 
that we take it. There was a war, the UN in 48 said to countries for two people. They didn’t like 
that. They wanted to fight. And we won the fight. And they wanted to fight again. And we won 
again. And they wanted to fight again and again we won  ..  What can I tell you? I don’t see it as 
taking the land. There was a war and they lost. Sorry. I feel bad for them but…”   Female medic, 
30’s, Jewish Israeli    
B) Non-recognition-recognition 
“I remember one day that me and a paediatrician, we saw two of our female colleagues 
were there, standing in the church wondering about this place. And we approached them 
by name. And they were surprised to hear that someone was calling them by name. So 
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from time to time they know about us, and from time to time some people mention that we 
are from the village and some of them ask ‘What is your story?  Do you still have a desire 
to go back and rebuild your village?’ Some try you know, some don’t say anything. The 
most painful thing for me, is that you start telling a narrative and within a second they 
turn over to their story, to their story about being a victim and having to defend, and 
saying ‘We were expelled from Europe and we were killed and all our properties were 
taken.’ And your story is not that striking, not that prominent any more. It’s ignored. And 
this is something that happens from time to time. And it makes you feel upset’   Male, 
40’s, Palestinian Israeli 
lose your spirit. We are committed to treating people regardless of their religion, their 
background, their gender. And from time to time the patients reward you. They come and 
tell you they are given a list of specialists in Haifa and Natanya but we choose to come to 
you. Why? The majority of the cases they say ‘Because you are an advantage. We trust 
you more. You are more sensitive. You are more human. 
And Jewish people say this? 
Yes. Not the Arabs but the Jews.  
It’s real paradox. 
Yes it’s surprising. And it lifts your spirit. The fact that a patient can somehow reward 
you, it goes very highly if they are a Jew.  Male, 40’s, Palestinian Israeli 
‘I have a lot of connections and we work together with close ties. So there are senior 
doctors who are Arabs who guide me and direct me and teach me and I learn a lot from 
them. Some of the doctors here are at the same level as me and they are more like friends 
and of course because we work together we do a lot of talking, professional but also 
some personal. On Friday I’m going to a wedding, a guy I work with, he’s a Muslim, and 
he invited me and I’m going there.’   Male, 30’s, Jewish Israeli 
‘It’s defensive if we both talk of being a victim. I tried to tell a Jewish colleague (at 
medical school), that if you want to approach me as an Arab, this is not correct. I prefer 
for us to talk as human beings. And as human beings we can open the horizons … And 
because I used this argument in order to build rather than destroy, it was interesting for 
him. And once I could approach him and try to open this closed door to tell him that if 
you see me as an Arab, don’t react in the way that I might only have the dreams of Syrian 
tanks coming into Tel Aviv. And he was convinced I was genuine. And I was not 
manipulating him. And that was the whole political talk with him. Now my friend from 
Tel Aviv, we continued with this sort of relationship after we graduate.’   Male, 40’s, 
Palestinian Israeli  
C) Equality-inequality   
‘I rent a house and after five months I decided I will leave it because all of my 
neighbours are Jews and they never contact me. And I’m a doctor and a physician and 
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have children. They ignore me. They just look at me…. and I think I am one of the 
successful Arabs in Israel because most of the Arab young, the new generation, they 
don’t have the jobs that they can offer to rent a flat. I am very frustrated because I cannot 
find a place to live here ... we cannot find a place. If I want to live in the village (I came 
from) there is no place, I cannot live there I cannot buy land to build my house. If I was a 
Jew, or if I was Russian Jew from Russia, they can buy land and build a house with the 
support of the government next to my village. But I can’t. All the people who studied with 
me, the Jewish doctors, all of them now they have the houses, they build their own.  All of 
them have the gardens and a big house and lawns and they don’t have to pay back ... 
They have everything they want and it was so easy for them. I would be glad if you could 
come to see some of the villages and you would see an Arab village and you can see that 
there is no place to build any house and on the other side you can see that they are all the 
time advertising (to Jewish Israelis to buy land / properties )… The problem is not from 
between me and the other doctors, my friends. The problem is from the government. It’s 
from the laws and there are many laws that are discriminating. I have very good 
relationships with all the people I treat. All the people. All of the religions. All of the 
colours. And I am happy when I’m working here. As I said the problem of is not the 
personal problem, I don’t see in my Jewish friends as irresponsible people. And that is 
why we are optimistic. We can live and work with each other as humans without problem 
… 
I think that much of our happiness  ..  we lose it because of that. We could be much  with 
our lives with our success because, but because of the political situation .. Who can 
ignore it?  Maybe you can be happy and not think about it but most of the people can’t 
ignore it.’   Male, 40’s Palestinian Israeli 
D) Threat – security  
‘If you were here during the war you would get probably quite different views and 
opinions and even I would talk to you differently. Even me and my Arab colleague over 
the war it was very hard to communicate, because of my kid, you know, because he is in 
the army and he was fighting, I needed to reach out to my Arab colleague and write a 
message telling him that I wanted to continue to be in contact …  
…  If you were here in this war time, if you are coming here and visiting and you go 
down to the south and you see a big piece of land or whatever with civilian populations 
who are being threatened for years, day after day. We call it like rain dropping, you 
know drops, five, six, ten bombs a day. It’s been like this for years and years. No country 
in the world would ever allow this to happen. If it would happen to Britain they would kill 
10,000 of whoever is across the border. No-one will say anything because someone dared 
to drop bombs on our population. Now Israel is under you know, under a magnifying 
glass all the time because of our history, because of … now I’m not saying this just to 
justify, I’m saying that there is hard evidence that Hamas, for example, the terrorists, go 
into the population … I know because my son was just there. It’s not like if there is a war 
here, then you would see that soldiers shooting from this building and this building. No. 
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There it is a population area. You don’t draw the fire, you know, you bring them where 
the citizens are, but they do that unfortunately.  
Our leaders and their leaders, that’s the problem. Because people can connect you know. 
Mostly they want a quiet life and you know being able to provide for their families. That’s 
what people want. They should have given the keys to women and a woman who gave 
birth and she had kids. If more people went through what I went through this summer you 
should be like crazy to think about war being an option. When I heard the stories when 
he came back I called him and said 'What was the idea of all of this? …  What was it? 
Taking a life? For what? I mean it’s ridiculous, it’s ridiculous and it’s such a mess  ... 
It’s crazy and it’s crazy and it’s crazy. And I sit here and I allow, I allow this to happen 
to my kid.’   Female medic, 40’s, Jewish Israeli.     
 
9.3. Study three overview (Chapter 6) 
This study used a mix of participants as discussed  in Chapter 3. A more detailed table of their 
background is shown below, followed by the quotes taken from this cohort that made up the data 
for the study.   
 
 
9.3.1. Sample details   
New Orig. Palestinian     
01 D3  Bethlehem: UK national for 15 yrs still returns     F 40’s 
02 D4  Ramallah; refugee in Europe for three yrs M 30’s 
03 D5  Gaza: post grad in London   M 20’s 
04 D6  Gaza: post grad in London  F 20’s 
05 D7  West Bank: post grad in London  M 20’s 
06 D9  Gaza: working in London F 40’s 
07 D10 East Jerusalem: Studied in London, now working   F 40’s 
08 D11 Bethlehem: Working in UK MSc from LSE  F 20’s 
09 D12  Gaza: post grad London  M 30’s 
10 D13 East Jerusalem M 20’s 
 
Gender: 4F and 6M; Ages: 20’s x 6, 30’s x 2, 40’s x 2. Education:  All grads / 5 post grads  
Location:  WB x 4; EJ x 2; Gaza x4   
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New Orig Jewish Israeli    
01 D3 L Born and lived in Israel until 2 years ago: G F 30’s 
02 D10 L Born and lived in Israel until 1 year ago: G   M 30’s 
03 D11 L Born and lived in Israel until 1 year ago: post grad   M 30’s 
04 D16 L Born and lived in Israel, studying in L: post grad  F 20’s 
05 D17 L Born and lived in Israel, studying in L:post grad  F 20’s 
06 D1  Is Junior doctor: post grad   F 20’s 
07 D11 Is  Consultant: post grad   M 40’s 
08 D7  Is Radiographer: post grad F 40’s 
09 D8  Is Junior doc: post grad F 20’s 
10 D9  Is Senior Psychologist: post grad F 40’s 
 
Gender: 7F and 3M; Ages: 20’s x 4, 30’s x 3, 40’s x 3; Education:  All grads / 8 post grads:   
Location: London x 5 (Israeli nationals, lived and educated in Israel plus IDF) and here for 1-2 
yrs with frequent visits back home): N Israel x 5.R/W x 5, LW x5.  L=London, Is = Israel 
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Themata of exclusivity-inclusivity /  semantic barriers and bridges  
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 Thema:  EXCLUSIVITY (in relation to semantic barriers) 
 
CLOSED TO PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER  
Base theme  Quote example 
 
Organising theme 
Majority rights Look, there's the West Bank which is like a big 
prison. It’s not very nice. Or Gaza which is 
horrible. It’s the truth.  A Palestinian would say  - 
‘I can't find a job. My cousins are stuck in 
Ramallah or Gaza or whatever and I can’t move 
anywhere.  And I’m looking around and seeing all 
this prosperity and it’s not equal in any way. And 
yes, I’m being educated constantly as an Arab 
that they came in 1948 and took what was ours in 
1967 they took more.’  What do you expect? But 
on their side they do acknowledge that Israel is 
extremely strong and extremely defensive. That's 
how I see it. Having said that, why not try and get 
along together still? 
POWER 
ASYMMETRY  
Denial of 
alternative 
reality  
If you want to find alternative information you 
can, but you need to look for it, as it’s not 
obvious. You need to read a certain newspaper a 
certain journalist so people don’t and if you   do 
they say they source is probably Palestinian. So 
it’s easier for them to tell me that I am not telling 
the truth, than to face the psychological 
consequences of admitting it might be true, 
because they want to be patriotic and humanist at 
the same time. 
POWER 
ASMMETRY 
Denial of 
alternative 
reality  
If you want to find alternative information you 
can, but you need to look for it, as it’s not 
obvious. You need to read a certain newspaper a 
certain journalist so people don’t and if you   do 
they say they source is probably Palestinian. So 
it’s easier for them to tell me that I am not telling 
the truth, than to face the psychological 
consequences of admitting it might be true, 
because they want to be patriotic and humanist at 
the same time. 
POWER 
ASMMETRY 
Media 
projection 
It’s awful. It’s really bad. And there is a war and 
people are dying but it’s just not written about in 
the papers. The whole front page, and underneath 
about an Israeli soldier. It’s really sad. You  don’t 
see that 20 Palestinian people were killed. 
POWER 
ASYMMETRY   
Jewish 
identification   
‘One wants to be one common entity. It means 
that I am part of this network of people and I feel 
COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY 
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that I naturally feel a bond with people when they 
associate me with being Jewish and I associate 
them with being Jewish. It’s a cultural evenness.  
It’s just a desire to be part of something that is 
bigger than you and the feeling that you’re not 
alone. 
 
 
Special people   It is very attractive. I feel special.  I thought I'd 
hide it here in the UK but I don't. I'm very open 
about it,  I'm talking about a special culture.  
COLLECTIVE 
IDENITY  
Fear  In this conflict it’s just , it’s so easy to, to transmit 
fear to people on this level you know.  ‘Oh they 
are so scary they just want to kill you, I want to 
destroy you’. And you know we are doing it both 
ways. The Arabs do brainwashing on my kids 
when they are little telling them horrible things 
about the Jewish country, you know, mostly 
bullshit. I don’t know how we are ever going to 
get out of it.  
COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY 
Ethnic 
exclusivity  
We want the Jewish race to carry on. I want our 
children to be Jewish and our grandchildren to be 
Jewish.  If we start intermarrying with Arabs then 
that's not going to be.      
 
I was saying about the Palestinians they don’t 
have recognition as a nation that’s one thing. And 
no one wants them honestly. None of the Arab 
countries around, they see them as refugees. They 
have all the Arab countries around us, pushing 
the Palestinians into these … Because you know 
they are spread a little bit to Syria and Lebanon, 
Egypt, they would have more space to breathe but 
nobody really wants them.  
IDEOLOGY  
  
 
Loyalty For us, it is becoming frightening to be here, 
because we would be considered a traitor. Not 
everyone considers you like that but, the media is 
always present.  I can’t hear the news.  I can’t 
bear it. The few times I did, it was horrible. It’s 
completely unbalanced. Whoever is saying it, the 
way they talk. They don’t say a traitor but the way 
they talk, the music of their words, they imply you 
are a traitor. You are not patriotic 
IDEOLOGY  
Biblical 
interpretation    
I don’t think Israel thinks they took the land, the 
land was ours.. You see this is where the problems 
lie. Because if you look, and if you go and you 
look at the Bible and every document, the history, 
tells it that Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So 
we don’t see it as.. And if you look at the history, 
the Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were 
moved and  came back and moved and came back. 
So we don’t see it as land being taken from other 
IDEOLOGY 
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people, it was our land. You see and this is exactly 
the problem 
Collective 
history  
 In 1948 .. When the war erupted and they were … 
excluded, or thrown away or never mind, out of 
their houses. And they became refugees in refugee 
camps and stuff and they multiplied.  There were 
a few here, you know, few Jews, but historically 
what happened was the Jews, after what 
happened in Europe and they needed a land. Of 
course they went back to the Bible.  
IDEOLOGY 
Thema: INCLUSIVITY in relation to semantic bridges  
 
MORE OPEN TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER     
 
Base theme  Quote example 
 
Organising theme  
Victimhood  For me, I feel like the Israelis, the Jewish people 
are missing the point when they are insisting on 
calling the land as their own land and not seeing 
the Palestinian side of how they also have the 
right to the land. I think the Israelis need to 
recognise that the Palestinian’s predicament, 
that their victimhood is caused by Israel.   
RECOGNITION 
Rights of the 
Other  
I met the Palestinians as kind of, as an enemy. I 
only knew them as a soldier, as a combat 
soldier. I was a combat soldier.  When we got 
into houses into their homes we had to take 
people out from their parents. And seeing the 
children crying I just didn’t know what to do. I 
was told to do that. I thought that I was keeping 
my country safe, but when I grew up and then 
went on to meet Arab people as normal citizen 
in my work, I was shocked. When I see that they 
are just like you and me. They have their rights 
and they should have their rights, as you have 
them.  In Israel we can’t really be so backward 
…. it’s very difficult for me to see a child crying. 
So I think it’s a deep psychological issue that is 
quite personal, to see the suffering of the other.            
RECOGNITION 
Understanding 
of the other  
We need to understand that they (Palestinians) 
have a right to define themselves. They don’t 
have a land, an identity, or a nation. 
 RECOGNITION  
Inequality   You can paint whatever you want. So it has 
become much deeper and the inequality of each 
confrontation in the Occupied Territories 
has been more pronounced each time. The rate 
of those killed  -  so that in order to sustain their 
own  perception of themselves Jews see 
themselves as humanists they have to sort of 
ignore or not know a lot of things.  
RECOGNITION 
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Dictatorship vs 
democracy  
The Arabs have had their struggles and they 
were always violent against Israel, right? They 
have always been. But we are a state, we are 
democratic. We have our values of democracy, 
of rights, of free speech. There is a few 
kilometers from us we have a regime. We are 
controlling it, another nation, and we don’t give 
them their rights, no freedom of speech. Our 
husbands and sons are serving there and 
oppressing these people. But it comes back to us. 
You cannot have a democracy here and a 
dictatorship there. It doesn’t work you know. It 
just leaks inside. And slowly, slowly, each year it 
becomes worse.    
IDEOLOGY 
 
Zionism versus 
liberalism  
 And they're not going to go all the way to say 
that ok actually Zionism in itself is a problem or 
the whole structure of the state needs re 
thinking. Our identity in the state is a problem 
or you know the immigration is a problem based 
on ethnic identity is a problem. They can't touch 
all of those things because in the end if you ask 
them what are you willing to do for a Jewish 
majority, that it should be secure always .. they 
don't like those questions as its admitting to be 
racist right? That actually you're willing to do 
loads of things in order for there to be a Jewish 
majority. It’s the Jewish and democratic 
paradox thing. But they don't want that  - the 
liberals and Zionists have lived with that 
paradox. 
IDEOLOGY 
Education / 
language  
It just makes sense to grow up together because 
the language can separate us, and especially 
with children and  I’m thinking about my baby 
here that in 17 years’ time he will go to the army 
and then what?  I had a few teachers who were 
very much into human rights. To me it seemed 
obvious then, but now that I think of them, it was 
pretty special.  I’m very unusual. Most people 
wouldn’t acknowledge this and it’s difficult to 
get everything out into the open.  
CO-EXISTENCE 
Equal 
opportunities  
People should be the same in their 
opportunities. Like have equal opportunities. 
There’s no intrinsic difference between Jews and 
Arabs.  Its no more intrinsic between the 
difference between a Jew from the UK and a 
Jew from Yemen. If that can be completely 
bridged, it is different, but if that can be 
embraced then there is a chance. 
CO-EXISTENCE 
Mutual 
suffering  
The problem is you can see the suffering on both 
sides so that causes you not to say that I’m right, 
CO-EXISTENCE 
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you’re wrong. It shouldn’t be like this, that  
you’re the bad guy because you also see the 
other side having problems. So it doesn’t make 
you say the Arabs are wrong and so I’ll do this 
and to hell with you and we should have this 
land and you should be out of the land There is 
another view which says that both of us live here 
and we have to coexist somehow.  
Themata of threat – security / semantic barriers and bridges 
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Thema: THREAT in relation to semantic barriers  
 
THREAT AS A BARRIER TO CONSENSUS  
Base theme  Quote example 
 
Organising 
theme 
Ethos of conflict   If you want a true peace, even the most right wing 
person will tell you ‘Okay, I’ll sign that paper, and 
they’re not going to shoot me, they’re not going to 
bomb me, they’re going to leave me alone, that’s 
fine!’ When will we believe they will do that? And 
they say too, they say they will never stop until they 
have all the land and all the Jews are in the sea. 
They always say that. 
MISTRUST    
Institutional 
belief  
A friend is a veteran of an intelligence 
organisation and he is convinced that the 
Palestinians are not trustworthy and the bottom 
line is that they want to destroy us’   
MISTRUST 
Defined by 
enemy  
Collective identities are structured around 
opposition to the other so the way that the Jewish 
entity  .. In Europe the Jews have no choice to be 
Jews because everyone else will call them Jews 
whether they want to be or not but in the new 
country   .. we have to define ourselves by enemies 
and everyone else who doesn't think so are weak. 
COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY 
Holocaust 
memories 
There is the Jewish history and the Holocaust and 
the traumas that we carry and we are very anxious 
people and an anxious nation. 
COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY 
Need to defend  I am very open minded and left wing, but if you 
challenge me and start pushing you know, yeah my 
God I have to defend, or I will lose my security 
very easily. 
FEAR 
Motivator to 
defend  
When we have the fear inside us then you are 
looking to validate it in all kinds of examples, so it 
only takes one terrorist who goes on a tractor and 
runs some people over for people to  say ‘You 
see?’ They don’t really want us to be here. They 
are dangerous and we have to protect ourselves.     
 FEAR 
Existential fear  Because most people are being moved, moved by 
fear, or managed I would say, by fear.  Actually my 
psychological view of all humankind, all people, 
not just in this conflict. I think most people who 
come for treatment they battle with fears, deep 
deep fears. Some you know like death fears  In this 
conflict it’s just , it’s so easy to, to transmit to 
people on this level you know.  Like ‘Oh they are 
so scary they just want to kill you, I want to destroy 
you. Oh they are so scary they just want to kill you, 
I want to destroy you’. And you know we are doing 
it both ways. The Arabs do brainwashing on my 
FEAR 
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kids when they are little telling them horrible 
things about the Jewish country, you know, mostly 
bullshit. I don’t know how we are ever going to get 
out of it. 
Thema: SECURITY as both a barrier and a bridge to dialogue   
 
Base theme  Quote example 
 
Organising theme  
Defence against 
perceived 
enemy   
It stems from the fact that the Muslims want to 
wipe out Israel. And don't forget that Israel was 
founded because of what had been going on in 
Europe at the time.  The people then felt nobody 
wants us, everybody's thrown us out and killed us 
and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on 
our own.  We've got to show the world that we'll 
do whatever we want, whatever you say.    
 SURVIVAL 
Legitimate 
violence  
The Israeli Arabs are becoming more educated, 
integrated in medicine, although there were 
integrated in medicine a long time ago. But 
another aspect feels there is a judgmental side.  
So I guess there are processes that go on but  
about violence and demonstrations, violence 
becomes something that is legitimate. It’s 
legitimate. The violence that’s against 
Palestinians 
SURVIVAL 
Belonging land  I’m sure they feel the same, I’m sure without a 
doubt.  I had a friend from school who was an 
Arab, he lives in the north and we were friends, 
and we never talked about politics just friends. I 
helped him in school, we were good friends and 
he told me, we were talking after school, we were 
studying for a test together. And there was 
another guy there, his friend and he told us he 
said something and the guy said ‘You know 
because you stole land, you took my 
grandfather’s house then you live in it’ he said it 
was the notion of it, that you took our land and 
now you expect me to be okay about it. No. Of 
course I’m not.  
SURVIVAL  
Education  My personal friends, not from work, but the 
general population and where my kids go to 
school and you have to deal with that when you 
send them to school. You have to put them 
through the system that educates them differently. 
And it’s  also difficult because you know that they 
will be soldiers fighting for things that you don’t 
believe in and you know it’s very hard to control 
it because however you educate them I know that 
when most of the boys go into the army it’s hard. 
IDF COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY  
National We’re talking about a different world in the IDF. IDF COLLECTIVE 
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mission  Being a soldier is like a way of putting your 
violence somewhere. And it makes you feel 
strong, capable, as you are when you’re a 
teenager. It’s very sad also, because they can 
become violent when in a group of soldiers. But 
it’s very difficult because your friends go to the 
army, your parents went to the army, your family, 
everybody went to the army. It’s like a national 
mission or something like that. It’s very difficult. 
It’s very difficult to come to terms with.  
IDENTITY  
Power 
asymmetry 
If I were a Palestinian, if I were.. I have to really 
try to understand how it is for the other side, I’ve 
tried to imagine how it would be .. if let’s say if 
all my family … And I’m an eight-year-old girl 
and I don’t understand anything about terror and 
then someone gets into my house in the middle of 
the night to get my father or my brother or arrest 
someone. The chance of me not hating who does 
that is very very low. So I think it’s a very very 
big problem, but I don’t need to do anything.  I 
hope that the Palestinians or Israeli Arabs feel 
good about themselves and they have a good 
quality of life so there is a greater chance that 
they would like to say stop this war and they 
would have more to lose and the pain will be 
more painful to lose their house or their way of 
life, so they will think twice about terrorism or 
try more to get in touch and strive for peace. But 
I don’t see that coming. 
INTRACTABLE 
Occupation First of all I am very left-wing in my political 
views. Since I can remember I have thought that 
the occupation is the worst thing that has 
happened in Israel. And I remember, I grew up in 
a left-wing environment and we were always 
afraid as to what would happen in Israel because 
of the occupation. And everything that we feared 
has come true I think.. I am very worried about 
Israel.   
INTRACTABLE 
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Thema:  NON RECOGNITION in relation to semantic barriers  
CLOSING BOUNDARIES OF CONSENSUS  
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising 
theme  
Jewish 
victimhood 
 
Fundamentally, there is an imbalance of power. 
And Israel thinks they can get away with it. The 
party that has the project has more power and 
that’s about it. Israelis I think, by and large 
understand this, and have developed a variety of 
tools and arguments that alleviate the problems 
related to that understanding. One is  ‘the world is 
a jungle, look  at us – we have been destroyed and 
so if we don’t fight for ourselves who will fight for 
us?  Tough luck for Palestinians. Nothing can be 
done about that.’ And another one is, ‘Well nobody 
likes us any way.’  And so it’s kind of ‘Well they 
don’t like us, and they wanted us out, so we’ll kick 
them out instead. 
DENIAL 
Status quo in 
politics/ media  
But when you’re in a place where your controlled 
by everything, like in the media then you kill the 
peace process. You need to get people to 
communicate together. If we communicate more, it 
will be much easier to have peace. Life will be so 
much easier because you can try and understand 
the other point of view. And he really wants to live a 
life like you. But you become separated and it’s all 
fuelled by politics. . And if you want to fuelled with 
the agenda of the politics there s nothing else. No 
opportunities.. This is what we have been seeing in 
the last 10 years.  
.  
And I told an American Jewish visitor, that in our 
class, in this University there was a Palestinian girl 
who doesn’t even hold a passport, who doesn’t even 
hold papers, no choice whatsoever.. It’s 
uncomfortable. Imagine a Jewish person going to 
live there and then discovers the locals are being 
expelled, you don’t want to know it. I try and 
explain things like that 
DENIAL 
Stalemate  There is no one in Israel who think that they need to 
change. Why should they? There is nothing that 
forces them. Nobody uses any stick. Nobody. Why 
bother? 
DENIAL 
Physical barrier  Of course you get frustrated and to get angry. For 
example, I’ll give you a personal example. When I 
see the wall started where it started in some places, 
I really felt it.   Really. And the most thing I could 
carry in my life when it came closer to my home to 
my village. And when they started to divide things 
that used to be when I was young, like the school, 
ASYMMETRY 
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that will always the same, suddenly, its high 
buildings and you can’t see anything and its not the 
same as what it used to be when you were young. I 
used to go to my school, which is near a road to the 
settlement, but they never did any violent things 
against us. So we are living peacefully and then 
suddenly the wall comes and everything is cut and 
you feel that you have cut your past from your 
future. So what it feels like, is like pushing very 
hard into my neck. Physically it was just like that. 
It’s not daily life, and so that’s why they’re tired 
now. 
 
They built a wall around us just like there was in 
Germany and they are promoting really racist 
ideology, that they want everyone to recognise 
Israel as a Jewish only state. 
IDF military 
capability  
Like when I went to school I had to go through 
checkpoint and sometimes the Israelis would beat 
us really badly. They wouldn’t sexually harass you 
but  I remember a soldier they would say ‘Now go 
across the checkpoint naked’ even though I was 13 
years old. The journey should take no more than 15 
minutes by car but we had to go all the way around 
and we had to go long way around just to avoid the 
checkpoint, otherwise you might be stuck at it two 
hours probably 
ASYMMETRY 
Ideology as 
justification  
The Israelis always try and claim things. Like this is 
our land this is our army.  And people are 
convinced by it. It all comes from the same 
ideology, that they were the chosen people, and they 
have to protect it, the land … I feel the Israelis have 
these false ideas, because they feel insecure.  I think 
what happened to the Jews in the Holocaust was 
tragic, and I don’t know why, but they are doing 
just the same thing to us. 
ASYMMETRY 
Jewish 
exclusivity  
I told him (the Israeli guy) ‘You know, it comes 
down to recognising you as an Israeli, but I see that 
you are not even seeing me’.  I don’t understand 
why they would insist on having the whole land for 
themselves and not even seeing any claim s and 
rights for the other side. 
ASYMMETRY 
Lack of respect  They don’t understand the resentment and the 
suffering that the Palestinians have been going 
through.  
STIGMA 
Ignored  There has been no real intention for peace from the 
Israelis.  Why is that? Because since 1994 they said 
they would stop settlements and yet they are 
growing all the time.  
STIGMA 
Misunderstood  My Jewish Israeli classmates at uni didn’t know 
about Palestinian house demolitions, particularly in 
the punitive sentence as a punishment for terrorist 
activities. And they would question me and they 
would think that I was lying, that I am deluded.  I 
STIGMA 
277 
 
remember there was one Jewish guy from America I 
met at University and was now living in Israel. I 
was so trying to convince him what was really 
going on. I took him around the West Bank. And 
after one of many discussions he said to me. 
‘Finally, you know what? Maybe you’re right. 
Maybe some of what is going on is unethical. But if 
that is what has to happen for Israel to exist, so be 
it. 
 
Even though we did some projects in Bethlehem 
together and I think there were really nice,  I feel 
like this is not reality. I feel like that they don’t 
know what it’s like when you go through a 
checkpoint. They can’t do anything about it and 
they criticize their government but then they don’t 
do anything about it. Sort of like I feel like they 
might think they are pro-Palestinian but like 
nothing happens…. Most of them are liberal or left-
wing, and for them the two state solution would be 
the best option but they’re not taking our position. I 
feel like they believe in coexistence but I know 
sometimes you have to be like you have to say that, 
but for them they are sort of neutral and if they 
criticize Israel it makes them look bad. 
Oppression  And this is depriving us of our rights, of having an 
army, living in security, having the freedom to go 
back home, going out of your city, getting into your 
city. When you are there are not sure about your 
safety, the Israeli army might come to your 
property. That is a very hard thing. But I say to 
people can you imagine what it’s like living in a 
place where you don’t have your army where you 
don’t have the freedom to go where you want. 
STIGMA 
Collective 
experience  
Probably more of a collective human experience 
than many others from other nations having to live 
through. We all have similar stories. We all relate 
to each other through our struggles and lives, when 
we go in and out of Palestine, securing our 
documentation, getting habits and passports, not 
getting one, try to get visas abroad to study, to come 
to Britain.  So that is quite a collective experience 
STIGMA 
Thema:  RECOGNITION in relation to bridges   
OPENING BOUNDARIES OF CONFLICT 
Base theme  Quoted examples Organising theme 
Exploring 
justice  
I always say to Palestinians try to think beyond 
Palestine, beyond the National conflict, the 
Palestinian rights will not be met without having 
alliances with other actors. Who will give 
Palestinians rights in a free way? No-one. 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
Human rights  And because already the Palestinians don’t have INTERNATIONAL 
278 
 
the same strength to project their story and to 
claim their rights legally and to present their 
story internationally, or to present themselves as 
well as the Israelis can do. We need resources, 
contacts and networks all sorts of things. 
COMMUNITY 
End of suffering   If we all under the law we treat the same and 
have our rights. We could achieve this because 
that’s what I grew up to believe. But of course 
what has happened within the conflict . It will be 
hard to accept on both sides, for the Israelis to 
accept a Palestinian and how I can live with him 
under these conditions. I think that we have 
furthermore to forgive, live together to end our 
suffering. 
FUTURE 
IMAGINED  
Co-existence  For this conflict the only resolution that I really 
see the one state solution. This is my belief. Two 
state solution is not going to work because, it may 
give bring calm for a few years but then it will 
explode again. 
 
When the peace process from Oslo was serious 
that it would lead to a Palestinian state. I was so 
excited about having peace and live side-by-side 
with Israel as neighbours, to live in peace and to 
have coexistence and all that stuff.  Which I still 
believe in. 
FUTURE 
IMAGINED 
Accepting State I’m one of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
refugees who left throughout our history.  We 
lived in the land what is now called Israel. That’s 
Israel as a state that was established in 1948 as a 
result of a war, the Israeli Arab war. I can’t deny 
their right to live in this piece of land. All 
Palestinians recognise the state of Israel.  No-one 
talks about destroying Israel. The only problem 
we have is the Israeli state politicians who 
represent the brutal policies of controlling the 
Palestinians, not only the land, but to the right to 
live in peace, the right to have a state.’     
PALESTINIAN 
RECOGNITION 
OF STATE OF 
ISRAEL 
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Thema:  OPPRESSION in relation to semantic barriers  
Perceived as the oppressed partner in the conflict 
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising 
theme  
State Policy  There should be a reason that justifies Israel to 
continue they first of all, settlement expansion, to 
continue with the enclosure of Gaza, to continue 
with all its policies against Palestinians. What is 
the reason? What are the facts for them that justify 
them to go on with their colonial policies? 
 
Most people in Gaza have been treated as some 
sort of contagion that needs to be contained. They 
have been deprived of anything related to just 
being humans. They have been deprived of their 
rights, they have been deprived of their humanity. 
So how do you like going to make people like that 
interact with people who are supposedly normal 
who have lived in a very stable society? 
 
I feel that they are occupiers, they are oppressors 
and also lie. They are all from different countries 
and now they have more rights than me. I feel that 
they don’t belong to the country.. I do know some 
Israeli people and they are really nice but that’s 
en masse what it feels like. 
 
INJUSTUCE 
Non recognition They don’t understand the resentment and the 
suffering that the Palestinians have been going 
through. They didn’t know about Palestinian 
house demolitions, particularly in the punitive 
sentence as a punishment for terrorist activities. 
And they would question me and they would think 
that I’m lying, that I am deluded.  I remember 
there was one Jewish guy from America I met at 
University and was now living in Israel. I was so 
trying to convince him what was really going on. I 
took him around the West Bank. And after one of 
many discussions he said to me. ‘Finally, you 
know what? Maybe you’re right. Maybe some of 
what is going on is unethical. But if that is what 
has to happen for Israel to exist, so be it.’    
INJUSTUCE 
Refugee status  I have to give you this story which is really 
important. When we were in an (encounter) group 
one guy said, ‘Yes, we are Jewish, we have 
suffered in Germany and what happened with us 
make us like. And after that we had our own state 
to forgive and to continue our lives’. So he said 
the Palestinians have to do the same to forgive 
INJUSTUCE 
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and to continue. And I said ‘Wait a minute the 
refugee rights’. Because if I want to forgive, I 
can’t forgive because of the refugees. If you said 
yes that they have the right to go back to 
Palestine. There are now 5 million refugees or 
more in all the world. So I can forgive but I can’t 
forget because it’s something different. I forgive 
the pain may be that you give to me, maybe I 
forgive that you kill my brothers, my sons. But I 
can’t forgive and say no rights to the 48. The  
Palestinians who left and live in some other place. 
I can’t. That is different. 
Forced 
degradation  
‘They used to come into our house at three in the 
morning … they were knocking at the door with 
their guns looking for my cousin.  And they told us 
to leave the house because they had to search for 
him.  My father said to them in Hebrew ‘My 
children are really young, and they have to go to 
school tomorrow’. But they were just saying ‘Shut 
up and go outside’. And I think that they knew he 
wasn’t there but they still had to do it.  I was about 
14 or so then but it started when I was about nine. 
. it was really scary.  It was terrifying. I had a 
younger brother and he used to get really really 
scared that something was going to happen to him. 
 
Like when I went to school and had to go through 
checkpoint and sometimes the Israelis would beat 
us really badly. They wouldn’t sexually harass you 
but I remember a soldier they would say now go 
across the checkpoint naked even though I was 13 
years old. The journey should take no more than 
15 minutes by car but we had to go all the way 
around and we had to go long way around just to 
avoid the checkpoint, otherwise you might be stuck 
at it two hours probably. 
HUMILIATION 
Anger and 
frustration 
There is anger. It’s not religion. Religion comes 
after.  It comes as a consequence of anger.  Anger, 
vulnerability, all these things, I feel it because I 
had this experience myself. And I remember. The 
anger feels like a furnace. I remember maybe 
thirty to forty times I was humiliated at 
checkpoints.  They want to humiliate us forever … 
some people accept being humiliated to secure 
their physical survival, but not the spirit and their 
soul and their self-respect. 
HUMILIATION  
Helplessness  I try to see them as people, and many Palestinians 
do the same.  But to be honest with you, the 
conflict makes you feel terrible. You just want 
someone to make them feel what we feel.’     
LACK OF 
AGENCY 
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Stalemate  They are terrified about losing the nature of the 
Jewish state. They have words for it. Like the 
demographic threat. And they have big group 
discussions about what it means to have a Jewish 
state. And they are right you know. If everyone in 
that land. It was one person for one vote, it 
wouldn’t be Jewish anymore. And what I think is 
that the way they’re trying to do social 
engineering, it doesn’t work. You can’t force 
things. They even had in the Jerusalem master 
plan in 2000, the stated aim of what percentage of 
Palestinians they wanted in the city. And they tried 
to implement it. We have no control in anything. 
We can do nothing.  
LACK OF 
AGENCY 
Victimhood  They have all this power and they are destroying 
our lives, women and children. You want to stop 
them but you cannot do anything. You don’t accept 
what they’re doing and you really hate them 
because, I mean, they’re doing so many 
unacceptable things and that makes you think that 
we will never forget. We will never forgive them. It 
adds to the history of hatred and the conflict with 
them. 
 
I can’t personally contact the settlers who are 
aggressive. Maybe they are crazy. In my mind so 
they are so aggressive and I can’t deal with that. If 
you go to Hebron and they are super aggressive, 
somehow in that place. And they have different 
arms and weapons, guns and things. Its really 
hard. These people I have never been in touch with 
them. I have never talked them. Because I don’t 
know, they are really super super aggressive. 
LACK OF 
AGENCY 
Thema:  FREEDOM in relation to bridges   
Combating effects of oppression  
Base theme  Quoted examples 
 
Organising 
theme  
Keeping 
traditions  
‘It is so important not to lose your sense of 
nationality when Israel declared itself a state. To 
keep and protect it. The conflict makes it more 
important for us to keep our roots, to keep our 
dignity as Palestinians. 
DIGNITY 
Imagined futures   I met Jewish people and listened to them more 
closely after I came here.  You take more interest 
in you listen more carefully. You meet more 
people. So I have changed. And suppose may be, 
that it does take a long time to listen to the other 
person. And it takes both time, maturity, interest 
and understanding of the person, for whatever 
DIGNITY 
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reason, to understand and think how is this 
resolvable. And so you take an interest in what the 
other person is saying.’     
Non violent 
resistance   
‘I think to be honest I never believed that violence 
is the solution with the conflict. Even if you try and 
stop an Israeli it makes no difference because they 
will demolish a house or hurt you in some way and 
you get nothing out of it. You’re just going to 
cause more harm to yourself and your parents. 
And if you hurt someone they will come back to 
hurt your family and you will spend the rest of 
your life in jail. So I don’t think that violence is the 
solution. Even at a certain age I thought we could 
coexist, which is why I took the human rights path. 
RESISTANCE 
Loyalty ‘When I go back home there is this incredible 
paranoia about how I might be an Israeli 
collaborator.  Because I might be meeting Israelie 
and I studied Hebrew and they have some sort of 
paranoia about that’.     
RESISTANCE 
Collective history 
of violent 
resistance  
Back home, I wouldn’t speak about my opinions 
because I know how my people think. And that will 
fire back at me. The problem with extremists is 
they play with the religion to suit what they want. 
Back home in Palestine whatever I said about 
others, [about Israelis] no-one would believe me, 
but if I said ‘God said that’ and I would use a few 
words from the Koran, they all go emotional and 
therefore accept it.’       
 
There are some problems with Hamas, with 
Islamic Jihad, where they want to fight, to react 
when Israelis do something. Others live by that. 
But this is not the norm.  I want to talk about 
normal people like me, who go to work, work in a 
bank, work in social media. These people who if 
they have more chance, that trust will be a little bit 
higher and more normal.      
RESISTANCE 
Human rights We do have a right to the land, and the Jewish 
people claim they have a right to be there too. I’ve 
always chosen to stick with the international law, 
and perspective. That just defines the conflict 
within the UN resolutions, conventions and 
treaties 
NON 
RETALIATION 
International 
support  
I think basically you need some external weighty 
broker that is capable of putting pressure on Israel 
and sit down and sign a peace deal. There is no 
other way. The main barrier again I go back to the 
point that I mentioned in the beginning, that there 
is no powerful references for Israel to commit with 
these negotiations. No one can force Israel to do 
NON 
RETALIATION 
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anything if it doesn’t represent the interest of 
power, not only in Israel, but strategically also for 
the United States. And again, as long as the 
international security council and the 
international community lose their credibility, so 
no actor in the world could force Israel to meet its 
obligations towards peace.  And so Palestinians 
can either continue resistance or provide more 
and more concessions and hopefully the second 
option will not happen. But again, it seems a 
question of power.  
 
 
